G.R. No. L-21743 - Canete vs. Court of 1st Instance of Zamboanga del Sur

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-21743)

Factual Background

Private respondent Ganlay Amban alleged that, in May 1957, petitioner Canete entered and possessed a five-hectare portion of Amban’s eight-hectare land in Camanga, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur, under a lease requiring annual rental of P50.00 per hectare per year. Amban further alleged that in 1958, after a very good harvest, Canete refused to pay the stipulated rentals despite repeated demands and instead began asserting ownership over the land.

Petitioner Rudas joined as a defendant because he was the tenant of his co-petitioner. In their answer dated February 29, 1960, petitioners denied the rental theory and claimed that Canete had purchased the five-hectare portion from Amban in 1953, although the deed was executed in 1955.

When the case was called for hearing on October 18, 1962, petitioners and their counsel did not appear. The trial court directed that the plaintiff’s evidence be taken ex parte before the clerk of court.

Trial Court Proceedings and Decision of November 23, 1962

On November 23, 1962, the trial court rendered judgment based on the ex parte proceedings. The decision found, in substance, that Canete, a school teacher, through fraud and deceit, induced Amban, described as an unlettered non-Christian Subano, to execute a purported lease contract that in reality proved to be a deed of absolute sale. The court further ruled that the deed could not legally sustain petitioners’ “pretended right to remain” because it was not approved by the Provincial Governor as required for conveyances by members of non-Christian tribes.

Consequently, the court ordered petitioners and all those claiming under them to vacate the disputed land and to restore possession to Amban. It also sentenced petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay Amban P100.00 a year as damages from the filing of the complaint until possession was turned over, plus P200.00 as attorneys’ fees, and the costs.

The decision was received by petitioners on December 10, 1962.

Petitioners’ Motions, the Non-Resolution of Their Motion, and the Course to Execution

After receiving notice of the decision, petitioners filed an unverified motion dated November 27, 1962 to reconsider the October 18 order and to set the case for trial on the merits. Petitioners alleged that counsel had sent a telegraphic request for postponement because he was attending to his wife’s operation and was himself operated on for appendectomy at a Community Hospital in Cebu City, and that the court had earlier allowed postponement in another case handled by counsel. Petitioners also asserted that the case was not ready because, on March 7, 1961, the court had directed a commissioner to relocate the land.

On February 15, 1963, the trial court rejected petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Amban then moved for execution on January 24, 1963, but the trial court denied that execution on February 23, 1963. Amban filed a motion for reconsideration on March 13, 1963, arguing that the record showed petitioners had received the decision on December 10, 1962 and that, despite more than three months having passed, petitioners had not appealed. On March 20, 1963, apparently without petitioners’ counsel, the court heard Amban’s motion. On March 22, 1963, it reconsidered its prior stand and granted execution.

Copies of the orders were mailed on March 15, 1963 and were received by petitioners’ counsel on April 3, 1963. Thereafter, on April 22, 1963, petitioners filed a petition for relief in the same court, seeking the setting aside of the orders of October 18, 1962, February 15, 1963, March 22, 1963, and the decision of November 23, 1962. On May 13, 1963, the trial court denied the petition for relief through a vacation judge.

Issues Raised in the Certiorari Petition

The petition before the Court of last resort questioned whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in: (a) proceeding with the hearing on October 18, 1962 despite claimed lack of readiness; (b) denying execution initially and later granting it; and (c) rendering judgment ex parte and then allowing execution after the decision had allegedly become final. The Court treated as a focal point the alleged misuse of discretion in the challenged orders and in the decision below.

Readiness for Trial on October 18, 1962

A preliminary question involved whether the case was ready for trial on October 18, 1962. Petitioners argued that the court had appointed a commissioner on March 7, 1961 to relocate the land claimed by Amban and the land over which Canete asserted ownership, and that the case should not have proceeded because the appointed commissioner had allegedly moved to Davao City, leaving relocation undone.

