Title
Cayao-Lasam vs. Spouses Ramolete
Case
G.R. No. 159132
Decision Date
Dec 18, 2008
A pregnant woman underwent a D&C procedure after vaginal bleeding; complications arose due to an undetected ectopic pregnancy. The Supreme Court exonerated the doctor, ruling no negligence and attributing injury to the patient's failure to follow up.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 159132)

Pertinent Dates and Applicable Law

Critical dates: initial admission July 28, 1994; D&C performed July 30, 1994; second admission and laparotomy September 16, 1994; complaint filed November 7, 1994; Board of Medicine decision March 4, 1999; PRC decision November 22, 2000; Court of Appeals decision July 4, 2003; Supreme Court decision (reviewed) December 18, 2008. Applicable law and rules relied upon in the decision: 1987 Philippine Constitution (due process), Republic Act No. 2382 (Medical Act of 1959, Section 26), Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals (Art. IV, Sec. 35, later amended), PRC Res. No. 06‑342(A) (2006 Rules of Procedure), Rules of Court (Rule 43 and Rule 65), and civil law standards for quasi‑delict (Articles 2176, 2179 of the Civil Code).

Procedural Posture

Respondents filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice before the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC). The Board of Medicine initially exonerated petitioner. Respondents appealed to the PRC, which reversed the Board and revoked petitioner’s license. Petitioner sought judicial relief: first to the Court of Appeals (which dismissed the petition on procedural grounds), then to the Supreme Court by Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari.

Core Facts of the Medical Events

On July 28, 1994 Editha was admitted for vaginal bleeding; sonogram showed weak fetal cardiac pulsation and later no fetal movement. Petitioner, after telephone coordination and hospital admission, conducted internal examinations on July 29 and July 30, 1994, found an open cervix and advised D&C because of persistent, profuse bleeding and expulsion by the patient of "meaty mass" and clots. D&C was performed July 30, 1994; patient discharged July 31 with instructions to return for follow‑up on August 4 (or August 5 as advised). Editha did not return. On September 16, 1994 she presented with severe abdominal pain and vomiting; laparotomy revealed massive intra‑abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus due to an ectopic interstitial (cornual) placenta increta, necessitating hysterectomy.

Allegations Against Petitioner

Respondents alleged that petitioner committed gross negligence and professional incompetence by: (1) failing to check, visit, or administer medication on the first day of confinement; (2) recommending D&C without an internal examination; (3) immediately suggesting D&C instead of monitoring the pregnancy; and (4) failing to remove the fetus during D&C, which respondents claimed caused the later rupture and need for hysterectomy.

Petitioner’s Answer and Defenses

Petitioner denied negligence and asserted she: arranged admission and telephone orders before patient arrival; visited during rounds; performed internal examinations on July 29 and 30 and found an open cervix; repeatedly advised D&C only because of profuse bleeding and the patient’s symptoms; observed no abortus in the operating room and relied on the patient’s description of expelled material; discharged the patient only with instruction to return for follow‑up; and maintained that the underlying pathology was an abnormal ectopic placental implantation (placenta increta/ectopic interstitial) that would have ruptured irrespective of the D&C.

Board of Medicine Findings

The Board found the case to be an ectopic interstitial pregnancy (a rare form protected by uterine musculature) and concluded the D&C could not have reached or removed an ectopic pregnancy located outside the uterine cavity; curettage is intrauterine and cannot remove an ectopic gestation. The Board therefore exonerated petitioner, explaining that obstetricians reasonably assume intrauterine pregnancy unless sonologist specifies otherwise, and that the D&C was necessary to control profuse bleeding.

PRC Decision Revoking License

On appeal, the PRC reversed the Board of Medicine and revoked petitioner’s license to practice medicine. The PRC decision became the subject of judicial proceedings.

Court of Appeals Ruling and Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that the petition for review (Rule 43) filed by petitioner in the CA was an improper remedy because Rule 43 enumerates quasi‑judicial agencies whose decisions may be reviewed and the PRC was not expressly listed; the CA treated the petition as improperly filed. The CA further held that if treated as certiorari under Rule 65, the petition was premature or improper because Section 26 of R.A. No. 2382 provided a plain, speedy and adequate remedy — appeal to the Office of the President — and thus certiorari was not the correct recourse.

Supreme Court Issues Presented

Petitioner raised procedural and substantive errors: (1) whether PRC decisions fall under Rule 43 appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals; (2) whether the PRC improperly entertained an appeal by complainants; (3) whether the CA committed grave abuse by dismissing the petition without addressing merits; (4) whether PRC violated petitioner’s due process by accepting and deciding the memorandum on appeal without proof of service; (5) whether PRC’s revocation lacked expert support and disregarded Board findings; and (6) whether PRC made factual conclusions contrary to the record.

Jurisdictional and Procedural Analysis by the Court

The Supreme Court concluded: (a) double jeopardy does not apply to administrative proceedings, so Section 26’s appeal provisions do not implicate constitutional double jeopardy rights; (b) the prior limitation that only respondents may appeal Board decisions was amended—Art. IV, Sec. 35 (as amended) and later PRC procedural rules expressly allow either complainant or respondent, or “a party aggrieved,” to appeal to the PRC; (c) Rule 43’s enumeration of quasi‑judicial agencies is illustrative, not exhaustive; B.P. Blg. 129 and subsequent jurisprudence confer appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over PRC decisions; therefore the CA was incorrect to dismiss on the sole ground that PRC was not enumerated in Rule 43.

Substantive Standard for Medical Malpractice and Expert Testimony

The Court recited the governing standards: medical malpractice is negligence requiring proof of duty, breach, injury and proximate causation; the physician‑patient relationship establishes the duty of reasonable care; determinations of standard of care and causation in medical malpractice cases ordinarily require expert testimony because causation and standards are scientific questions beyond lay competence.

Expert Testimony and Court’s Evaluation

Respondents presented no expert witness to support their theory that the D&C caused the rupture; petitioner presented expert testimony from Dr. Augusto M. Manalo (qualified obstetrician‑gynecologist). Dr. Manalo diagnosed a ruptured ectopic interstitial (cornual) pregnancy and testified that (1) D&C instruments could not reach an interstitial ectopic site and thus could not have caused the rupture; and (2) if D&C were causative the rupture would have occurred much earlier, not one and a half months later. He also testified regarding customary practice (inspection of scanty curettings, telephone ord

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