Case Summary (G.R. No. 133250)
Chronology of central factual events
- 20 Nov 1973: Contract between the government (Commissioner of Public Highways) and CDCP for reclamation under MCCRRP, including 50% share of reclaimed land to CDCP as consideration.
- 4 Feb 1977: PD No. 1084 creating PEA and PD No. 1085 transferring reclaimed lands under MCCRRP to PEA.
- 29 Dec 1981: Memorandum of Agreement between PEA and CDCP reorganizing responsibilities; PEA to fund future works and CDCP cedes development rights in certain reclaimed areas.
- 19 Jan 1988 / 9 Apr 1988: Special Patent No. 3517 issued in favor of PEA for MCCRRP reclaimed parcels; corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to PEA for the Freedom Islands (total ~157.841 hectares).
- 25 Apr 1995: PEA and AMARI executed a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) to develop Freedom Islands and to undertake additional reclamation (250 hectares to complete configuration), entered into by negotiation without public bidding and later confirmed by PEA Board and approved by the President.
- Subsequent renegotiations produced an Amended JVA (signed 30 Mar 1999, approved 28 May 1999 by the Office of the President), expanding the project to cover up to 750 hectares (157.84 reclaimed + 592.15 submerged areas), with AMARI to receive 70% of net usable area (367.5 hectares) and to be issued titles.
Senate investigation and conflicting evaluations
A Senate joint committee investigated and concluded, inter alia, that: (1) the involved reclaimed lands are public domain lands not classified as alienable; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are void; and (3) the JVA is illegal. The Presidential Legal Task Force subsequently reviewed the matter and concluded the JVA was legally defensible, taking a contrary position to the Senate committees.
Issues framed by the parties
The parties presented seven principal issues including: mootness by supervening events; failure to respect judicial hierarchy; non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; petitioner’s locus standi; scope of the constitutional right to information during ongoing negotiations; constitutionality of provisions in the Amended JVA transferring reclaimed and to-be-reclaimed lands to AMARI under the 1987 Constitution; and whether the Court is the proper forum to determine if the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Mootness and continued judicial review
The Court held that the signing and presidential approval of the Amended JVA did not moot the petition. Signing and approval did not eliminate the Court’s authority to prevent unconstitutional implementation or effects. The petition’s challenge—principally that the Amended JVA contravened Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution barring private corporations from alienable public lands—remained justiciable because the Amended JVA sought present transfer of title and ownership to AMARI and contemplated immediate implementation measures (including issuance of titles and mortgage rights).
Jurisdiction and hierarchy of courts
The Court refused dismissal for alleged failure to follow judicial hierarchy. It emphasized that the principle of hierarchy primarily concerns factual disputes and that constitutional questions of public importance, like those here, fall squarely within the Court’s original mandamus jurisdiction under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
The Court held the exhaustion doctrine inapplicable where a constitutional question is involved and where the agency had a positive statutory duty to disclose. Under CA No. 141 and the Government Auditing Code, PEA had duties requiring public disclosure in disposition of public lands. Because PEA allegedly failed to discharge its affirmative disclosure duties and because the issues raised were exclusively legal/constitutional, immediate judicial relief was proper.
Petitioner’s standing
The Court sustained petitioner’s standing as a taxpayer and citizen to bring the suit. When a mandamus seeks enforcement of a public right (here, the right to information and the protection of public patrimony) and is pursued by a Filipino citizen, the personal-interest requirement is satisfied. The petition implicated matters of “transcendental importance” (right to information; equitable diffusion of natural resources).
Scope of the constitutional right to information
The Court interpreted Section 7, Article III and Section 28, Article II as establishing a broad State policy of transparency. The right to information covers: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions; and (3) government research data used in policy formulation. The right extends to information on ongoing negotiations prior to contract consummation if the information pertains to a “definite proposition” by the government. The right does not, however, compel disclosure of intra-agency or pre-decisional deliberative material, nor does it extend to matters privileged by separation of powers, national security, diplomatic secrets, or other statutory confidentiality protections. Reasonable rules may be imposed to govern inspection and copying.
Regalian doctrine and historical statutory framework
The Court recited the Regalian doctrine: all lands and waters of the public domain are owned by the State. It traced the legal evolution governing reclaimed lands: Spanish Law of Waters (1866), Act No. 1654 (1907), Act No. 2874 (1919), Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936), the Civil Code provisions, and subsequent constitutional provisions (1935, 1973, 1987). Historically, government-reclaimed, foreshore, and marshy lands have been treated as sui generis and generally subject to lease rather than sale; disposition required formal classification as alienable/disposable by the proper authority and declaration that the lands were no longer needed for public service.
CA No. 141 and classification requirements
Under CA No. 141 (Sections 6–8, 58–61, 63, 67), the President (upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture/Natural Resources or DENR) must classify public lands as alienable or disposable and declare them open to disposition. Government-reclaimed lands are explicitly enumerated as disposable only by lease unless formally declared otherwise. Public bidding (oral auction to the highest bidder) is required for disposition, subject to statutory exceptions.
