G.R. No. 187495 - People vs. Jumawan

Case Summary (G.R. No. 187495)

Factual Background

SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted a marriage with Petitioner on June 20, 1969, and they had two children, Sahlee and Sandee Carino. The deceased and Respondent lived together from 1982 and purportedly contracted marriage on November 10, 1992; they had no children. The deceased fell ill in 1988 and died on November 23, 1992, while under the care of Respondent. Both Petitioner and Respondent filed claims for monetary benefits from various government agencies. Petitioner collected a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, and Pag-ibig. Respondent received P21,000.00 from GSIS Life and burial benefits.

Trial Court Proceedings

Respondent filed a complaint on December 14, 1993 seeking at least one-half of the P146,000.00 Petitioner received as death benefits. Petitioner failed to answer and was declared in default. Respondent alleged the marriage between Petitioner and the deceased was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license and produced a marriage certificate bearing no license number and a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating no record of a marriage license for the 1969 marriage. The trial court found for Respondent and ordered Petitioner to pay P73,000.00, attorney’s fees of P5,000.00, and costs.

Court of Appeals Disposition

On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision in toto, following the approach in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System by recognizing rights of both the first and second wife to share in the property attributable to the deceased without requiring prior judicial declaration of nullity for purposes other than remarriage in the manner applied by the lower court.

Respondent’s Contentions

Respondent admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of the marriage between Petitioner and the deceased and without prior judicial declaration of nullity. She asserted lack of knowledge of the first marriage until the funeral. She contended that the first marriage was void for absence of a marriage license and that she was entitled to one-half of the P146,000.00 collected by Petitioner as equitable relief.

Petitioner’s Contentions on Review

Petitioner sought relief in the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals’ affirmance and argued that the appellate court erred in applying Vda. de Consuegra and in resorting to equitable considerations instead of the clear commands of the Family Code, and that the jurisprudence relied upon had been modified or superseded by the Family Code.

Legal Framework Governing Marriages and Nullity

Under Art. 53 of the Civil Code as in force in 1969, a marriage license is a requisite of marriage except in marriages of exceptional character; Art. 58 and Art. 80 prescribe the license requirement and declare void marriages solemnized without a license, subject to specified exceptions. Article 40 of the Family Code provides that absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, but the Court may adjudicate the validity of a marriage for other purposes when essential to the determination of the case, as clarified in Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Ninal v. Bayadog. Article 147 of the Family Code governs property regime of unions where parties are capacitated to marry but live together without marriage or under a void marriage and presumes joint ownership of wages and properties acquired through joint effort, while Article 148 governs property relations in bigamous or similarly illicit unions and limits co-ownership to properties acquired by actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.

Evidentiary Findings on the 1969 Marriage

The records showed that the marriage certificate of Petitioner and the deceased bore no marriage license number and that the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan certified absence of any marriage license record for the June 20, 1969 marriage. The Supreme Court accepted that such certification is adequate proof of non-issuance of a marriage license, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals and the Rules of Court, and observed that Petitioner, having been declared in default, failed to discharge the burden to prove the existence of the required license.

Determination of the Validity of Both Marriages

The Court held that the marriage of Petitioner and the deceased was void ab initio for lack of the required marriage license and that, because Article 40 requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity only for purposes of remarriage, the 1992 marriage of Respondent to the deceased likewise remained void ab initio insofar as it was contracted without a judicial declaration permitting remarriage. The Court emphasized that for purposes other than remarriage a court may rule on the validity of a marriage when essential to the cause before it and upon adequate proof.

Application of Articles 147 and 148 to the Death Benefits

The Court analyzed the character of the disputed P146,000.00 as remunerations, incentives, and benefits earned by the deceased as a police officer. Applying Article 148, the Court explained that in bigamous unions only properties acquired by actual joint contribution are co-owned; wages and salaries belong exclusively to the earner and contributions such as home care are excluded. Because Respondent presented no proof of actual joint contribution to the acquisition of the death benefits, she could not claim co-ownership under Article 148. Conversely, under Article 147, which governs the property regime of void marriages entere

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 187495)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Susan Nicdao Carino was the first wife of the deceased and the petitioner before the Court.
Susan Yee Carino was the second wife of the deceased and the respondent before the Court.
The petition sought review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
The trial court declared petitioner in default and ordered her to pay respondent one-half of P146,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the Court of Appeals, and dismissed the complaint.

Key Factual Allegations

The deceased, SPO4 Santiago S. Carino, contracted a first marriage with Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, and had two children, Sahlee and Sandee.
The deceased contracted a second marriage with Susan Yee on November 10, 1992, after cohabiting with her since 1982.
The deceased became ill in 1988 and died on November 23, 1992, while under the care of Susan Yee.
Susan Nicdao collected P146,000 in various "death benefits" from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, and Pag-ibig.
Susan Yee collected P21,000 from GSIS Life and burial benefits from GSIS and SSS.
Susan Yee filed a collection suit on December 14, 1993, seeking at least one-half of P146,000 which Susan Nicdao had received.
Susan Yee admitted the second marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the first marriage without a prior judicial declaration of nullity and claimed she did not know of the first marriage until the funeral.
Susan Yee produced a marriage certificate without a license number and a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating no record of a marriage license for the 1969 marriage.

Issues Presented

Whether the first marriage between the deceased and Susan Nicdao was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
Whether the second marriage between the deceased and Susan Yee was valid or void for having been contracted without a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage under Art. 40, Family Code.
Whether Susan Yee was entitled to one-half of the P146,000 death benefits collected by Susan Nicdao.

Contentions of Parties

Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, erred in applying equity instead of the Family Code, and erred in treating prior precedent as unmodified by the Family Code.
Respondent contended that the first marriage was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license and that she was entitled to one-half of the death benefits.

Statutory Framework

Article 40, Family Code provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Article 147, Family Code governs property regime of unions without marriage or under a void marriage, presuming equal ownership of wages and jointly acquired property.
Article 148, Family Code governs pro