The Court held that if relocation were truly important to defendants, petitioners should have moved in the premises. The Court further reasoned that Canete’s answer did not question Canete’s possession of the five-hectare portion. The trial court had identified the land in its decision as the western portion of the bigger area belonging to Amban. Thus, the lack of relocation did not deprive the trial court of authority to hear the case and resolve the parties’ conflicting rights.

Accordingly, the Court rejected petitioners’ challenge to the setting of the hearing on the ground of unreadiness caused by non-relocation.

Court’s Discretion in Proceeding with the Hearing and Petitioners’ Failure to Secure Postponement

The Court then examined whether the trial court was justified in proceeding on October 18, 1962, despite petitioners’ comparison with a postponement in another case. Petitioners invoked alleged inconsistency: the same trial judge postponed Civil Case 621 when counsel represented that counsel and his wife were operated on in October 1962, yet did not postpone Civil Case 577, scheduled for the next day.

The Court found that the circumstances differed. In Civil Case 621, defendants were allegedly not notified, and the case could not properly be tried. In Civil Case 577, the trial judge pointed out that the case had already been postponed four times—first upon stipulation of the parties, and the last three upon counsel’s applications. The Court noted that the notice of hearing for October 18 was received by petitioners’ counsel on September 25, 1962. Counsel left for Cebu on October 2 with his wife, who was then suffering from back pains due to a cyst. The Court treated the absence of any timely action to secure a postponement as decisive.

The Court held that counsel should have made arrangements to postpone the trial before leaving for Cebu, or sought to have another counsel appear. After counsel’s wife underwent operation on October 5, counsel was given a warning signal to send a rush petition for postponement with notice to the adverse party, possibly through telegrams. Counsel instead waited until counsel himself was operated on for appendectomy, which occurred on October 10, eight days before the trial date. Further, the record did not show that Amban’s counsel received notice of the telegraphic petition.

The Court emphasized that the trial court’s directive to proceed aligned with the policy of expediting the disposal of cases to prevent clogging of dockets. Since counsel’s failures caused the situation, the Court ruled that petitioners could not attribute abuse of discretion to the court.

Finality of the Decision and Mandatory Issuance of Execution

The Court also addressed the effect of the decision dated November 23, 1962. It held that by the time the trial court granted execution on March 22, 1963, the judgment had become final, because petitioners’ counsel admitted receipt of the decision on December 10, 1962, and the period for appeal had long elapsed.

The Court rejected petitioners’ attempt to rely on the pendency of their motion for reconsideration of the October 18 order. It declared that a court’s decision concludes the controversy between the parties and should not be treated lightly. The Court also treated the trial court’s eventual March 22, 1963 action reconsidering its prior refusal to execute as effectively a denial of the interlocutory motion with respect to receiving plaintiff’s evidence in defendants’ absence. Petitioners were held to have waited too long even after receiving the decision.

Timeliness of the Petition for Relief Under Rule 38

The Court ruled that petitioners should have filed their petition for relief from judgment within the sixty-day period after receipt of the decision on December 10, 1962. It stressed that the 60-day period in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is absolutely fixed, inextendible, never interrupted, and cannot be subjected to any condition or contingency, citing Cruz vs. Ernesto Oppen, Inc. (L-23861, February 17, 1968). Because the petition for relief was filed on April 22, 1963, beyond sixty days from December 10, 1962, the Court ruled that the trial court properly struck it down as filed out of time.

