Title
Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 217126-27
Decision Date
Nov 10, 2015
Ombudsman challenged CA's TRO and WPI against preventive suspension of Makati Mayor Binay, Jr. over alleged graft in city hall construction. SC ruled in favor of Ombudsman, upholding suspension and rejecting condonation doctrine.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 217126-27)

Petitioner and Respondents

Petitioner: Ombudsman (through the Office of the Solicitor General) assails CA resolutions that (a) granted a TRO and later a WPI enjoining implementation of the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order, and (b) ordered the Ombudsman to comment on a contempt petition filed by Binay, Jr.

Key Dates

Complaint filed before Ombudsman: July 22, 2014.
Special Panel investigation and OMB Complaint filed: March 5, 2015 (first Special Panel); March 6 and March 9, 2015 (second Special Panel).
Ombudsman preventive suspension order (Joint Order): March 10, 2015.
CA TRO: March 16, 2015.
CA directive to comment on contempt petition: March 20, 2015.
CA writ of preliminary injunction: April 6–8, 2015.
Supreme Court decision reported here: November 10, 2015 (decision delivered November 10, 2015; decision text referenced as September 12, 2016 entry in citation).

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

Primary constitutional basis used by the Court: 1987 Philippine Constitution (judicial power, separation of powers, independence of Ombudsman). Statutory provisions central to the dispute: Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), specifically Section 14 (first and second paragraphs) and Section 24 (preventive suspension), and Section 21 (disciplinary authority). Procedural rules implicated: Rule 58 (TRO and WPI) and Rule 65 (certiorari/prohibition) and Rule 45/Rule 43 references concerning modes of judicial review. The Court also addressed its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Factual Background — Allegations and Administrative Complaints

Complaints alleging plunder and graft (RA 3019 violations) were filed against Binay, Jr. and other Makati officials regarding the five phases of procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The Ombudsman constituted Special Panels, which reported and filed administrative and criminal charges in March 2015 charging respondents with grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, violation of RA 3019, malversation, and falsification of public documents. The Ombudsman found the requisites for preventive suspension present (evidence of guilt strong and risk of prejudice to the investigation) and issued preventive suspension orders for up to six months without pay.

Service and Immediate Aftermath

The preventive suspension order was sent to the City Mayor’s Office (March 11–16, 2015). On March 16, 2015, DILG implementation occurred; an acting mayor assumed duties. On the same day the CA issued a TRO enjoining implementation of the preventive suspension; the CA later directed the Ombudsman to comment on a contempt petition filed by Binay, Jr. alleging disobedience to the CA’s TRO.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

Binay, Jr. filed a Rule 65 petition with the CA seeking nullification of the preventive suspension and injunctive reliefs. His primary defenses included the condonation doctrine (re-election condones misconduct committed during a prior term), and contesting the strength of the evidence supporting preventive suspension. The CA granted a TRO (March 16, 2015) and, after hearing, issued a writ of preliminary injunction (April 6, 2015), basing its relief in significant part on application of the condonation doctrine as articulated in prior jurisprudence (e.g., Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, Governor Garcia, Jr.).

Petition to the Supreme Court and Ombudsman’s Contentions

The Ombudsman filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, arguing (a) the CA lacked jurisdiction to enjoin Ombudsman investigations and to issue injunctive writs against preventive suspension under Section 14, RA 6770 (no injunction policy), and (b) the CA’s directive to have the Ombudsman comment on the contempt petition was improper because the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer and thus constitutionally insulated from certain contempt proceedings.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The Court distilled the principal issues to: (1) whether certiorari/prohibition to the Supreme Court was the Ombudsman’s plain, speedy, and adequate remedy (or whether the Ombudsman should have first filed motions for reconsideration in the CA); (2) whether the CA had subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.’s Rule 65 petition; (3) whether the CA had authority to issue a TRO/WPI enjoining enforcement of an Ombudsman preventive suspension order; (4) whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO/WPI based on the condonation doctrine; and (5) whether the CA’s order directing the Ombudsman to comment on the contempt petition was improper.

