G.R. No. 110427 - Caniza vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner: Carmen CaAiza, through her guardian Amparo Evangelista.
Respondents: Court of Appeals (Special First Division), Pedro Estrada, and Leonora Estrada.

November 20, 1989: RTC of Quezon City declares Carmen CaAiza incompetent and appoints Amparo Evangelista guardian.
September 17, 1990: Guardian files ejectment (unlawful detainer) suit in Metro. Trial Court (Branch 35).
April 13, 1992: MetroTC renders judgment ordering Estradas to vacate and pay attorney’s fees.
October 21, 1992: Quezon City RTC (Branch 96) reverses, holding accion publiciana proper.
June 2, 1993: Court of Appeals affirms RTC decision.
February 24, 1997: Supreme Court renders final decision.

CaAiza owned a house and lot at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City.
Out of “kindness,” she allowed the Estradas and their extended family to occupy the premises rent-free.
She later required possession for her support and medical needs and, through her guardian, issued written demands dated February 3 and 27, 1990, to vacate. The Estradas refused.

MetroTC: Plaintiff (CaAiza through guardian) filed amended complaint for unlawful detainer (desahucio) within one year of last demand. Judgment for plaintiff.
RTC: On appeal, held that possession by “adopted family” required accion publiciana (plenary action) and reversed.
Court of Appeals: Affirmed RTC, gave weight to an unprobated holographic will expressing CaAiza’s intent that the Estradas remain in possession.
Supreme Court: Petition for certiorari filed by CaAiza’s guardian.

Whether an ejectment (unlawful detainer) action was the proper remedy for recovery of possession.
Whether the guardian had authority to institute and maintain said action.
Whether the action survived CaAiza’s death and her heirs’ substitution.

Occupancy by tolerance carries an implied promise to vacate upon demand; refusal makes continued possession unlawful.
Rule 70, Sec. 1 does not require an express or implied lease; tolerance suffices to establish a terminable right.
The complaint alleged: ownership by CaAiza, free occupancy by Estradas, repeated demands to vacate, refusal, and filing within one year of the last demand—adequate for desahucio.
The Estradas’ insistence on accion publiciana is rejected: no de jure right of possession existed, only de facto tolerance ended by demand.

Letters of Guardianship (December 19, 1989) conferred full authority over CaAiza’s person and estate, including recovery of property.
Rule 96, Sec. 4 imposes on guardian the duty to manage ward’s estate frugally and apply income to maintenance, authorizing actions to protect estate.
Filing ejectment was a proper exercise of guardian’s duty to secure necessary funds for ward’s support and medical treatment.

The guardianship relationship terminates upon ward’s death, but the underlying desahucio action survives, as it is not purely personal.
Under Rule 3, Sec

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