Title
Casimiro vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 84462-63
Decision Date
Mar 29, 1989
1988 Las Piñas election dispute: COMELEC upheld Riguera's proclamation; petitioners failed to prove fraud; Supreme Court ruled electoral protest proper remedy.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 129892)

Factual Background

In the canvassing proceedings for the 18 January 1988 elections in Las Pinas, the petitioners challenged the legality and regularity of certain steps taken during the canvass and the alleged manner by which election returns were handled. It was undisputed that the canvass and proclamation followed the issuance of a transfer of venue for canvassing of election returns from the municipality to the COMELEC Central Office.

The COMELEC had ordered that the venue of the canvass in Las Pinas be transferred to the COMELEC Central Office in Intramuros, Manila. The municipal board communicated this to the UNIDO Party by letter dated February 2, 1988, stating that, pursuant to a COMELEC order dated 29 January 1988, the venue of canvassing would be transferred that afternoon at 1:00 P.M. and specifically noting that the board “need[ed] your representative to accompany us in transferring the remaining election returns in the Central Office.”

COMELEC Proceedings and Consolidated Decisions

Several pre-proclamation cases reached the COMELEC on the legality of canvassing and the propriety of continued canvassing and proclamation. On 25 March 1988, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued a consolidated decision dismissing the petitions in part on jurisdictional and procedural grounds. The decision held that the issues should be ventilated in the proper election protest filed with a court of general jurisdiction and declared that it had no jurisdiction over the matters raised, while also ordering the lifting of the restraint on proclamation.

Following the lifting of the restraining order, Rosalino Riguera and the other winning local officials were proclaimed. On 8 June 1988, the COMELEC en banc denied Casimiro’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the Second Division’s dismissal of the pre-proclamation cases. On 13 July 1988, the COMELEC en banc denied Casimiro’s motion for clarification and/or partial reconsideration, observing that the motion did not present new issues or new evidence and that the matter had already been passed upon.

Supreme Court Petitions and Related Electoral Protest

On 19 August 1988, petitioners Casimiro and the UNIDO Party filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus (G.R. Nos. 84462-63) against the COMELEC, the Las Pinas Board of Canvassers, and Rosalino Riguera. They sought to annul and set aside portions of the COMELEC Second Division decision of 25 March 1988, and resolutions of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on 8 June 1988 and 13 July 1988, alleging grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction. They also prayed for reliefs that included directing the COMELEC to constitute a new board of canvassers for the purpose of recanvassing deferred election returns, and annulling Riguera’s proclamation on the asserted ground that it was premature and void.

In parallel, an electoral protest was filed by Reynaldo Salvador (Election Case No. 88-505) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 137, where the presiding judge scheduled verification of tally sheets and the opening of seven (7) ballot boxes. The ballot boxes were transferred from the COMELEC Main Office to the RTC. Petitioners sought a Supreme Court restraining order to prevent the opening of the ballot boxes, and on 20 September 1988, the Court ordered that status quo be maintained by not opening the ballot boxes scheduled for 22 September 1988, pending further orders from the Court.

Additionally, on 1 September 1988, other defeated UNIDO candidates for Councilors filed separate petitions in the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 84678-79) seeking nullification of the COMELEC decision and resolutions being challenged in the earlier petitions. On 13 December 1988, the Court consolidated the cases in view of similarity or identity of issues.

Issues Raised by Petitioners

Petitioners attributed multiple errors to the COMELEC, essentially arguing that: first, the canvass in the COMELEC Central Office was illegal due to lack of prior notice; second, the evidence supporting their allegations of irregularities was allegedly not properly appreciated; third, the COMELEC allegedly erred in finding that charges of tampered, padded, and spurious election returns were unproven; fourth, the COMELEC allegedly treated their allegations in an affidavit as mere generalities and held that denials at the canvassing level could no longer be raised; fifth, the COMELEC allegedly required an objection to specific election returns at the canvassing board level in a manner alleged to be fatal to their case; and sixth, proclamation allegedly occurred hastily while a motion for reconsideration was pending.

