Title
Canal Sr. vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 163181
Decision Date
Oct 19, 2005
Bonifacio convicted of Grave Oral Defamation for publicly calling Daylinda a thief; SC affirmed guilt, imposed 6 months imprisonment, and awarded moral damages.
grave oral defamation
thief
imprisonment

Case Summary (G.R. No. 163181)

Nature of the Charge and Content of the Information

The Information charged petitioner with Grave Oral Defamation under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. It stated that petitioner, with deliberate intent to bring Daylinda into discredit, disrepute, and contempt, willfully and publicly uttered insulting words during the incident on July 25, 1996, to wit: “AYAW MO KAHADLOK SA TESTIGOS NI DAYLINDA KAY WALAY BANCA-AGAN, NAHADLOK KAW KANG DAYLINDA, NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT, NABUHI ITON SA PANGAWAT”. The Information provided the English translation as imputing that Daylinda was a thief who lived by stealing. The Information further alleged that the utterance caused mental anguish, serious anxiety, and social humiliation, and thus resulted in a claim for damages.

Arraignment, Initial Trial, and Proceedings in the MCTC

Petitioner was arraigned on November 20, 1997 with the assistance of counsel de parte, Atty. Elias C. Irizari, and he pleaded not guilty. The trial proceeded on the merits. The prosecution presented two witnesses: Daylinda, who testified as to her reaction and humiliation upon hearing the words, and Emelinda A. Kimilat, who testified that she was outside the courthouse during the incident and clearly overheard petitioner’s defamatory utterances. Specifically, Emelinda testified that petitioner said in Filipino that Daylinda’s witnesses were ignorant “nincompoops,” and that Daylinda was a thief who had been living as one.

After the prosecution rested, petitioner indicated through counsel that he intended to file a demurrer to evidence within fifteen days. No demurrer was filed. The trial court then scheduled the reception of defense evidence. The first set date (November 12, 1998) was postponed because the defense witness, Carmelita Salas, was absent. The next hearing was reset to December 4, 1998, but petitioner again sought postponement, allegedly because the fiscal was absent. On January 29, 1999, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Alvizo, again failed to appear. The prosecution orally moved that the case be submitted for decision because the defense had effectively waived its right to present evidence. The trial court granted the motion over petitioner’s objection.

Failure to Seek Reconsideration of the Submission Order

Petitioner did not file any motion for reconsideration of the MCTC’s order submitting the case for decision. Thereafter, on July 2, 1999, the MCTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Oral Defamation. It imposed imprisonment and ordered petitioner to pay moral damages, compensatory damages, and costs, and it referenced that petitioner was to suffer imprisonment he had been previously sentenced to in another case, based on petitioner having filed a petition for probation in that earlier matter.

Appeal to the RTC and Affirmance

Instead of moving for reconsideration of the MCTC’s submission order, petitioner appealed the conviction to the RTC. On August 3, 2000, the RTC affirmed the MCTC’s decision. It held that the trial court correctly declared that petitioner waived his right to present evidence after several settings were given for the defense presentation. The RTC added that the penalty was properly imposed, particularly in light of petitioner’s prior conviction, as it understood the case to be affected by that earlier conviction and probation posture.

Petition to the CA and Denial

Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via petition for review. The CA affirmed the RTC “in toto,” and denied petitioner’s petition. It also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court, asserting that he had been deprived of due process and requesting that the case be remanded for reception of his evidence.

Issues Raised in the Supreme Court

Petitioner argued that the CA sustained his conviction despite the alleged deprivation of his right to due process, because he was allegedly unjustly prevented from adducing evidence due to counsel’s continuous absence. He insisted that he had remained ready to present evidence in the MCTC and that any failure was attributable to counsel, not himself. He also alleged that the appellate court failed to appreciate the facts and that the prosecution did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Due Process Analysis: Opportunity to be Heard and Waiver by Conduct

The Court applied the due process criterion articulated in Siquian v. People. It held that due process in criminal cases is satisfied when the accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, proceeded against under orderly processes of law, punished only after inquiry and investigation, with notice, opportunity to be heard, and judgment within constitutional authority. The Court found that petitioner had been afforded the chance to adduce evidence, but that due to the unjustifiable failure of his witness and his counsel to appear at hearings, the trial court declared the case submitted for decision and considered only prosecution evidence.

The Court emphasized that petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the MCTC’s submission order. It further held that petitioner’s mere physical presence during scheduled hearings did not suffice; readiness to present evidence was equally necessary so that the right would not be deemed waived. The Court recognized that petitioner was granted continuances during the first two hearing dates due to the absence of his witness and/or counsel. Nevertheless, on January 29, 1999, petitioner’s defense was not presented despite due notice, and petitioner did not take corrective procedural steps to challenge the submission order.

The Client’s Binding Effect of Counsel’s Negligence

The Court rejected petitioner’s attempt to shift blame to counsel as futile. It reiterated the jurisdictional rule that the client is bound by the negligence or failings of counsel in the conduct of a case, and cannot complain that the result might have been different had counsel acted differently. It also reasoned that if counsel’s mistakes were readily accepted as grounds to reopen cases, litigation would never end. While acknowledging that exceptions may exist, the Court found that petitioner did not establish excusable negligence to justify reopening or remanding the case, particularly concerning counsel’s non-appearance at the January 29, 1999 hearing.

The Court also noted that petitioner could have dispensed with the services of his counsel de parte and engaged new counsel, but he did not do so.

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence and Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

The Court also addressed petitioner’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It reiterated the fundamental rule that in criminal cases, the burden of proof rests with the prosecution and guilt must rest on the strength of prosecution evidence, not on the weakness of the defense.

The Court held that the prosecution evidence was sufficient. Emelinda A. Kimilat, who was present during the incident, identified petitioner and gave a detailed account of his utterances. Based on her testimony, petitioner publicly called Daylinda a thief and made insulting remarks before people outside the courthouse. The Court characterized “to say that Daylinda is a thief” as irrefragably constituting grave oral defamation because it imputes a crime that is dishonorable or contemptuous.

Correction of the Penalty: Straight Penalty of Six Months

Although the Court affirmed conviction, it modified the penalty. It held that the penalty range under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code for Grave Oral Defamation, as amended, was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, corresponding to four months and one day to two years and four months. For purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, as amended, the Court reduced the minimum term by one degree to arresto mayor in its medium and minimum period, which spans one month and one day to four months.

The Court then corrected the basis for the trial court’s indeterminate sentencing. It found no factual support in the record for the MCTC’s premise that petitioner had been previously convicted and that he filed a petition for probation in another case, as neither the Information alleged a

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