Case Summary (G.R. No. 11524)
Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman on May 31, 2000 with Malversation of Public Funds in the amount of P556,681.53. She pleaded not guilty on February 16, 2001. On August 31, 2001 she filed a Motion to Quash alleging lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the Information, asserting that the Information did not allege her salary grade, a material fact upon which jurisdiction over the person and forum allegedly depends. The RTC denied the Motion to Quash (Order dated September 7, 2001) on grounds that jurisdiction depended on the penalty imposable, not salary grade, and that the Ombudsman had prosecutorial authority as recognized by the Supreme Court’s March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy v. Sandiganbayan (which set aside an earlier August 9, 1999 decision). The RTC also held that the Motion to Quash was improperly filed after a plea. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied (December 18, 2001); a certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals was dismissed; subsequent motion for reconsideration before the CA was denied, leading to the present Supreme Court petition.
Issues Presented
- Whether, as of May 31, 2000 when the Information was filed, the Ombudsman had the authority to file and prosecute the case in light of the Supreme Court’s August 9, 1999 decision in Uy v. Sandiganbayan which limited the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial power to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. 2) Whether the Supreme Court’s March 20, 2001 clarificatory Resolution in Uy can be applied to petitioner’s case without violating the constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws and on denial of due process.
Petitioner’s Argument
Petitioner argued that between August 9, 1999 (the Uy decision) and March 20, 2001 (the Court’s resolution setting that decision aside), prevailing jurisprudence denied the Ombudsman prosecutorial authority over cases cognizable by regular courts (RTC). Because the Ombudsman conducted investigation and prosecution beginning April 26, 2000, petitioner contends the August 9, 1999 decision controlled at that time, rendering the Ombudsman’s investigation and the resulting Information void. She further contended that applying the March 20, 2001 Resolution retroactively would be constitutionally impermissible as an ex post facto application and a denial of due process.
Court’s Analysis of Precedent and the Ombudsman’s Authority
The Court reviewed prior controlling jurisprudence, particularly Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc and Office of the Ombudsman v. Breva. In Enoc the Court set aside an RTC dismissal based on the earlier Uy decision and held that the Ombudsman’s powers to investigate and prosecute are plenary and unqualified, extending to acts or omissions of public officers that appear illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, without limitation to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The Court emphasized that the statutory references in RA 6770 to primary jurisdiction over Sandiganbayan cases and to the Special Prosecutor’s limited role do not confine the Ombudsman’s broader investigatory and prosecutorial authority. Enoc and Breva establish that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy recognized that the Ombudsman may investigate and prosecute cases cognizable by the regular courts and that this recognition validly applies to cases filed or pending when the August 9, 1999 decision was operative.
Analysis on Retroactivity, Ex Post Facto and Due Process Concerns
The Court rejected petitioner’s ex post facto and due process arguments. It explained that a judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law from the statute’s original enactment and does not, in that respect, create a new law. The Court distinguished situations where a judicial ruling invalidates a law or abandons a long-standing doctrine—circumstances in which prospective application may be required—from the present case, where the March 20, 2001 Resolution corrected an ea
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Case Caption, Procedural Posture, and Disposition
- Jurisdiction and docket: Third Division of the Supreme Court; G.R. No. 163586; Decision promulgated January 27, 2009 (Austria‑Martinez, J.).
- Nature of the proceeding: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Sharon Castro to assail:
- The July 22, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed CA‑G.R. SP No. 69350; and
- The March 26, 2004 Resolution of the CA which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
- Final disposition by the Supreme Court: Petition dismissed for lack of merit; no costs. The second issue was declared moot and academic.
Parties and Roles
- Petitioner: Sharon Castro — Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras (public officer, accused).
- Respondents:
- Hon. Merlin Deloria, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras;
- Commission on Audit (COA) – Region VI, represented by its Director;
- Court of Appeals (respondent in certiorari).
- Other actors in the record: Ombudsman (as the prosecuting/investigating authority) and intervening or cited courts (RTC, CA, Supreme Court).
Facts as Alleged in the Information
- Date and offense charged:
- On or about August 17, 1998, and for some time prior thereto, in Buenavista, Guimaras, petitioner, a public officer (Revenue Officer I), was alleged to have custody and possession of public funds amounting to P556,681.53 representing collections and other accountabilities.
- The Information charged petitioner with Malversation of Public Funds for willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously appropriating, taking, misappropriating, embezzling and converting to her own use said funds, and failing to account for them despite notice and demand, to the damage and prejudice of the Government. Charge concluded with the phrase "CONTRARY TO LAW."
- Petitioner’s initial plea and actions:
- Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY at arraignment on February 16, 2001.
Motions and Rulings in the Trial Court (RTC)
- Motion to Quash:
- Filed by petitioner on August 31, 2001, raising: lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation and to file the Information.
- Argument included that the Information failed to allege petitioner's salary grade, a material fact upon which RTC jurisdiction depends under petitioner’s theory, and relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 180214, August 9, 1999) to contend that as a public employee with salary grade 27 the matter was cognizable only by the RTC and could be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, not the Ombudsman.
- RTC rulings:
- RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order dated September 7, 2001, holding:
- Jurisdiction of the RTC over the case depended on the penalty imposable for the offense charged, not on the salary grade of the accused.
- The Ombudsman had prosecutorial authority in the case; the RTC relied on the fact that, upon motion for clarification in Uy, the Supreme Court set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and issued a March 20, 2001 Resolution recognizing the Ombudsman's prosecutorial and investigatory authority in cases cognizable by the RTC.
- The Motion to Quash was procedurally infirm for being filed after petitioner had pleaded not guilty, contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117.
- Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 18, 2001.
- RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order dated September 7, 2001, holding:
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals challenging the RTC orders.
- The CA dismissed the petition in the Decision under review (July 22, 2003), and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration by Resolution dated March 26, 2004.
Issues Raised in the Supreme Court Petition
- The petition to the Supreme Court confined the issues to:
- Whether, as of May 31, 2000 (when the Information for Malversation was instituted against petitioner), the Ombudsman had the authority to file the Information in light of the Supreme Court’s August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy v. Sandiganbayan, which had declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman were limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
- Whether the March 20, 2001 clarificatory Resolution in Uy v. Sandiganbayan could be applied retroactively to petitioner without violating the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws and without denying the accused due process.
Petitioner’s Principal Contentions
- From promulgation of the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy until the March 20, 2001 Resolution, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC.
- Because the Ombudsman’s investigation and prosecution of petitioner commenced on April 26, 2000, the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy governed and the Ombudsman lacked authority at that time.
- Consequently, the Information filed against petitioner was void as the Ombudsman then had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over such cases.
- Petitioner further argued that application of the March 20, 2001 Resolution to her case would have retroactive effect amounting to an ex post facto law and would deprive her of due process.
Relevant Precedents and Authorities Cited by the Court
- Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180214, August 9, 1999, 312 SCRA 77 — the decision earlier interpreted to limit Ombudsman prosecutorial powe