Title
Carandang vs. Santiago
Case
G.R. No. L-8238
Decision Date
May 25, 1955
A civil case for damages due to bodily injuries under Article 33 of the New Civil Code proceeds independently of a pending criminal appeal for frustrated homicide.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-8238)

Background of the Case

Cesar M. Carandang filed a civil case against Tomas Valenton, Jr. and his parents seeking actual and moral damages for bodily injuries sustained from an incident where Tomas Valenton, Jr. was criminally charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. The criminal conviction was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Batangas on September 1, 1953, with an appeal pending before the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the civil case proceeded before the Court of First Instance of Manila. Respondents moved to suspend the civil trial pending the resolution of the criminal appeal.

Procedural Posture and Issue

The trial judge, Vicente Santiago, granted the motion to suspend the civil case pending the criminal appeal. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied, prompting the present petition for certiorari to annul the suspension order. The central legal issue involved whether the trial of the civil case for damages based on bodily injuries should be stayed until the final determination of the related criminal case.

Legal Provision Invoked

Article 33 of the Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the injured party may bring a civil action for damages independent and separate from the criminal prosecution. The civil action requires only a preponderance of evidence and is not contingent upon the outcome of the criminal case.

Respondent’s Argument

Respondents contended that the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 refers specifically to the crime defined in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, since the accused was convicted of frustrated homicide and not of the crime of physical injuries, the term should be interpreted narrowly, applying only to the particular technical crime, and consequently justifying the suspension of the civil trial until the criminal case concludes.

Court’s Interpretation of "Physical Injuries"

The Court rejected the respondents’ restrictive interpretation of "physical injuries" by emphasizing statutory construction principles. It noted that the Code Commission used "defamation," "fraud," and "physical injuries" in their ordinary and generic senses rather than their technical criminal definitions, as there are no corresponding offenses directly labeled as "defamation" or "fraud" under the Revised Penal Code. The Court reasoned that it would be inconsistent and illogical for the term "physical injuries" to carry a strict penal definition while the others did not. Consequently, the phrase "physical injuries" in Article 33 should be understood to mean any bodily injury, regardless of whether it was inflicted with intent to kill or not.

Supporting Precedent and Policy Considerations

The Court referred to the Code Commission’s Report, which analogized the civil action for physical injuries to the American tort action for assault and battery, reinforcing that the civil remedy should exist regardless of the specific criminal classification of the offense. It further cited the case Bixby v. Sioux City to illustrate that a civil claim for damages founded on personal injury is

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster—building context before diving into full texts.