G.R. No. 12191 - Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 12191)

Facts of the Accident

Cangco, returning home by train after work, rose in the second-class coach as the train slowed at San Mateo, took a position on the coach steps, grasping the rail with his right hand, and stepped off while the train was still moving slowly. A row of tow sacks filled with watermelons had been piled on the platform during harvest season; the sacks were placed so that only about two feet separated them from the platform edge. One or more melons caused his feet to slip; Cangco fell, his body rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, severely crushing and lacerating his right arm. The car moved about six meters after he alighted before stopping. The station was dimly lit; objects near the spot were difficult to discern. Cangco was rendered unconscious, taken to hospitals where his right arm was amputated twice (final amputation near the shoulder). He incurred medical and related expenses of P790.25.

Procedural History and Trial Court Ruling

Cangco sued the railroad company in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila for damages on the ground of negligence by the company’s servants in placing and leaving the sacks of melons on the platform. The trial court found negligence by the company in placing the sacks but concluded that Cangco failed to use due caution in alighting and was therefore precluded from recovery. Judgment for the defendant was entered; the plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Manila Railroad Company is liable for the injuries to Cangco caused by sacks of melons placed on the platform by its servants.
Whether plaintiff’s alleged contributory negligence in alighting from the slowly moving train bars or reduces recovery.
Whether proof that negligence of servants caused the injury may serve to excuse the carrier when liability arises from a contractual obligation (i.e., the contract of carriage).

Contractual vs. Extra‑Contractual Liability — Governing Legal Principles

The Court emphasized the distinction between liabilities arising ex contractu (from contract) and ex delicto or culpa aquiliana (extra‑contractual tort). When the source of an obligation is contractual — here, the carrier’s contract to transport and afford safe means of egress — the obligation exists independently of any servant’s fault and the carrier’s liability for breach is direct and immediate. Article 1903 (and related articles) of the Civil Code, which create a presumption of employer negligence for acts of servants in extra‑contractual settings, are not applicable to obligations arising from contract; those provisions govern extra‑contractual culpability and impose a rebuttable presumption of negligence in selection or supervision of servants. The Court reasoned that if employers could avoid contractual liability by proving due care in selection and supervision, they would enjoy an unjust immunity for breaches of contract committed through servants.

Burden of Proof in Contractual Actions

In actions founded upon breach of contract, proof of the contract and its nonperformance suffices prima facie; the plaintiff need not separately prove the defendant’s negligence. Conversely, in extra‑contractual (tort) actions, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the defendant’s negligence. The Court reiterated that where the duty to the injured party arises from contract (e.g., the duty of a carrier to provide safe means of alighting), proof that servants’ negligence caused the breach is not a defense for the carrier.

Court’s Analysis of Defendant’s Negligence

The Court found that the railroad company’s servants were negligent in piling the sacks of melons on the platform so as to obstruct passengers’ passage and create a hazard. Given the contractual duty to provide safe alighting facilities (citing article 1258 and the implied duties of carriage), this negligent placement constituted a breach of the carrier’s contractual obligation to Cangco.

Contributory Negligence — Standard and Application

The defendant contended that alighting from a moving train is negligence per se and that Cangco’s failure to wait until the train stopped was the proximate cause of his injury. The Court declined to adopt an absolute rule that alighting from a moving train is always negligence per se. Instead, it adopted the reasonable‑person standard as expressed in Thompson: whether an ordinarily prudent person of the passenger’s age, sex, and condition would have acted as the passenger did under the circumstances. The Court also framed the test as whether circumstances would have admonished a person of average prudence that getting off was dangerous. Factors considered in favor of Cangco: the train was barely moving (it stopped within six meters), the platform was elevated and cemented (reduced risk), Cangco was young and vigorous, the station and platform were familiar to him, and the platform was dimly lit so that he could not reasonably have seen the concealed obstruction. The Court emphasized that a passenger is entitled to assume the platform is clear in the absence of circumstances warning otherwise, particularly where the carrier owes a duty to keep the alighting place safe and adequately lit. Considering these facts, the Court concluded plaintiff’s conduct was not imprudent and did not constitute contributory negligence barring recovery.

