Title
Campao, Jr. vs. Datuin
Case
G.R. No. 172142
Decision Date
Oct 17, 2007
Datuin, convicted of Estafa, claimed new evidence and filed a complaint for Incriminating Against Innocent Persons. SC ruled Quezon City Prosecutor lacked jurisdiction; complaint dismissed.
lack of jurisdiction
further investigation
final and executory
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 172142)

Factual Background

The record showed that an Information for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed against respondent, and that the case that followed resulted in respondent’s conviction of estafa by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71 of Pasig City on May 3, 1999. Respondent’s appeal was ultimately dismissed, and the RTC decision became final and executory on October 24, 2003.

After the conviction became final, respondent asserted that the accusation against him was “false, unfounded and malicious” in view of alleged newly discovered evidence. Acting on that claim, respondent filed in August 28, 2003 a complaint for Incriminating Innocent Persons before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, naming petitioner David B. Campanano, Jr. and Yasunobu Hirota. In the complaint-affidavit, respondent anchored the supposed falsity of the estafa charge on a cash voucher dated June 28, 1993, which he claimed evidenced that the roadrollers he was accused of not having paid were actually purchased by him in cash from the corporation through Hirota, and that the voucher was signed by respondent and Hirota. Respondent further alleged that petitioner and Hirota were criminally liable for Article 363 because the earlier estafa complaint was knowingly baseless and driven by malicious intent.

Proceedings Before the Prosecutor (Quezon City)

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint by Resolution of January 20, 2004. The prosecutor first ruled on jurisdiction, stating that because the estafa case was filed in Pasig City and the testimony given by petitioner was also made in Pasig City, the Quezon City prosecutor had no jurisdiction over the case. The prosecutor additionally observed that the RTC in Pasig City had found merit in the estafa prosecution, and that the earlier petition for review to the Supreme Court had been denied, with an entry of final judgment.

As to the “new evidence,” the prosecutor held that it was not for the Quezon City prosecutor’s office to determine the materiality or immateriality of the alleged cash voucher.

DOJ Review and the Court of Appeals Reversal

Respondent elevated the matter to the DOJ through a petition for review. The DOJ dismissed the petition outright by Resolution of August 20, 2004, holding that it found no error by the prosecutor that would justify reversal of the challenged dismissal, as the resolution was in accord with law and evidence. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied by DOJ Resolution of April 11, 2005.

The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the DOJ resolutions on December 9, 2005, and remanded the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for further investigation.

The Petitioner’s Assigned Errors to the Supreme Court

In the present petition, petitioner Campanano faulted the Court of Appeals in two principal respects. First, he argued that the appellate court improperly treated the counter-affidavit executed in Quezon City as determinative of whether the Quezon City prosecutor had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation. Second, he argued that the Court of Appeals wrongly considered the DOJ dismissal an abuse of discretion, given that the complaint-affidavit appeared to be meritorious.

Issues Addressed by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court addressed whether the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of the Article 363 complaint, and whether the allegations in respondent’s complaint-affidavit established probable cause for Incriminating Innocent Persons under Article 363. In resolving jurisdiction, the Court applied the criminal venue doctrine that venue is an essential element of jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction in criminal prosecutions is determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information. The Court also considered whether the acts alleged fell within the ambit of Article 363, as distinguished from other wrongs such as perjury or malicious prosecution.

Ruling on Jurisdiction and Venue

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the DOJ resolutions. The Court restated that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction, and that the jurisdiction of the trial or prosecuting forum depends on the allegations in the complaint or Information. For purposes of instituting criminal actions, the Court relied on Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Applying that rule, the Court concluded that respondent’s complaint-affidavit did not allege that the charged crime, or any of its essential ingredients, was committed in Quezon City. The only reference to Quezon City in the complaint-affidavit was that it was where respondent resided. Because the complaint did not allege Quezon City as the locus of the offense or of an essential ingredient, the Court held that the Quezon City prosecutor properly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court further rejected the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that jurisdiction in Quezon City was established by the fact that petitioner executed his counter-affidavit in Quezon City. The Supreme Court held that such circumstance did not cure the absence of jurisdictional allegations in the complaint-affidavit.

Ruling on the Sufficiency of Probable Cause Under Article 363

Even assuming arguendo that jurisdiction could be entertained, the Supreme Court held that the allegations in respondent’s complaint-affidavit failed to establish a clear probable cause for Incriminating Innocent Person. Under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court emphasized that the offense punishes a person who, by an act not constituting perjury, directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime. The Court reiterated the elements of the offense: (one) the offender performs an act; (two) by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime; and (three) the act does not constitute perjury.

The Court examined respondent’s own allegations in paragraph 14 of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent asserted that petitioner and Hirota filed a false and malicious estafa charge because the alleged new evidence showed that respondent had already paid for the roadrollers on June 28, 1993. The Supreme Court ruled that Article 363 did not contemplate the idea of malicious prosecution, such as someone instigating a criminal charge in court without justifiable cause. Rather, the Court noted that the offense refers to “incriminatory machination,” particularly acts such as planting evidence and similar conduct that tends directly to cause a false prosecution.

In support of this narrow construction, the Supreme Court cited Ventura v. Bernabe, where the Court had held that allegations that the accused filed a criminal complaint without justifiable cause and testified falsely did not constitute incriminatory machination. The Supreme Court applied the same principle here. Respondent’s narrative, as framed in his complaint-affidavit, did not allege acts of planting evidence or similar conduct that would directly fit within Article 363. At most, it reflected respondent’s theory that the earlier prosecution was baseless and that petitioner’s testimony should be regarded as false due to the supposed cash voucher. The Supreme Court held that such allegations could not sustain a charge under Article 363, because the provision expressly excludes perjury as a means of committing the crime and instead focuses on incriminatory machination of the kind described by jurisprudence.

The Court also addressed the effect of respondent’s conviction. It

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