Title
Caneland Sugar Corp. vs. Alon
Case
G.R. No. 142896
Decision Date
Sep 12, 2007
Caneland Sugar Corp. sought to nullify a mortgage and stop foreclosure, but the Supreme Court ruled the petition moot after the sale, citing P.D. No. 385's mandate on loan recovery.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 202206)

RTC Proceedings and Orders

After petitioner sought injunctive relief, the RTC initially issued an order on July 21, 1999 holding an auction sale in abeyance (the sale originally set for July 23, 1999). Despite that order, subsequent scheduling placed a foreclosure sale on October 15, 1999; the RTC issued an October 14, 1999 order holding that sale in abeyance but then re-scheduled and authorized an extrajudicial foreclosure sale for November 15, 1999. The RTC’s authorization expressly relied on P.D. No. 385, citing its mandatory foreclosure directive and the prohibition against injunctive relief against government financial institutions complying with the decree. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC order was denied on November 8, 1999.

Court of Appeals Proceedings

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunctive relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), which was docketed as CA‑G.R. SP No. 56137. The CA, by decision dated March 22, 2000, denied due course and dismissed the petition for lack of merit, concluding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in authorizing the foreclosure sale. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the CA was denied by resolution dated April 17, 2000.

Issue Presented to the Supreme Court

The principal legal issue brought to the Supreme Court was whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to enjoin the extrajudicial foreclosure of petitioner’s mortgaged properties.

Threshold Disposition — Fait Accompli and Mootness

The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on the sole procedural ground that the act petitioner sought to enjoin had already been consummated: the foreclosure sale was carried out and a Certificate of Sale dated June 26, 2000 had been issued to Landbank. The Court invoked the doctrine against issuing injunctive relief where the acts sought to be enjoined have become fait accompli, noting that there was no longer any actual case or controversy with respect to the RTC’s refusal to enjoin the sale and that deciding the propriety of that refusal would serve no practical purpose.

Decision to Address the Merits Despite Mootness

Although the petition was dismissed on the ground of mootness with respect to injunctive relief, the Court expressly decided the substantive issue as well for the guidance of bench and bar, invoking the exception for questions “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”

Petitioner’s Substantive Contentions and the Court’s Findings

Petitioner did not deny liability on the loan obligation but contended that the promissory notes were silent on whether they were covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation affecting TCT No. T-11292; petitioner also alleged respondent had effectively taken over management and control (implying respondent’s conduct caused petitioner’s financial difficulties). The Court characterized petitioner’s denials as “negative pregnants” — denials that nonetheless imply admission of substantial facts — and found such vague allegations insufficient to establish a prima facie right to the injunctive relief sought. The Court reiterated the well-settled rule that injunctive relief, particularly preliminary injunctions, require at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief.

Application of P.D. No. 385

The Court emphasized the mandatory foreclosure regime established by P.D. No. 385: Section 1 mandates foreclosure by government financial institutions when arrearages (including interest and charges) amount to at least twenty percent of the total outstanding obligation; Section 2 prohibits the issuance of restraining orders or injunctions against a government financial institution in any foreclosure undertaken pursuant to Section 1, except under narrow circumstances (after due hearing and proof that 20% of outstanding arrearages had been paid after foreclosure proceedings). The RTC’s reliance on P.D. No. 385 was thus an appropriate ground for authorizing the foreclosure sale.

Distinguishing Filipinas Marble and Related Precedent

Petitioner sought refuge in the Court’s earlier decision in Filipinas Marble Corporation, which had enjoined foreclosure where the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) had allegedly taken over management, mismanaged the corporation, and misappropriated loan proceeds, with prima facie findings supporting such mismanagement. The Supreme Court distinguished Filipinas Marble: unlike that case, petitioner here did not deny its loan liability and offered only conclusory allegations of respondent’s takeover and wrongdoing; there were no prima facie findings of mismanagement or misappropriation that would justify invoking the exceptional protection recognized in Filipinas Marble. Accordingly, petitioner’s complaints about respondent’s conduct were matters to be determined at trial, not bases for preliminary injunction.

On Allegations of Prejudgment by the Trial Court

Petitioner argued that the RTC’s authorization of the foreclosure constituted prejudgment on the vali

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