Title
Carillo vs. De Paz
Case
G.R. No. L-22601
Decision Date
Oct 28, 1966
Ownership dispute over Lot No. 221 involving inheritance, reserva troncal, and prescriptive claims; plaintiffs' suit dismissed due to 10-year prescription period.
ownership dispute
possession dispute
prescription

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-22601)

Antecedent Property Title and Estate Proceedings

The property history began with the ownership of Lot No. 221 by Severino Salak and Petra Garcia, as evidenced by O.C.T. No. 41543. Petra Garcia died on September 21, 1941. On August 16, 1943, Severino Salak sold his one-half portion of Lot No. 221 to Honoria Salak for P812.00. Severino Salak died on December 5, 1944.

Thereafter, in January 1945, Honoria Salak and other family members died, having been “massacred by the Japanese.” As a result, two estate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac: Special Proceeding No. 3 to settle the estates of Severino Salak and Petra Garcia; and Special Proceeding No. 23 to settle the estates of the Salak family.

On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition was submitted in Special Proceeding No. 3, and the court approved it on November 19, 1946. Under that partition, Lot No. 221 was adjudicated to Francisca Salak de Paz, consisting of one-fourth (1/4) in her capacity as heir and the remaining three-fourths (3/4) by purchase and/or exchange with her co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun, and Ernesto Bautista. From 1946, Francisca Salak de Paz possessed the entirety of Lot No. 221.

Meanwhile, in Special Proceeding No. 23, the court held on February 26, 1948 that the heirs entitled to the estates of the Salak family were Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo (3/4 share) and Ernesto Bautista (1/4 share). The court applied the survivorship presumption under Rule 123, Sec. 69(ii), now Rule 131, Sec. 5(jj) of the Rules of Court. This judicial determination followed a sequence of deaths: Simeon Salak died first, so his properties went to the children (Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo, and Ligaya, each with a one-fourth share); next Honoria, Consuelo, and Ligaya died, so Honoria and Consuelo’s properties went to their mother Isabel and Ligaya’s properties went to her son Ernesto Bautista; then Isabel died, so her properties went to her son Adolfo; and lastly Adolfo died, so his properties went to his maternal grandmother, Agustina. Consequently, Agustina succeeded to properties that came by intestate succession from Honoria Salak and Isabel Carrillo, including one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 221.

Action Filed by Agustina and the Development of Reserva Troncal

On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed Case No. 351 in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the heirs in Special Proceeding No. 3 to recover one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 221, which had been possessed by Francisca Salak de Paz.

Agustina died on April 24, 1950. Subsequently, on June 8, 1950, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in Special Proceeding No. 23, and further decreed that the properties inherited by Agustina were subject to reserva troncal. On November 6, 1950, Ernesto Bautista filed a petition in Special Proceeding No. 23 for the execution of the judgment. The petition was heard on November 10, 1959, after service on the lawyer of Prima Carrillo, who appeared as a party as administratrix of Agustina’s estate.

Acting on that petition, the lower court issued an order dated November 14, 1950, declaring “in view of the death of the reservista” that all the interest of the reservista Dona Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo and that of her heirs in the three-fourths share adjudged to the reservista had “definitely terminated,” and that the reservee, the minor Ernesto Bautista, was entitled to immediate delivery of the three-fourths share reserved to him in the Court of Appeals decision of June 8, 1950.

Dismissal of Case No. 351 and the Trial Court Rationale

On December 20, 1960, the Court of First Instance dismissed Civil Case No. 351. The dismissal was anchored on the theory that the reservation had not converted Agustina’s inherited interest into absolute ownership because, as stated by the court, there existed third-degree relatives of Adolfo Salak; hence, the portion inherited by Agustina was never released from the reserva. The court reasoned that upon Agustina’s death on April 24, 1950, the property did not pass by inheritance to her legal heirs. Instead, it reverted to the family trunk of the Isabel–Adolfo line. The court thus concluded that the estate of Agustina, as plaintiff, had no cause of action against the defendants. The court also declared that the adjudication in Special Proceeding No. 23 had become res judicata and could not be disturbed in that case.

Present Suit and the Motion to Dismiss

On April 22, 1963, Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup filed the present suit for recovery of 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 against Francisca Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautista. The defendants moved to dismiss on June 20, 1963, invoking two grounds: (1) that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment, and (2) that it was barred by the statute of limitations.

On November 19, 1963, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata, finding that the suit was barred by the order of delivery dated November 14, 1950 in Special Proceeding No. 23.

Issues on Appeal and the Court’s Approach

The plaintiffs-appellants appealed, raising questions of law. The record indicated that several grounds supported the motion to dismiss, including res judicata and prescription. Although the trial court expressly relied on res judicata, the appellate court noted that it did not totally disregard prescription. The lower court had observed that Prima Carrillo, as administratrix of Agustina’s estate, had been served with and personally knew of the petition for execution and the order of November 14, 1950, yet did not file any opposition or seek relief, and instead filed the action only after “about thirteen (13) years.”

The appellate court nonetheless chose to resolve the appeal on the question of prescription, invoking the rule that when the trial judge decides on a particular ground, an appellate court may uphold the dismissal on some other point ignored or erroneously decided.

Legal Framework on Reserva Troncal and Accrual of the Right to Sue

The appellate court treated reserva troncal in the context of Article 891 of the new Civil Code and Article 811 of the old Civil Code, both of which impose an obligation on an ascendant who inherits property obtained by a descendant through gratuitous title from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister. Under these provisions, the ascendant must reserve such property for the benefit of relatives within the third degree who belong to the line from which the property came.

The appellate court identified that the reserva troncal arose by operation of law when Agustina acquired, as a matter of law, all the properties of her descendant Adolfo, because Adolfo had acquired the properties by gratuitous title from another ascendant, Isabel. The Court of Appeals’ final decision in Special Proceeding No. 23 had made the reservation’s existence “all the more doubtless.”

The appellate court further explained that, according to the commentary cited, the reservation is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, after which the related right becomes one for the reservatarios to claim full ownership. Yet the right to reclaim may be lost by prescription if not enforced within the legally prescribed time. The Court relied on doctrinal discussions from Manresa and Scaevola indicating that the reservation-related rights are not purely personal, can pass to heirs, and are subject to extinction by prescription if the reservatarios, who may have a right to reclaim property, do not assert it within the period provided by law.

Prescription: Governing Law and Computation

The plaintiffs-appellants, as reservatarios, were said to have had the right to claim 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 from Francisca Salak de Paz, who had possessed it as owner from April 24, 1950, the date of Agustina’s death. The appellate court considered that the right or cause of action accrued on April 24, 1950.

For the applicable prescriptive period, the appellate court treated Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure as fixing ten (10) years for actions to recover real property, counted from the time the cause of action accru

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