PD No. 1084, PD No. 1085, PD No. 3‑A, EO No. 525 and PEA’s charter role
PD No. 1084 established PEA with powers to reclaim, develop, administer, lease, and sell lands owned or managed by the government; it allowed PEA to hold lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 transferred specific reclaimed Manila Bay lands to PEA and contemplated issuance of land patents in PEA’s favor, subject to recognition of contractor rights. PD No. 3‑A limited reclamation authority to the national government or authorized contractors. EO No. 525 designated PEA as the primary agency responsible for reclamation projects on behalf of the national government, requiring presidential approval for reclamation projects and confirming PEA’s role in administration and disposition of reclaimed lands while not, by its terms alone, converting reclamation into automatic alienability.
Role of DENR and classification authority
The Revised Administrative Code vests DENR with supervisory authority over alienable and disposable public lands and exclusive jurisdiction for management, classification, surveying, and titling of public lands (including recommending proclamations classifying lands as open to disposition). Consequently, PEA generally needs DENR authorization to undertake reclamation and for classification steps that would make reclaimed lands alienable and open to disposition.
Effect of Special Patent No. 3517 and titled Freedom Islands
Special Patent No. 3517 (issued in 1988) and subsequent Torrens titles in PEA’s name covered the Freedom Islands (157.84 hectares). The Court held that PD No. 1085 and the patent, together with necessary surveys, are equivalent to an official classification and declaration that those reclaimed parcels were alienable/disposable and no longer needed for public service. Accordingly, those 157.84 hectares are alienable lands of the public domain, but their disposition remains governed by constitutional and statutory restrictions (including public bidding requirements and the constitutional ban on private corporations holding alienable public lands except by lease).
Reclaimed vs. still-submerged areas and their legal status
The Court distinguished (a) already reclaimed and patented areas (Freedom Islands: 157.84 ha) which are alienable/disposable public lands but subject to CA No. 141 and constitutional constraints, from (b) still-submerged areas (592.15 ha) which remain inalienable natural resources (waters) outside the commerce of man until actually reclaimed, surveyed, classified, and formally declared no longer needed for public service.
Limits on PEA’s power to sell to private corporations
Although PEA’s charter authorizes it to sell lands, such legislative authority cannot override the constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII: private corporations may not hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. Consequently, PEA cannot transfer ownership to a private corporation of alienable lands of the public domain even if PEA otherwise has statutory authority to sell—PEA’s ability to sell can benefit private individuals but cannot vest ownership in private corporations. Any PD, EO, or administrative act that would effectively permit a private corporation to acquire title to alienable public lands runs afoul of the 1987 Constitution.
Public bidding and COA requirements
Disposition of alienable public lands ordinarily requires public auction under CA No. 141 (Sections 63 and 67) and Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, implemented by COA Circulars. Negotiated sales are exceptional and permitted only a
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 133250)
Procedural Posture
- Original petition for mandamus filed by Frank I. Chavez (petitioner) with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to (a) compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on its then on‑going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation (AMARI) concerning reclamation portions of Manila Bay, and (b) enjoin PEA from signing or implementing any new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
- Petition filed April 27, 1998; parties filed comments and memoranda; Court gave due course in a Resolution dated March 23, 1999 and required memoranda.
- PEA and AMARI executed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA) on March 30, 1999; Office of the President approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
- Petitioner persisted in seeking judicial relief, arguing that subsequent signing and approval did not moot constitutional issues and sought declaration of the renegotiated contract null and void.
- Supreme Court, En Banc, heard and resolved issues presented and granted the petition: permanently enjoined PEA and AMARI from implementing the Amended JVA, declaring it null and void ab initio.
Relevant Factual Background (chronological)
- November 20, 1973: The government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, contracted with Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay and to construct Phases I and II of the Manila–Cavite Coastal Road; CDCP was to be compensated with 50% of the total reclaimed land.
- February 4, 1977: Presidential Decree No. 1084 (PD No. 1084) created the Public Estates Authority (PEA), tasked to reclaim land (including foreshore and submerged areas) and "to develop, improve, acquire, . . . lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."
- February 4, 1977: Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferred to PEA lands reclaimed under the Manila‑Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
- December 29, 1981: Presidential memorandum directed PEA to amend its contract with CDCP so that "All future works in MCCRRP . . . shall be funded and owned by PEA;" PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement that ceded CDCP’s participation and transferred specified reclaimed areas to PEA.
- January 19, 1988: Special Patent No. 3517 issued to PEA by President Corazon C. Aquino for parcels reclaimed under MCCRRP totaling 1,915,894 square meters.
- April 9, 1988: Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 were issued in the name of PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" (total area 1,578,441 sq.m. or 157.841 hectares).
