Case Summary (G.R. No. 252578)
Factual Antecedents
Lea married Bautista on 25 May 1972. She later married Renato on 6 January 1979. Renato filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on 28 May 2001, alleging that Lea’s marriage to him was void because she had a subsisting marriage to Bautista (bigamy) and alleging psychological incapacity (the CA observed petitioner did not pursue psychological incapacity in the RTC). Lea opposed and asserted among other defenses that her first marriage to Bautista was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license and improper solemnizing officer; she later filed an action seeking a declaration that the Bautista marriage was void, and the RTC of Parañaque declared that first marriage null and void on 22 January 2003, a decision later certified final and executory.
Procedural History
At the RTC in Quezon City, respondent moved a demurrer to evidence (12 August 2004), which was denied (8 March 2005). The RTC, in a decision dated 23 March 2007, declared the marriage between Renato and Lea null and void ab initio for bigamy under Article 41 of the Family Code (as applied by the RTC to the facts). Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed on 20 April 2009, holding the marriage valid. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration at the CA was denied (16 September 2009). Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, which denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision.
Issue Presented
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that Lea’s second marriage to Renato was valid despite the later judicial declaration that her first marriage to Bautista was void, i.e., whether a prior marriage that is void ab initio under the Civil Code can render a subsequent marriage valid without a prior judicial declaration of nullity.
Applicable Law and Legal Framework
Because both marriages were contracted before the Family Code’s effectivity on 3 August 1988 and the parties’ children were born while the Civil Code governed family relations, the Supreme Court applied the Civil Code provisions concerning void and voidable marriages (Arts. 80–83, 85–86 as cited). The Court contrasted void marriages and voidable marriages under the Civil Code, emphasizing five key differences: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent from the beginning while a voidable marriage is valid until annulled; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified but a voidable marriage can be by continued cohabitation; (3) a void marriage may be collaterally attacked whereas a voidable marriage may not; (4) offspring in a void marriage are treated as natural for fiction purposes, while offspring in a voidable marriage conceived before annulment are legitimate; and (5) under the Civil Code no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage, whereas a judicial decree is required for a voidable marriage.
Relevant Precedent on Necessity of Judicial Declaration
The Court relied on longstanding Civil Code jurisprudence (People v. Mendoza; People v. Aragon; Odayat v. Amante) holding that the Civil Code contains no express requirement for a judicial declaration to establish the invalidity of a void marriage, so a subsequent marriage entered into while the prior marriage was still validly subsisting may be null (bigamous), and conversely a later marriage may be valid if the prior marriage was void ab initio. The Supreme Court also acknowledged the legislative change effected by the Family Code (Article 40) requiring a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void to invoke absolute nullity for purposes of remarriage for marriages celebrated after the Family Code’s effectivity. The Court cited Domingo v. Court of Appeals to explain the Family Code’s policy rationale — the institutional protection of marriage requires an official state pronouncement to confirm nullity where the Family Code applies. The Court further noted that Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals carve out that the Family Code’s judicial-decree requirement does not apply retroactively to marriages celebrated before its effectivity, especially where children were born under the Civil Code.
Analysis and Application to the Present Case
The Supreme Court applied the Civil Code to the marriages at issue because both marriages and the births of the children occurred before the Family Code’s effectivity. Under the Civil Code, Lea’s 1972 marriage to Bautista — declared void by the RTC of Parañaque for la
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 252578)
Procedural Posture
- This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed before the Supreme Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 20 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 and the CA Resolution dated 16 September 2009 that denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
- The CA had reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City, Branch 84 Decision dated 23 March 2007, which had declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
- The sole issue presented for resolution by the Supreme Court was whether the CA correctly held that respondent was not prevented from contracting the second marriage because her first marriage was an absolute nullity and that she need not await a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage where the Civil Code governed.
Factual Background
- On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista).
- On 6 January 1979, respondent Lea married petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato) at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila.
- On 28 May 2001, petitioner Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage seeking a declaration that his marriage to Lea was void due to: (a) respondent’s alleged subsisting marriage to Bautista, and (b) psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA found that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC; the reason for that finding was described by the CA as unclear but irrelevant to the present Petition.
- Respondent opposed the nullity petition and contended, inter alia, that her first marriage to Bautista was null and void for lack of a marriage license and because the solemnizing officer did not belong to the denomination of the parties.
- On 3 January 2002, respondent filed a separate action to declare her first marriage to Bautista void. On 22 January 2003, the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered a Decision declaring that Lea’s first marriage to Bautista was null and void ab initio. The same court issued a Certificate of Finality stating that the 22 January 2003 Decision had become final and executory.
- On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence in the RTC nullity petition before Renato’s case, claiming petitioner’s proof was insufficient to warrant nullity on the ground of bigamy. Petitioner opposed, arguing that whether the first marriage was thereafter judicially declared void was irrelevant because at the time Lea married Renato the first marriage was valid and subsisting.
- The RTC denied respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence by Order dated 8 March 2005.
- In a Decision dated 23 March 2007, the RTC (Quezon City, Branch 84) declared the marriage between Renato and Lea null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC emphasized that Lea’s marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato and that, absent a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage prior to the second marriage, the first marriage remained valid and existing.
- Petitioner moved for reconsideration limited to the issue of distribution of properties, which the RTC denied by Order dated 6 September 2007. Both parties filed Notices of Appeal thereafter.
- In a Decision dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the marriage between Renato and Lea. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied by CA Resolution dated 16 September 2009.
Issue Presented
- Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that, where both marriages were celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (3 August 1988), the Civil Code governs and, under the Civil Code, a prior marriage that is void from the beginning need not be judicially declared void before a party may validly contract a subsequent marriage.
Rulings Below
- RTC (Decision dated 23 March 2007)
- Declared the marriage between Renato and Lea null and void ab initio on the ground of bigamy under Article 41 of the Family Code.
- Held that because Lea’s marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato, her marriage to Renato was bigamous and void from the beginning.
- Rejected respondent’s contention that she could presume the nullity of the prior marriage without a judicial decree; stressed that without a judicial declaration the prior marriage remains valid and subsisting.
- Noted that even if respondent later obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, both marriages were subsisting before such annulment because Lea did not obtain a judicial decree before contracting the second marriage.
- Court of Appeals (Decision dated 20 April 2009; Resolution dated 16 September 2009)
- Reversed and set aside the RTC Decision and Order; upheld the validity of the marriage between the parties.
- Reasoned that both marriages (1972 and 1979) were solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code (3 August 1988), so the Civil Code governs the validity of the marriages.
- Ruled that the Civil Code does not require a judicial decree in order to establish the nullity of a marriage that is void ab initio.
Applicable Law and Statutory Provisions Invoked
- Governing law for the validity and incidents of marriage is the law in effect at the time of its celebration; here, the Civil Code governed because both marriages and the births of the parties’ children (1979, 1981, 1985) occurred before the Family Code’s effectivity.
- Civil Code p