Title
Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 120363
Decision Date
Sep 5, 1997
Cecilleville Realty sued Herminigildo Pascual for occupying land claimed under his mother’s tenancy. Courts ruled only the tenant, not household members, has rights to a home lot, ordering Pascual to vacate.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 120363)

Procedural History

Petitioner instituted an ejectment action in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) after Herminigildo refused to vacate. On September 17, 1992, the MTC ordered Herminigildo to vacate and awarded petitioner attorney’s fees (P10,000) and damages of P500 monthly from filing. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) set aside the MTC decision and remanded the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for further adjudication, reasoning that the tenancy relationship between Ana Pascual and petitioner had to be determined and that the son’s presence might be incident to the tenant’s rights. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the DARAB’s determination that a tenancy relationship existed and that Herminigildo—an immediate farm household member—was entitled to protection and could not be treated as a common squatter; the CA therefore dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner sought review before the Supreme Court.

Issue Presented

Whether a member of a tenant’s immediate farm household (Herminigildo), who assists the tenant in cultivation but is not the tenant, is entitled under Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by R.A. No. 2263, to demand and maintain a separate home lot and construct and occupy his own house within the landholding.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Framework

Primary statutory provisions relied upon in the decision are Republic Act No. 1199 (as amended by R.A. No. 2263) — particularly Section 5(a) (definition of “tenant” and “immediate farm household”), Section 22(3) (right of the tenant to demand a home lot), and Section 2 (purpose of the Act). The decision was rendered in 1998 and therefore is applied under the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

Statutory Interpretation Adopted by the Court

The Court applied the plain-meaning rule: the statute’s language is clear that the right to demand a home lot is vested in “the tenant.” Section 22(3) expressly confines the home-lot right to the tenant and prescribes a maximum area (not more than 3% of the landholding, up to 1,000 square meters) and conditions governing removal of the tenant’s dwelling. Because Herminigildo did not claim to be the tenant and admitted he was an immediate household member assisting his mother, the Court found the statutory grant of a home lot did not extend to him.

Policy Considerations and Legislative Purpose

The Court emphasized the Act’s declared purpose to establish equitable agricultural tenancy relations and to protect the rights of both tenants and landholders. It reasoned that permitting every member of an immediate farm household to claim a separate home lot (up to 1,000 sq. m. each) would convert productive farmland into residential clusters, frustrate equitable division of produce and income, and undermine efficient agricultural production—outcomes contrary to the statutory objectives. The Court also noted that Ana Pascual already had an existing home lot and house available for Herminigildo’s incidental use while attending to agricultural labor.

Facts Pertaining to the Occupation and Use

The Court observed that Herminigildo constructed a concrete house on petitioner’s small parcel without petitioner’s permission, thereby appropriating property use from the landholder without compensation. The Court found this conduct not merely incidental to tenancy-assistance, particularly given the tenant-mother’s available home and house and her infirmity that would reasonably require her children’s assistance.

Legal Conclusions and Reasoning on Protection of Parties

The Court concluded that assistance by immediate household members to the tenant in cultivation is protected insofar as it secures the tenant’s ability to farm, but that protection does not extend to conferring the tenant’s statutory privilege to demand and occupy a separate home lot. The Court reiterated that the

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