Title
Caram vs. Segui
Case
G.R. No. 193652
Decision Date
Aug 5, 2014
A mother sought custody of her child via a writ of amparo after surrendering him for adoption; the Supreme Court ruled it improper, as amparo applies only to enforced disappearances, not custody disputes.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 193652)

Factual Background

Ma. Christina Yusay Caram had a relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III and bore his child out of wedlock. Christina planned to place the child for adoption through Sun and Moon Home for Children. The child, Julian, was born on July 26, 2009, and Sun and Moon paid hospital expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina executed a Deed of Voluntary Commitment and surrendered the child to the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Marcelino died on November 26, 2009 without knowledge of the birth. On November 27, 2009, the DSWD issued a certificate declaring the child legally available for adoption. A local matching conference and a match with the Medina spouses followed in early 2010, and supervised trial custody commenced. Christina sought a suspension of adoption proceedings on May 5, 2010, and the DSWD took the position in a May 28, 2010 memorandum that the certificate had attained finality under R.A. No. 9523. A requested DNA test was denied in mid‑July 2010. Christina then filed a petition for a writ of amparo on July 27, 2010 to recover custody and parental authority over the child.

RTC Proceedings

On July 28, 2010, the RTC, Branch 106, issued a writ of amparo and set an initial hearing for August 4, 2010, directing respondents to produce the child and to file a verified return under Section 9 of the Amparo Rule. Respondents filed a return and appeared at the hearings of August 4 and August 5, 2010, alleging security threats to the child and resisting production at the first hearing; the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance. The RTC narrowed the issues for submission and acknowledged that the child had been presented to the court and that petitioner was allowed to see and photograph him. On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition, finding that petitioner had invoked the wrong remedy and that custody matters must be pursued under the Family Code, the Rule on Custody of Minors and the Rule on Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on August 20, 2010, which the RTC denied on September 6, 2010.

Issue Presented

The dispositive issue before the Supreme Court was whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper remedy to obtain parental authority and custody of a minor child who had been declared legally available for adoption and placed in the custody of prospective adoptive parents.

Petitioner's Contentions

Petitioner asserted that the DSWD and its officers had unlawfully deprived her of custody by blackmail and misrepresentation, using an allegedly invalid certificate of availability for adoption to place the child for adoption. She characterized the separation as an enforced disappearance and a threat to the child's life, liberty and security and sought relief through the writ of amparo to recover custody and parental authority. Petitioner also sought declarations regarding the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9523 and the applicability of the Rule on Adoption.

Respondents' Position and RTC Rationale

Respondents maintained that the administrative procedures were properly followed, that the certificate declaring the child legally available for adoption had attained finality under R.A. No. 9523, and that petitioner’s remedy was to litigate custody in the regular courts. The DSWD denied that it had concealed the child’s whereabouts and contended that the amparo rule was not the proper vehicle to resolve custody disputes. The RTC adopted this approach and held that custody claims should be brought under the Family Code, the Rule on Custody of Minors, the writ of habeas corpus in custody contexts, and the Rule on Adoption.

Supreme Court's Analysis and Legal Reasoning

The Court examined Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which limits the remedy to violations or threats to the rights to life, liberty and security by extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The Court relied on its precedents, notably Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al. and Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, which confined the amparo remedy to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court also considered the elements of enforced disappearance as articulated in Navia v. Pardico and defined under R.A. No. 9851: deprivation of liberty, state involvement or acquiescence, the State’s refusal to acknowledge or disclose the fate or whereabouts, and the intent to place the person outside the protection of law for a prolonged period. Applying those standards, the Court found that respondents did not conceal the child’s whereabouts; petitioner possessed the DSWD memorandum indicating the child’s placement and the child was presented in cour

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