Title
City of Cebu, City Council of the City of Cebu, Cebu City Treasurer, Cebu City Auditor and Mario Ortiz vs. Jose Mendoza and Efren Arnejo
Case
G.R. No. L-26321
Decision Date
Feb 25, 1975
Appeal dismissal affirmed: Second reconsideration motion, reiterating old grounds, can't extend appeal period.
appeal
motion for reconsideration
damages
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-26321)

Factual Background Leading to the Trial Court Decision

The Court of First Instance, acting through Judge Jose M. Mendoza, rendered its decision dated September 10, 1965. It declared that Arnejo’s removal as Assistant Chief of Police was void and ordered his reinstatement with the “right to receive the corresponding salaries from the time of his removal up to the actual reinstatement.” It further ordered payment of P5,000 as exemplary damages, P500 as attorney’s fees, and costs. The decision was served on the respondents (now petitioners) on October 18, 1965.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on October 23, 1965, and the trial judge denied it in an order dated November 26, 1965. Service of that denial order occurred on different dates: Ortiz allegedly received it on December 9, 1965 in Bacolod City, while the City Fiscal received it for the other respondents through their counsel on December 16, 1965. A second set of motions for reconsideration then followed. On December 14, 1965, Ortiz filed a “Second Motion for Reconsideration or Motion for Leave to Amend Answer of Defendant Ortiz and/or for Extension of Time to Perfect Appeal.” On December 18, 1965, the other respondents filed a second motion for reconsideration adopting Ortiz’s motion. Arnejo opposed both, arguing that the motions were not based on grounds available when the first motion had been filed. On January 5, 1966, Judge Mendoza denied these second motions for lack of sufficient merits. The denial order was served on the City Fiscal on January 7, 1966 and a copy for Ortiz was served on January 10, 1966.

On January 14, 1966, all respondents filed a notice of appeal signed by an Assistant City Fiscal, and on January 15, 1966 they filed a record on appeal and deposited a cash appeal bond of one hundred twenty pesos.

The Trial Court’s Dismissal of the Appeal

On February 4, 1966, Arnejo moved to dismiss the appeal, contending it was not perfected within the reglementary period because the motions for reconsideration were pro forma and therefore did not interrupt the period to appeal. Judge Mendoza, in an order dated February 18, 1966, dismissed the appeal and held that the judgment had become final and executory. The judge characterized the first motion for reconsideration as pro forma because it merely restated Ortiz’s memorandum. The judge similarly treated the second motions for reconsideration as pro forma because they sought reconsideration of the order denying the first motion rather than reconsideration of the judgment itself. A petition for relief from the dismissal of the appeal was later denied.

Petitioners’ Mandamus and Certiorari in the Supreme Court

On July 22, 1966, the respondents in Civil Case No. R-8612, now petitioners (with the exception of Osmena, Jr.), filed mandamus and certiorari to compel the Court of First Instance to give due course to their appeal. This Court required Arnejo and Judge Mendoza to answer and issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining execution of the trial court judgment in Civil Case No. R-8612.

During the Supreme Court proceedings, Arnejo maintained that the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary “fifteen-day” period, and this contention was reiterated in the memorandum. Petitioners did not file any memorandum. The Court later directed the parties to manifest whether the case had become moot, and although Arnejo stated that it had not, the petitioners expressed difficulty withdrawing because of the award for damages.

The dispositive factual and legal hinge ultimately became whether petitioners had seasonably perfected their appeal under the procedural rules governing appeals from judgments in mandamus cases.

The Voting Split and the Court’s Ultimate Focus

The case proceeded to resolution after the Court ordered the parties to file simultaneous memoranda limited to the legal issues involved in the appeal. After further deliberation, a majority vote that included Chief Justice Makalintal and Justices Castro, Teehankee, Munoz Palma, and Aquino supported dismissal of the petition.

The decisive majority position was that petitioners could have perfected their appeal by filing a notice of appeal and appeal bond within the thirty-day period and that the trial court erred in assuming that, in a mandamus case, the appeal should be perfected within the former fifteen-day period. The majority reasoned that the fifteen-day phrase present in the old rule had been deleted, and therefore mandamus, certiorari, quo warranto, prohibition, and employers’ liability cases had to be perfected like ordinary actions within the thirty-day period fixed under Section 3 of Rule 41 (as interpreted in Enciso vs. Remo, L-23670, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 580, 588). The timeliness issue then shifted to whether petitioners’ motions for reconsideration had interrupted the thirty-day period.

The Majority’s Legal Reasoning on Pro Forma Motions and the Second Motions’ Effect

The majority addressed the trial court’s characterization of petitioners’ motions as pro forma. It explained that the grounds for a motion for new trial are enumerated in Section 1, Rule 37, and it noted that a motion for reconsideration is treated as a motion for new trial only insofar as it rests on those grounds. It then held that petitioners’ motions were not pro forma. Although petitioners’ motions and supplemental arguments did not expressly cite the technical headings of the rule, the majority found that their attacks were, on the face of their motions, based on grounds corresponding to Section 1(c), Rule 37, namely that excessive damages were awarded and that the decision was contrary to law and the evidence. Under Alvero vs. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 435, a pro forma motion is one that fails to specify the findings or conclusions not supported by evidence or contrary to law with express reference to pertinent evidence or legal provisions; the majority concluded petitioners had indeed specified the erroneous conclusions and challenged the decision’s legality, including the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

The majority further held that the trial court itself recognized that the motions raised at least one significant issue—whether Arnejo’s appointment as Assistant Chief of Police was “good only up to the close of session of Congress in 1960”—which demonstrated that the motions were not merely a rehash of Ortiz’s earlier memorandum.

However, even with this correction against the trial court’s view of the first motions, the majority still dismissed the appeal based on the effect of the second motions. While the first motions for reconsideration (treated as motions for new trial in substance) interrupted the thirty-day period, the majority held that petitioners were not invariably entitled to file second motions that would again suspend the remaining reglementary period. It relied on Section 4, Rule 37, which states that a first motion must include all grounds available and that omitted grounds are deemed waived. It further provides that a second motion for new trial may be filed only if based on a ground that did not exist nor was available when the first motion was made, and it excludes from the computation the time during which the first motion had been pending. The majority characterized the purpose of the rule as preventing interminable litigation through repetitive motions.

Under the Court’s jurisprudence cited in the decision, a second motion for new trial or reconsideration will not interrupt the period for appeal if it merely reiterates the first motion or is founded on a ground available when the first motion was filed. Applying this, the majority held that Ortiz’s second motion asked for reconsideration of the order denying the first motion, and the other petitioners’ second motion sought reconsideration of the same denial order and the dismissal of Arnejo’s mandamus petition. The majority found it “incontrovertible” that these second motions were not based on a ground not existing or not available at the time the first motions were filed; they invoked the same grounds already ventilated in the first motions.

Consequently, petitioners’ second motions for reconsideration did not interrupt the remaining period for perfecting the appeal. The majority computed the deadlines based on the date of service of the order denying the first motion for reconsideration and concluded that Ortiz could have perfected his appeal by December 26, 1965, while the other respondents could have perfected their appeal by January 10, 1966. Because notice of appeal was filed only on January 14, 1966 (and the bond deposited on January 15, 1966), the majority held the appeal was not perfected on time and cited Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 74 Phil. 235.

Disposition of the Main Opinion

The Court concluded that the required majority for granting the petition could not be secured. Pursuant to Section 11, Rule 56, Rules of Court, it dismissed the petition. It imposed no costs.

The Dissent and the Concurring Views on Procedural Fairness and Enforceability

Justice Antonio dissented and relie

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