Case Summary (G.R. No. L-50550-52)
Procedural History
A temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court (resolution dated May 23, 1979) enjoining the respondent judge from proceeding with the three criminal cases or enforcing the related warrants. The municipal judge and the private complainants opposed the petition; the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, manifested no objection to granting the requested reliefs except as to damages. The Court treated respondents’ comments as answers, gave due course to the petition, and proceeded to adjudicate the matter.
Legal Issues Presented
(1) Whether the facts alleged in the criminal complaints constituted the crime of estafa by misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code; (2) whether the municipal court of Jolo had jurisdiction to try the alleged offenses on the merits; and (3) whether the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in finding a prima facie case, issuing warrants, and attempting to try the cases.
Facts as Alleged in the Complaints
Criminal Case No. M-111: Rosalinda M. Amin alleged misappropriation of P50,000.00 by petitioners Chee Kiong Yam and Yam Yap Kieng; the complaint expressly stated the amount was received “as a loan.” A civil collection action (Civil Case No. N-5, Court of First Instance of Sulu, filed Sept. 11, 1975) likewise characterized the sum as a “simple business loan” demandable six months from July 12, 1973. Criminal Case No. M-183: Tan Chu Kao alleged misappropriation of P30,000.00 against several petitioners; the complaint described the amount as “a simple loan,” and a corresponding civil action (Civil Case No. N-8, filed Apr. 6, 1976) repeated this characterization. Criminal Case No. M-208: Augusto Sajor charged misappropriation of P20,000.00; the complaint did not expressly state the sum was a loan, but a sworn statement submitted to the respondent judge by Sajor (dated Sept. 29, 1976) declared the amount to be a “loan.”
Law on Estafa by Misappropriation (Article 315[1][b], RPC)
Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes misappropriation or conversion “to the prejudice of another” of money or personal property “received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same.” A conviction under this provision requires proof that the accused was under an obligation to deliver or return the identical money, goods, or property received.
Law on Loan (Mutuum) vs. Commodatum; Relevant Civil Code Provisions and Precedent
Under Civil Code Article 1933, a simple loan (mutuum) is the delivery of money or other consumable thing upon the condition that “the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid”; ownership of the money passes to the borrower. Article 1953 reiterates that a borrower of money acquires ownership and is bound only to pay an equal amount of the same kind and quality. By contrast, commodatum (loan for use) involves delivery of a non-consumable and the bailor retains ownership; the borrower must return the identical thing. Article 248 of the Civil Code (as referenced) governs the borrower's power to dispose of owned property. The Court also cited U.S. v. Ibanez (19 Phil. 559, 560 (1911)) for the proposition that a debtor’s mere refusal to pay or denial of indebtedness does not constitute estafa when the relationship is purely that of debtor and creditor.
Application of the Law to the Allegations
The Court found that, as alleged in the criminal complaints, supporting sworn statements, and related civil complaints, the sums involved were loans (mutuum), not commodatum or trust relationships creating an obligation to return the identical bills or coins. Because a mutuum transfers ownership of the money to the borrower, the recipient is not under an obligation to return the same money and therefore cannot be convicted for misappropriation under Article 315(1)(b) for alleged failure to return what was lawfully acquired as owner. The respondent judge misappreciated the legal distinction and treated the transactions as if they imposed a duty to return the identical money (i.e., as commodatum or trust), thereby committing a manifest error of law.
Jurisdictional Analysis
Under Section 87 of the Judiciary Act, the municipal court of a provincial capital (such as the Municipal Court of Jolo) has jurisdiction over criminal cases only when the penal
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Procedural Posture
- Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners.
- Petitioners allege respondent Municipal Judge Nabdar J. Malik acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, and with grave abuse of discretion in three criminal cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. M-111, M-183 and M-208.
- A resolution dated May 23, 1979 required respondents to comment and issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining respondent judge from proceeding with the three criminal cases or enforcing the warrants of arrest.
- Comments were filed by the respondent judge and private respondents urging dismissal of the petition; the Solicitor General manifested that the People of the Philippines do not object to the grant of the reliefs prayed for except damages.
- The Court treated comments as answers, gave due course to the petition, and proceeded to decide.
Parties
- Petitioners: Chee Kiong Yam, Ampang Mah, Anita Yam, Jose Y. C. Yam, and Richard Yam.
- Principal respondent: Hon. Nabdar J. Malik, Municipal Judge of Jolo, Sulu (Branch I).
- Other respondents: The People of the Philippines, Rosalinda Amin, Tan Chu Kao, and Lt. Col. Agosto Sajor.
- Solicitor General: manifested the People had no objection to the reliefs except as to damages.
Reliefs Sought by Petitioners
- Annulment of the municipal judge’s determination of a prima facie case in the preliminary investigations.
- Declaration that warrants of arrest issued against petitioners are void.
- Prohibition against the respondent judge from conducting trial on the merits of Criminal Cases Nos. M-111, M-183 and M-208.
- Mandamus directing dismissal of the criminal cases and recall of warrants; preliminary injunction issued by the Court and later made permanent by the decision.
Factual Background — Overview of the Three Criminal Complaints and Related Civil Actions
- Criminal Case No. M-111
- Complainant: Rosalinda M. Amin.
- Accused: Petitioners Yam Chee Kiong and Yam Yap Kieng.
- Allegation: Estafa through misappropriation of P50,000.00.
- Complaint expressly states the amount was received "as a loan."
- Related civil action: Civil Case No. N-5 filed in the Court of First Instance of Sulu on September 11, 1975, which likewise characterizes the P50,000 as a "simple business loan" that earned interest and was originally demandable six months from July 12, 1973 (Annex E).
- Criminal Case No. M-183
- Complainant: Tan Chu Kao.
- Accused: Petitioners Yam Chee Kiong, Jose Y. C. Yam, Ampang Mah, and Anita Yam, alias Yong Tay.
- Allegation: Estafa through misappropriation of P30,000.00.
- Complaint expressly states the P30,000.00 was "a simple loan."
- Related civil action: Civil Case No. N-8 filed by Tan Chu Kao on April 6, 1976 in the Court of First Instance of Sulu, which likewise alleges a simple loan (Annex D).
- Criminal Case No. M-208
- Complainant: Augusto Sajor.
- Accused: Jose Y. C. Yam, Anita Yam alias Yong Tai Mah, Chee Kiong Yam and Richard Yam.
- Allegation: Estafa through misappropriation of P20,000.00.
- The criminal complaint itself does not state the amount was a loan; however, a sworn statement dated September 29, 1976, submitted to the respondent judge to support the complaint, states the amount was a "loan" (Annex G).
Issues Presented
- Whether respondent Municipal Judge Nabdar J. Malik acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in:
- Finding a prima facie case in preliminary investigations of the three criminal complaints.
- Issuing warrants of arrest against petitioners.
- Undertaking to conduct trials on the merits of Criminal Cases Nos. M-111, M-183 and M-208.
- Whether the facts alleged in the three criminal complaints constitute the crime of estafa through misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
- Whether the Municipal Court of Jolo had jurisdiction to try the alleged offenses on the merits given the amounts involved.
- Whether damages may be recovered from the People of the Philippines or from private respondents in this certiorari, mandamus and prohibition case.
Applicable Statutory and Precedential Law as Quoted in the Source
- Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), Revised Penal Code (definition of estafa through misappropriation):
- "By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same...&qu