The Court further noted that even assuming timeliness, the petition for relief could not prosper because it was not shown to be verified on its face and did not attach an affidavit of merits, both of which violated Section 3, Rule 38 as interpreted

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-21743)

The case arose from an original petition for certiorari assailing proceedings in Civil Case 577 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, sitting at Pagadian.
The petitioners sought to annul orders and the decision issued by the respondent judge in Civil Case 577, and the Court treated the controversy as one centered on alleged abuse of discretion.
The Court ultimately denied the petition for certiorari, with costs against petitioners.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Ganlay Amban acted as plaintiff in Civil Case 577 for possession and damages against the petitioners.
Federico Canete and Pedro Rudas acted as defendants and later as petitioners before the Court.
Pedro Rudas was impleaded because he was the tenant of his co-petitioner, Federico Canete.
The respondent judge issued a decision and subsequent orders that led to the issuance and reconsideration of a writ of execution.
After a petition for relief was denied by Vacation Judge Benedicto, the petitioners elevated the matter by certiorari to challenge the questioned orders and decision.

Key Factual Allegations

Ganlay Amban alleged that in May 1957, Federico Canete entered into possession of a five-hectare portion of Amban’s eight-hectare land under a contract labeled a lease calling for annual rentals of P50.00 per hectare.
Amban alleged that in 1958, after a good harvest, Canete refused to pay rentals, repeatedly despite demands, and then asserted ownership over the land.
Canete’s answer alleged that he had purchased from Amban the five-hectare portion in 1953, although the deed was executed in 1955.
When the case was called for hearing on October 18, 1962, petitioners and their counsel did not appear, leading to the taking of plaintiff’s evidence ex parte.
The decision described a purported lease contract that allegedly was procured through fraud and deceit and that in reality proved to be a deed of absolute sale.
The decision found that the deed lacked approval by the Provincial Governor as required for conveyances by members of the non-christian tribes, and thus sustained no legally enforceable right in petitioners.

Trial Court Proceedings

After petitioners failed to appear at the October 18, 1962 hearing, the trial court directed that plaintiff’s evidence be taken ex parte before the clerk of court.
The trial court issued a decision on November 23, 1962, ordering petitioners to vacate the disputed land and restore possession to Amban.
The decision further sentenced petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay P100.00 a year as damages from the filing of the complaint until possession was turned over, plus P200.00 as attorney’s fees, and the costs.
Petitioners received a copy of the decision on December 10, 1962.
Petitioners filed an unverified motion for reconsideration on November 27, 1962, seeking to set aside the October 18 order and obtain trial on the merits.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration by order of February 15, 1963.
Amban then moved for execution on January 24, 1963, but the trial court denied execution on February 23, 1963.
Amban sought reconsideration of the denial on March 13, 1963, and the trial court granted execution on March 22, 1963.

Petitioners’ Motions and Relief

Petitioners asserted that their failure to appear at the October 18, 1962 hearing was due to counsel’s medical incapacity and a telegraphic request for postponement.
Petitioners also argued that the case was not ready for trial because a commissioner had been appointed on March 7, 1961 to relocate land, but relocation apparently did not occur due to the commissioner’s move.
After execution was granted, petitioners filed a petition for relief on April 22, 1963, praying for the setting aside of the October 18, 1962 order, the February 15, 1963 order, the March 22, 1963 execution-related order, and the November 23, 1962 decision.
The trial court, presided by Vacation Judge Benedicto, denied the petition for relief on May 13, 1963.

Issues Framed for Certiorari

The primary issue was whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the case on October 18, 1962 despite alleged lack of readiness.
A related issue was whether the trial judge abused discretion in denying petitioners’ procedural requests for postponement, reconsideration, and resistance to execution.
The Court also assessed whether the petitioners’ petition for relief complied with the mandatory requirements of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, including timeliness and verification.
The Court finally examined the merits of petitioners’ asserted ownership based on the deed presented as the basis of their claim.

Readiness for Trial

Petitioners challenged readiness for trial by pointing to an order dated March 7, 1961 appointing a commissioner to relocate the land claimed by plaintiff and the land claimed by defendants.
The record suggested that the appointed commissioner, identified as Marcelino Malate, had moved to Davao City, and no relocation was performed.
The Court held that if relocation was truly important to defendants, they should have taken steps in the trial proceedings, noting that no such move was made.
The Court further held that the alleged lack of relocation did not