Title
Ching vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 124642
Decision Date
Feb 23, 2004
A loan default led to attachment of shares; wife contested, claiming conjugal property. Supreme Court ruled shares were conjugal, not liable for husband's suretyship, reversing lower court.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 124642)

Applicable Law and Legal Instruments

Primary authorities invoked: Rule 57, Sections 1 and 14, Rules of Court (preliminary attachment and third-party remedies); Article 160 and Article 161 of the New Civil Code (conjugal partnership presumptions and liabilities) and their counterparts in the Family Code as cited by the Court; standards for certiorari under Rule 45; jurisprudential standards on third-party claims and burden of proof (cases cited by the Court include Ong v. Tating; Wong v. IAC; Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals).

Factual Background — Loans and Guaranty

PBMCI borrowed from ABC: P9,000,000 on September 26, 1978 (14% interest) evidenced by a promissory note signed by PBMCI through Executive VP Alfredo Ching. A continuing guaranty was executed on September 28, 1978 by Alfredo Ching, Emilio TaAedo and Chung Kiat Hua to guarantee PBMCI obligations up to P38,000,000. PBMCI obtained another loan of P13,000,000 on December 28, 1979 (16% interest), evidenced by a promissory note executed by PBMCI through Ching. PBMCI defaulted on its loans.

Procedural History — Attachment, SEC Rehabilitation and Levy

On August 21, 1981, ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment against PBMCI, impleading Ching and the other guarantors as co-defendants. After initial denial, the trial court granted the application on September 14, 1981, issuing a writ of preliminary attachment against properties of Alfredo Ching up to P12,612,972.82 upon posting of a bond. ABC posted the bond and the writ issued. PBMCI and Ching sought suspension of payments and rehabilitation with the SEC on April 1, 1982; SEC placed PBMCI under rehabilitation on July 9, 1982 and suspended related actions. Despite suspension as to PBMCI, the trial court directed individual defendants to file answers; on July 26, 1983 the deputy sheriff levied the attachment on 100,000 Citycorp shares registered in the name of Alfredo Ching.

Motion to Set Aside Levy — Claim of Conjugal Ownership

On November 16, 1993 Encarnacion Ching, assisted by husband Alfredo, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy, alleging the 100,000 shares were acquired during the marriage out of conjugal funds after Citycorp’s establishment in 1974 and therefore were conjugal partnership property not liable for the husband’s surety obligations. She produced their marriage contract and corporate documents showing Ching as a director and top stockholder. ABC opposed on grounds of lack of personality (she was not a party), failure to intervene, prescriptive/laches grounds, and that the motion should be a separate action.

Trial Court Orders — Quash and Return of Shares

On December 15, 1993, the trial court granted the motion and ordered the writ of preliminary attachment quashed and lifted with respect to the 100,000 Citycorp common shares registered in the name of Alfredo Ching, directing the sheriff to return the shares to the Chings. ABC’s motion for reconsideration was denied on February 17, 1994.

Court of Appeals Ruling — Certiorari Granted

ABC petitioned the Court of Appeals for certiorari, arguing the trial court exceeded jurisdiction by allowing a stranger (Encarnacion) to file the motion and by lifting the writ without basis. The CA granted the petition on November 27, 1995, set aside the RTC orders as null and void, and held that Encarnacion had no right to file the motion in the case and that the spouses’ claim was barred by laches; it also found the shares belonged to Alfredo given corporate registration and applied Wong to require proof of source of funds.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court distilled the issues to: (a) whether the petitioner-wife (Encarnacion) had the right to file a motion to quash the levy although not a party in the collection case; and (b) whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the orders quashing the attachment.

Right of a Third Person to Seek Relief from an Erroneous Levy

The Court reaffirmed that a sheriff may attach only property of the defendant; when property of a third person is levied, the aggrieved third person may invoke the court’s superior authority in the same case and request a summary hearing to determine whether the levy was erroneous and to order return if warranted (citing Ong v. Tating and related authorities). The Court therefore held Encarnacion had standing to file the motion to set aside the levy even though she was not a named party, because the motion sought summary relief against an allegedly erroneous levy on third-party property.

Presumption of Conjugal Ownership — Burden of Proof

Applying Article 160 of the New Civil Code, the Court reiterated the presumption that property acquired during marriage is conjugal partnership property, regardless of the name in which title is registered, unless overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that it pertains exclusively to one spouse. The Court found the Chings proved the shares were issued and registered to Alfredo during the couple’s marriage and that ABC failed to prove the shares were acquired with husband’s exclusive funds. Consequently, registration in the husband’s name alone was insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption of conjugal ownership.

Liability of the Conjugal Partnership for Husband’s Suretyship

On the question whether the conjugal partnership was liable for obligations contracted by the husband as surety for PBMCI, the Court relied on precedent (Ayala Investment and related cases) to hold that signing as surety is not the exercise of an industry or profession and does not, by itself, constitute contracting obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161. The conjugal partnership is liable only where debts were contracted for the benefit of the partnership or the family, or where the husband was the principal obligor receiving money or services for his business/profession. Here, ABC did not prove that the continuing guaranty produced a direct benefit to the conjugal partnership; any incidental or speculative advantage to the husband’s position or to PBMCI’s rehabilitation

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