Case Summary (G.R. No. 113092)
Petitioner
Martin Centeno was charged under Presidential Decree No. 1564 for soliciting contributions without first securing a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). He contested applicability of the Decree to solicitations for religious purposes.
Respondent(s)
The prosecution proceeded on the complaint of Judge Angeles. The trial and intermediate appellate courts convicted Centeno (and co-accused Vicente Yco), imposing fines and, on appeal to the RTC, an increased penalty for Centeno.
Key Dates and Procedural History
- Solicitation occurred in the last quarter of 1985.
- Information filed and prosecuted in Municipal Trial Court, Malolos (Criminal Case No. 2602).
- Trial court (December 29, 1992) convicted Centeno and Yco, fined P200.00 each and recommended pardon based on good faith.
- RTC, Branch 10 (May 21, 1993) affirmed and increased Centeno’s penalty to six months imprisonment and P1,000.00 fine.
- Appeal to the Supreme Court followed; the appeal raised solely whether solicitations for religious purposes fall within the ambit of P.D. No. 1564.
Applicable Law
Primary constitutional framework: 1987 Philippine Constitution (free exercise clause and related provisions cited by the Court). Statutory/regulatory: Presidential Decree No. 1564 (amending Act No. 4075, the Solicitation Permit Law), requiring permits from DSWD regional offices for solicitations "for charitable or public welfare purposes."
Facts
Members of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay conducted a fund drive to renovate the barrio chapel. Petitioner and others solicited P1,500.00 from Judge Angeles without a DSWD permit. An information charging violation of P.D. No. 1564 was filed. The trial court convicted but recommended pardon, finding good faith. The RTC affirmed but increased penalty. Petitioner appealed on the ground that P.D. No. 1564 does not cover solicitations for religious purposes.
Issue Presented
Whether solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes (here, chapel renovation) fall within the statutory scope of "charitable or public welfare purposes" in P.D. No. 1564, thereby requiring a DSWD permit and exposing solicitors to criminal liability for lack of permit.
Statutory Text and Claim
P.D. No. 1564 mandates that any person or organization desiring to solicit or receive contributions "for charitable or public welfare purposes" must secure a permit from regional DSWD offices; permits may be issued, renewed, revoked, or disapproved at the Regional Director's discretion. Petitioner argued the statute does not explicitly include "religious purposes," invoking expressio unius and the rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused.
Statutory Construction: Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
The Court applied the maxim that explicit enumeration of certain things excludes others. It observed that various provisions in the 1987 Constitution and other statutes separately enumerate "charitable" and "religious" purposes (e.g., tax exemptions for lands used "for religious, charitable, or educational purposes"), showing that legislators and drafters treat the two terms as distinct. Because P.D. No. 1564 uses only "charitable or public welfare purposes" without mentioning religious purposes, the Court inferred that the Decree’s framers did not intend to include solicitations for religious ends.
Distinction Between Charitable and Religious Purposes
The Court acknowledged overlap—many religious activities rely on voluntary contributions and may be charitable in nature—but emphasized that "religious purpose" is not legally interchangeable with "charitable purpose." While every religious purpose may be charitable in a broad, social sense, not every charitable purpose is religious. A charitable term can be broad and admit various meanings across statutory contexts; however, when a statute is penal, the broader meanings that would expand criminal exposure should not be adopted absent clear legislative intent.
Rule of Strict Construction of Penal Statutes
Applying the settled principle that penal laws must be construed strictly against the State and favorably toward the accused, the Court held that ambiguous penal language should not be extended by implication to create offenses not clearly specified. Where a statute can reasonably be construed in a way that avoids imposing criminal liability, that construction is preferred. Consequently, the Court concluded that P.D. No. 1564 should be read narrowly and should not be extended to encompass solicitations for religious purposes absent explicit statutory language.
