Canet vs. Decena

Factual Background

The Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, authorizing petitioner to establish, operate and maintain a cockpit in Sitio Cabuya, San Roque, Bula. The Sangguniang Bayan later enacted Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999, entitled An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl Activities, but the ordinance was returned to the Sangguniang Bayan by respondent Mayor Decena for lacking rules and regulations and a separability clause. The Sangguniang Bayan thereafter adopted Resolution No. 078, Series of 1999, withdrawing and shelving Ordinance No. 001.

Administrative Act and Denial of Permit

Relying on Resolution No. 049, S. 1998, petitioner applied to respondent Mayor Julieta A. Decena for a mayor’s permit to operate the cockpit. Respondent denied the application. She based her denial on the Local Government Code and on the absence of a municipal ordinance that would authorize and regulate the establishment and operation of cockpits and specify the applicable fees.

Trial Court Proceedings

Petitioner filed a complaint for mandamus and damages with an application for preliminary mandatory injunction before the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur, docketed as Special Civil Action No. P-84-99. The respondent moved to dismiss. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and, upon the posting of bond, issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering respondent to approve and issue the mayor’s permit and to accept the fees therefor.

Court of Appeals Proceedings

Respondent sought relief in the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the RTC resolution and writ. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order suspending enforcement of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. On June 3, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling and setting aside the RTC resolution and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and made permanent the Court of Appeals’ earlier writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue Presented

Whether respondent, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, could be compelled to issue a mayor’s permit to petitioner for the establishment, operation and maintenance of a cockpit in the absence of a municipal ordinance authorizing and regulating such activity.

Petitioner’s Contentions

Petitioner conceded the absence of an ordinance but relied on Resolution No. 049, S. 1998, which authorized him to operate a cockpit. He further invoked existing municipal tax ordinances Nos. 01, S. 1989, and 05, S. 1993, which contain general provisions for the issuance of business permits, as sufficient authority for respondent to issue the mayor’s permit.

Respondent’s Contentions

Respondent argued that authority to authorize and license cockpits and to regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang Bayan by Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code of 1991, and that absent an enabling ordinance that prescribes regulatory measures and fees, the mayor lacked legal power to grant the permit.

Legal Analysis and Reasoning

The Court examined Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which expressly vests in the Sangguniang Bayan the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits and to regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks. The Court observed that neither of the municipal tax ordinances cited by petitioner contained specific provisions prescribing reasonable fees or the regulatory framework required for cockpits. The Court found that Resolution No. 049, S. 1998, which merely authorized petitioner, could not substitute for a legislative ordinance that provides regulatory detail and fee schedules. The Court reiterated settled rules of statutory construction: where a statute expressly limits application to certain matters, courts may not extend it by interpretation; express mention excludes others (expressio unius est exclusio alterius); courts may not fill legislative gaps or supply what the legislature omitted by judicial fiat. The Court added that gambling activities, including cockfighting authorized by statute, must be strictly construed and any dou