Standing to Seek Relief — Exceptions to Motion for Reconsideration Rule

The Supreme Court found that the Ombudsman’s direct resort to certiorari/prohibition before the High Court was justified despite not having moved for reconsideration in the CA. The Court invoked exceptions to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration, emphasizing the novel and transcendent nature of the legal questions raised involving separation of powers, the constitutional role and independence of the Ombudsman, and the continued validity of the condonation doctrine. These constituted urgent, exceptional circumstances warranting direct Supreme Court review.

CA Subject Matter Jurisdiction — Statutory and Constitutional Analysis

The Court examined Section 14, RA 6770, which (1) prohibits injunctive writs by courts to delay an Ombudsman investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the investigation’s subject is outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction (first paragraph), and (2) provides that no court shall hear appeals or applications for remedy against Ombudsman decisions or findings except the Supreme Court on pure questions of law (second paragraph). The Court applied principles of statutory construction and prior jurisprudence (including Fabian v. Desierto) and concluded:

  • The second paragraph, as worded, is ambiguous and purports to restrict judicial remedies to a Rule 45 appeal to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. That construction would improperly expand the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and interfere with the Court’s rule-making authority.
  • As in Fabian, the provision is unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to alter the scope of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence and to limit ordinary remedies. Consequently, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is declared unconstitutional and invalid.

Accordingly, the CA had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Binay, Jr.’s Rule 65 petition under its original certiorari jurisdiction (BP 129) and settled practice that Rule 65 petitions challenging interlocutory/unappealable Ombudsman issuances are properly filed initially in the Court of Appeals.

CA Authority to Issue Provisional Injunctive Reliefs — Separation of Powers and Rule-Making

The Court analyzed the constitutionally mandated separation of powers and the Supreme Court’s exclusive rule-making power (Section 5(5), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). It held that provisional injunctive remedies (TRO/WPI) are procedural devices created and governed by the Rules of Court (Rule 58) and are ancillary to a court’s exercise of judicial power. Because Congress, by Section 14’s first paragraph, attempted to prohibit all courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctions to delay an Ombudsman investigation, that legislative proscription intruded upon the Supreme Court’s exclusive authority to promulgate procedural rules and the courts’ inherent powers necessary to vindicate their jurisdiction. The Court therefore declared the first paragraph’s policy against issuance of provisional injunctive writs by lower courts ineffective until such a policy is adopted as part of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court through appropriate administrative action. In consequence, lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, retain the authority to issue ancillary provisional injunctive reliefs in aid of judicial review.

Nature and Requisites of Preventive Suspension

The Court reiterated that preventive suspension is a preventive administrative measure, not a penalty. Section 24, RA 6770 prescribes two primary requisites for preventive suspension: (1) the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) one of three circumstances is present — the charge involves dishonesty/oppression/grave misconduct; the charge would warrant removal; or the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation. Preventive suspension supports the investigatory process by precluding influence over witnesses and tampering with records.

CA’s Basis for Issuing TRO/WPI — Reliance on Condonation Doctrine

The Court observed that the CA’s TRO and WPI were grounded largely on the condonation doctrine — the judicially created rule (originating in Pascual and followed in subsequent jurisprudence) that an elective official’s re-election condones misconduct committed in a prior term, thereby precluding administrative removal for earlier acts. The CA concluded there was an ostensible right to the relief sought (nullification of the preventive suspension) because, if the acts were committed during a prior term, condonation would bar administrative charges.

Historical and Legal Examination of the Condonation Doctrine

The Supreme Court conducted a thorough doctrinal review. It traced condonation’s origin to Pascual (1959) and its subsequent application in Philippine cases (Lizares, Insco, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, Salumbides, Governor Garcia, Jr.). The Court analyzed comparative U.S. state jurisprudence cited in Pascual and noted divergent approaches among states, observations about statutory dependence of the doctrine, and variations such as the “own-successor theory” and treatment of continuing offenses.

More importantly, the Court evaluated condonation against the 1987 Constit




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