- December 10, 1991: PEA scheduled public bidding for Freedom Islands (no bidders resulted); PEA later pursued negotiated arrangement.
- April 25, 1995: PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI (negotiated without public bidding) to develop Freedom Islands and to reclaim an additional 250 hectares to complete the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project—MCCRRP; PEA Board confirmed the JVA on April 28, 1995; President Ramos approved the JVA June 8, 1995.
- November 29, 1996: Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech denouncing the JVA; Senate Committees conducted joint investigation and produced Senate Committee Report No. 560 (September 16, 1997), concluding among other things that the lands PEA seeks to transfer are public domain lands not classified as alienable and that the JVA is illegal.
- December 5, 1997: President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force (Secretary of Justice, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, Government Corporate Counsel) to study legality of the JVA; Legal Task Force upheld the JVA’s legality.
- April 1998: Press reported on PEA–AMARI renegotiations; petitioner filed present petition April 27, 1998 asserting potential loss of billions of pesos and invoking constitutional right to information and constitutional prohibition against alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations.
- March 30, 1999: PEA and AMARI signed the Amended JVA; May 28, 1999: Office of the President approved the Amended JVA.
- Supreme Court ultimately adjudicated a set of legal issues and declared the Amended JVA null and void ab initio; PEA and AMARI permanently enjoined from implementing it.
Issues Presented to the Court
- I. Whether the principal reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events (signing and presidential approval of the Amended JVA and furnishing of a copy to petitioner).
- II. Whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the judicial hierarchy.
- III. Whether the petition merits dismissal for non‑exhaustion of administrative remedies.
- IV. Whether petitioner has locus standi to bring the suit.
- V. Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on‑going negotiations before a final agreement.
- VI. Whether the stipulations in the Amended JVA for transfer to AMARI of certain lands (reclaimed and to be reclaimed) violate the 1987 Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII) and related laws.
- VII. Whether the Court is the proper forum to raise whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Petitioner’s Principal Contentions
- Requests PEA publicly disclose terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II (State policy of full public disclosure) and Section 7, Article III (right of people to information) of the 1987 Constitution.
- Asserts constitutional violation: sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain would contravene Section 3, Article XII prohibiting sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
- Claims potential loss to the State of billions of pesos; prays the Court to enjoin execution or implementation of any renegotiated agreement and ultimately declare it null and void if unconstitutional.
Respondents’ Principal Contentions (PEA and AMARI)
- Contend the petition is moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner a copy of the signed Amended JVA (June 21, 1999) and the Amended JVA had already been signed (March 30, 1999) and approved by the President (May 28, 1999).
- Assert petitioner failed to observe judicial hierarchy and should have proceeded in lower courts or administrative channels before invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.
- Argue petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies and did not first request the information from PEA; claim mandamus is inappropriate where other adequate remedies exist.
- Maintain petitioner lacks standing and concrete injury; alternatively assert that the Amended JVA is lawful because PEA, under PD No. 1084 and PD No. 1085 (and related executive orders), holds reclaimed lands and may dispose of them; AMARI characterizes the Amended JVA as a joint venture and reimbursement, not a sale of title to a private corporation.
- Argue the right to information is limited at the pre‑decisional stage and does not extend to intra‑agency recommendations or exploratory deliberations until definite propositions are made by government.
Court’s Ruling: Preliminary (mootness) — Issue I
- Court held that the signing of the Amended JVA and its presidential approval did not moot the petition or divest the Court of jurisdiction because:
- The petition sought not only disclosure but also an injunction against entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement and, if unconstitutional, prevention of its implementation or annulment of its effects.
- Supervening events (signing/approval) cannot preclude judicial review where there is a grave constitutional question and potential irreversible transfer of public patrimony.
- The Amended JVA sought to transfer title and ownership of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas to a single private corporation; the Court found the constitutional question pressing and of first impression and appropriate for resolution notwithstanding subsequent events.
- Conclusion: Petition not rendered moot by signing or approval of Amended JVA; Court retained jurisdiction.
Court’s Ruling: Judicial Hierarchy — Issue II
- Court recognized the general principle that the hierarchy of courts pertains primarily to factual inquiries and that this Court is not a trier of facts.
- The petition raised constitutional issues of transcendental public importance that the Court could resolve without resolving disputed factual matters.
- Petition for mandamus falls within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
- Conclusion: The Court exercised primary/original jurisdiction and did not dismiss on grounds of hierarchy.
Court’s Ruling: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — Issue III
- PEA argued petitioner should have first sought information directly from PEA and that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that requires absence of a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
- Court distinguished this case from Taft (Taft v. Tuvera): where an executive agency has an affirmative statutory duty to disclose (e.g., publication), an initial demand is unnecessary. Here, PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to publicly disclose matters pertaining to disposition of reclaimed lands, especially where public bidding was required.
- The principal issue is a constitutional question (whether private corp