Constitutional Free Exercise Considerations
The Court addressed petitioner’s constitutional free exercise claim, recognizing two aspects of constitutional protection: freedom to believe (absolute) and freedom to act (subject to regulation). The Court conceded the State may, under its police power, impose reasonable regulations on conduct—including solicitation—to protect the public from fraud, protect safety, or regulate time and manner; such regulations need not be invalid merely because they incidentally affect religious practices. However, the Court emphasized that restrictions must not unduly infringe on the protected freedom. Given its conclusion that P.D. No. 1564 does not reach religious solicitation, the Court did not find it necessary to hold the Decree unconstitutional as applied here, but it reiterated that prior restraints on religious exercise would raise serious constitutional concerns.
Permissible Regulation Under Police Power
The Court acknowledged legitimate public interests in regulating solicitation—preventing fraud, protecting the public trust, and preserving safety and order. It accepted that the State may require identification or qualifications for public solicitations by strangers, and may regulate time and manner. Nonetheless, the Court found that P.D. No. 1564’s scope, as written, does not encompass solicitations purely for religious purposes, and criminal penalties under that Decree cannot therefore be applied to the facts at bar.
Court’s Analysis and Holding
Analyzing the statutory
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Facts of the Case
- In the last quarter of 1985, officers of a civic organization named Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive to renovate the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
- Petitioner Martin Centeno, chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, solicited Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, for a contribution of P1,500.00.
- It was admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
- Judge Angeles filed a complaint which gave rise to an information for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564 (the Solicitation Permit Law), charging Martin Centeno, Religio Evaristo, and Vicente Yco before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602.
Procedural History
- Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts did not constitute an offense, arguing PD No. 1564 covered solicitation for charitable or public welfare purposes but not solicitations for religious purposes (construction/renovation of a chapel). The MTC denied the motion to quash and denied reconsideration.
- Trial on the merits ensued. On December 29, 1992, the MTC rendered judgment finding Vicente Yco and Martin Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced each to pay a fine of P200.00, but recommended executive clemency on the basis of good faith.
- Both accused appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Branch 10; Vicente Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, leaving the appeal to proceed only as to petitioner Centeno.
- On May 21, 1993, respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos of the RTC affirmed the lower court’s decision but modified the penalty, sentencing petitioner to imprisonment of six months and a fine of P1,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, purportedly due to the “perversity” of the act which caused damage and prejudice to the complainant.
- The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
- The sole issue brought to the Supreme Court was whether solicitations for religious purposes fall within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
Statutory Provision Quoted (Presidential Decree No. 1564 — Section 2)
- The Court recited Section 2 of PD No. 1564 (amending Act No. 4075, the Solicitation Permit Law):
- “Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development...”
- The Regional Director may issue a permanent or temporary permit, disapprove the application, renew or revoke any permit in the interest of the public, all in his discretion.
- The Court framed the main legal question as whether the phrase “charitable purposes” in the statute should be construed broadly to include religious purposes.
Issue Presented
- Whether solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes (specifically for the renovation of a chapel) are within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, which requires a permit for solicitations “for charitable or public welfare purposes.”
Holding
- The Supreme Court held that solicitations for religious purposes are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564; therefore, petitioner Martin Centeno could not be held criminally liable under that decree for soliciting funds for the chapel renovation.
- The decision of the RTC was reversed and set aside, petitioner Martin Centeno was acquitted of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
Reasoning — Statutory Construction (Part I)
- The Court applied the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius: where a statute expressly limits itself to certain matters, it may not be extended by interpretation to include others not mentioned.
- The Court observed that the 1987 Constitution and several statutes treat the words “charitable” and “religious” separately and independently (for example, Section 28(3), Article VI of the Constitution regarding tax exemptions for lands and buildings “used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes”).
- The Court cited other statutory contexts where “charitable” and “religious” are dissociated and individually mentioned (e.g., Sections 26(e) and 28(8)(E) of the National Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 of the Corporation Code; Section 234(b) of the Local Government Code), and reasoned that since PD No. 1564 only said “charitable or public welfare purposes,” the framers did not intend to include solicitations for religious purposes.
- The Court acknowledged that all contributions to advance church work are charitable in a broad sense because religious activities often depend on voluntary contributions, but insisted that “religious purpose” is not interchangeable with “charitable purpose” in the legal sense.
- The Court emphasized the distinction: while there is no religious purpose that is not also charitable in some sense, the converse is not true—there are charitable