Comparative Negligence Doctrine and Its Application

Relying on prior jurisprudence (including Rakes), the Court acknowledged the doctrine of comparative negligence: if both parties were negligent, damages should be apportioned; if plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause, defendant is not liable. Applying the reasonable‑person test and the factual circumstances, the Court determined that defendant’s neglige

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 12191)

Case Caption, Citation and Decision

Reported at 38 Phil. 768, G.R. No. 12191, decided October 14, 1918.
Decision authored by Justice Fisher; Chief Justice Arellano, and Justices Torres, Street and Avancena concurred.
Justice Malcolm dissented, with Justice Johnson concurring in the dissent.

Parties, Status and Employment Facts

Plaintiff and appellant: Jose Cangco, a clerk employed by the Manila Railroad Company.
Defendant and appellee: Manila Railroad Company.
Cangco's employment: clerk, monthly wage of P25.
Cangco resided in the pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, on the defendant's railroad line.
As an employee he used a pass furnished by the company entitling him to free carriage on the company's trains.

Factual Narrative of the Accident

Date of occurrence: January 20, 1915; plaintiff was returning home by rail after his day's work.
Plaintiff rode in the second-class car, rose to exit as the train drew up to San Mateo station, passed through the door and took position upon the coach steps, holding the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
Another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an employee, alighted safely at the point where the platform begins to rise.
The platform side where passengers alight had a cement platform that began to rise with a moderate gradient some distance from the company’s office and extended along in front of that office for a sufficient length to cover several coaches.
After the train moved a little farther, plaintiff stepped off the car; one or both of his feet contacted a sack of watermelons, his feet slipped, and he fell violently on the platform.
His body rolled from the platform and was drawn under a moving car, causing his right arm to be badly crushed and lacerated.
The car moved forward possibly six meters after plaintiff alighted before coming to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’clock on a dark night; the station was dimly lighted by a single light located some distance away, making objects on the platform difficult to discern, particularly to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The sacks of melons were present because it was the customary harvesting season; a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment.
The melons were contained in numerous tow sacks piled on the platform in a row one upon another, placed so that only about two feet of space remained between the sacks and the edge of the platform.
The plaintiff’s fall was caused by stepping on one of these melons as he alighted; his statement that he failed to see the objects in the darkness was credited.

Injury, Medical Treatment and Expenses

Plaintiff was unconscious when drawn from under the car; his injuries were very serious.
He was taken to a hospital in Manila, examined, and his arm was amputated.
The first operation’s result was unsatisfactory; he was then taken to another hospital where a second operation amputated the member at a higher point near the shoulder.
Plaintiff expended P790.25 for medical and surgical fees and other expenses related to his cure.

Procedural History and Relief Sought

On August 31, 1915, plaintiff instituted suit in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila to recover damages from the defendant.
The action was founded on alleged negligence of the defendant’s servants and employees in placing and leaving sacks of melons on the platform so as to menace alighting passengers.
At trial, the trial judge found the facts substantially as presented in the petition and evidence, concluded that the defendant was negligent in placing the sacks as they obstructed passengers, but held that the plaintiff failed to use due caution in alighting and therefore denied recovery.
Judgment for defendant was entered in the trial court; plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.

Threshold Legal Framework: Contractual v. Extra-Contractual Liability

The Court emphasized the foundational basis of defendant’s legal liability as the contract of carriage; the obligation to respond arises, if at all, from breach of that contract by failure to exercise due care in its performance.
Liability arising ex contractu (from contract) is direct and immediate and differs essentially from the presumptive responsibility for the negligence of servants imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which relates to extra-contractual obligations.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code applies only to extra-contractual obligations (culpa aquiliana) and not to culpa contractual; the Court cited Manresa’s commentaries and the Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) decision to support this distinction.
The Court explained that in contractual breaches it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove negligence; proof of contract and its nonperformance suffices prima facie to warrant recovery.
By contrast, in extra-contractual liability based on negligence the burden rests on the plaintiff to prove negligence.
The legislature, in adopting the Civil Code, limited extra-contractual liability to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the person charged, including failure to exercise due care in selection or supervision of servants.
Article 1903 creates a rebuttable presumption of employer negligence in selection or supervision of servants in extra-contractual cases, but does not apply to contractual obligations.

Authorities, Commentators and Precedents Cited

Manresa’s commentary on articles 1093, 1103, 1104, and 1903 of the Civil Code is cited repeatedly for the conceptual distinction between culpa aquiliana and culpa contractual.
Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) is relied upon for the proposition that articles 1902 and 1903 are not applicable where duties arise from pre-existing contractual relations.
Carmona v. Cuesta (20 Porto Rico Re