Petitioners’ Arguments on Due Process and Notice

Petitioners contended that they were denied due process because the canvass at the COMELEC Central Office proceeded without adequate notice of the date and time, causing them to leave. They argued that their counsel was present at the COMELEC Main Office not to witness the canvassing but only to accompany the transfer of the election returns and ballot boxes. They further claimed to have requested postponement because they lacked watchers, tabulators, and election paraphernalia, but postponement was allegedly denied.

The Court rejected this theory. The decision noted that the transfer of canvassing to the COMELEC Main Office was at petitioners’ instance. The letter from the municipal board referred not only to the transfer of election returns but also to the transfer of the “venue of the canvass” at 1:00 P.M. on February 2, 1988, and expressly requested petitioners’ representative to accompany the board for the transfer in the Central Office. The Court held that petitioners could not plausibly claim absence of notice, and that, if their representatives were absent during the canvassing, the absence was attributable to petitioners’ choice.

The Court also treated petitioners’ objection to the canvassing as a contest to the proceedings. Since petitioners raised the objection by challenging the validity of the canvass on the ground of alleged lack of notice, and the Board continued in the canvassing, the Board in effect overruled the objections. The Court emphasized that under Section 244 of the Omnibus Election Code, when the proceedings were contested, petitioners should have appealed within five (5) days from the time the contested ruling or proceeding was held. It further noted that the COMELEC found that no such appeal was timely made.

Evaluation of Evidence of Fraud, Irregularities, and Alleged Spurious Returns

On the merits of the irregularities alleged, petitioners relied substantially on affidavits executed by their own representatives, including the affidavit of Atty. Florencio Dalupang (petitioners’ head watcher/representative) and the affidavit of Atty. Paterno Lubaton, also a lawyer for the petitioners. Petitioners argued that the affidavits detailed specific precincts and illegalities and that the combined circumstances revealed a clear pattern of anomalous acts. Petitioners also criticized the COMELEC for not holding a hearing before the Second Division where they could have presented the affiants as witnesses.

The Court held that the evidence relied upon consisted mainly of self-serving affidavits prepared by petitioners’ own representatives. It invoked the principle that reliance should not be placed on mere affidavits, and it found that the record did not show other substantial evidence supporting the requested exclusion of election returns for being fraudulent or spurious. The Court invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty under Section 5(m), Rule 131, and it required “clearly convincing evidence” before disbelieving election returns. It stressed that concluding that returns were obviously manufactured required extreme caution and the most convincing proof.

The Court further ruled that the COMELEC could not be faulted for requiring the parties to submit memoranda. It held that under Section 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, parties were notified and heard. Petitioners were thus given opportunity to submit evidence in support of their allegations and to submit memoranda in amplification. The Court also relied on election law policy favoring the summary resolution of pre-proclamation controversies, so that canvass and proclamation are delayed as little as possible. It added that determining whether election returns were fraudulent, tampered with, or spurious involved factual matters within the exclusive function of the COMELEC.

Failure to Object to Specific Returns and Credibility of Allegations

Petitioners next argued that the COMELEC gravely abused discretion in holding that they failed to object to specific election returns at the canvassing board level because, they insisted, they had interposed written objections. However, the Court noted an inconsistency in petitioners’ own assertions. Petitioners alleged at one point that they could not intelligently and effectively register objections because defects and anomalies were not apparent on the face of the election returns. This inconsistency, the Court held, undermined the credibility of the petitioners’ allegations.

Even assuming that failure to object to specific returns was not fatal under Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Court still held that the COMELEC had passed upon petitioners’ allegations. The COMELEC found the charges to be unsubstantiated or mere generalities, especially in view of the self-serving character of the affidavits relied upon.

Proclamation Allegedly Premature Due to Pending Motion for Reconsideration

Petitioners also challenged the proclamation of Rosalino Riguera, asserting it was hasty and void because their motion for reconsideration was then pending. The Court rejected this claim as inaccurate. It observed that the motion for reconsideration was dated 29 March 1988, while proclamation occurred right after the COMELEC Second Division decision of 25 March 1988.

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