Title
Camacho vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. L-21850
Decision Date
Apr 29, 1977
Petitioners' certiorari petition dismissed; amended petition and motions untimely, rendering prior resolutions final and executory, stripping court of jurisdiction.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-21850)

Procedural History in the Supreme Court

The original petition for certiorari was filed on September 17, 1963. On September 26, 1963, the Court dismissed the petition “for being factual and for lack of merit.” A copy of the September 26, 1963 resolution was received by petitioner Luis Camacho on October 16, 1963, but the record did not show when the other petitioners were served.

On October 21, 1963, Camacho, personally and assisted by Atty. Abraham R. Castaneda, filed a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to present a motion for reconsideration, which period would expire on October 31, 1963. The Court granted the extension on October 25, 1963. Thus, Camacho’s extended deadline to file a motion for reconsideration would expire on November 15, 1963.

On November 8, 1963, Atty. Castaneda filed a formal appearance as “additional counsel for petitioner Luis Camacho.” On the same date, the petitioners—no longer Camacho alone—through Atty. Llorente (previously counsel of Camacho as intervenor in the court below) and Atty. Castaneda, filed a motion for leave to file an amended petition for certiorari. They asserted that an amended petition, rather than a motion for reconsideration, would better present the “real and new issues.” On November 14, 1963, the Court denied the motion for leave.

Despite the denial, on November 15, 1963, Camacho filed his announced amended petition for certiorari. On November 25, 1963, the Court dismissed the amended petition for lack of merit. Service of the dismissal resolution occurred on November 29, 1963 upon Attys. Llorente and Castaneda.

On December 14, 1963, petitioners, through Attys. Llorente & Associates and Atty. Castaneda, moved for reconsideration of the dismissal. On December 18, 1963, the Court denied the motion, and notification of this denial was received on December 20, 1963 by their counsel.

Without leave of court, on December 23, 1963, Attys. Llorente & Associates and Castaneda filed a second motion for reconsideration on behalf of the petitioners.

The Court’s January 8, 1964 Action and the Issue of Finality

By resolution of January 8, 1964, the Court reconsidered its resolutions of November 25, 1963 and December 18, 1963 and gave due course to the amended petition for certiorari. Upon “mature deliberation,” the Court later held that it had “no more authority or jurisdiction over this case, except to formally set aside the resolution of January 8, 1964.”

The Court anchored this conclusion on the premise that, by January 8, 1964, the prior dismissals had already become “final and unalterable.” It reasoned that the last day for filing a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the original petition, taking into account Camacho’s extension, was November 15, 1963. The other petitioners did not request any extension. The petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration; instead, they filed—through counsel—an amended petition on November 15, 1963, even though their motion for leave to substitute an amended petition had been denied on November 14, 1963.

The Court emphasized that filing an amended petition rather than a motion for reconsideration did not prevent the resolution dismissing the original petition from attaining finality on the relevant deadline. It noted that an amended petition raising new issues and filed beyond the period for appeal was not allowed, which explained the Court’s denial resolution dated December 14, 1963. Even under a “most liberal interpretation” at the time—treating the amended petition as a motion for reconsideration and disregarding defects as to timeliness and the introduction of belated issues—the dismissal of the amended petition on November 25, 1963 caused the dismissal to become final after December 1, 1963.

In computing the deadline for filing a motion for reconsideration, the Court applied the rule that counsel were entitled to move “the day after notice.” It observed that notice of the November 25, 1963 resolution was received by petitioners’ counsel on November 29, 1963, making the next day November 30, 1963, which was a public holiday. Therefore, the deadline became December 1, 1963.

Treatment of Petitioners’ Subsequent Motions for Reconsideration

The Court clarified that petitioners’ subsequent procedural steps reflected an incorrect assumption. When petitioners filed on December 14, 1963 a motion for reconsideration of the November 25, 1963 dismissal, they operated on the belief that their amended petition, instead of a motion for reconsideration, had given them a “new period of fifteen (15) days” after the denial to seek reconsideration anew. The Court rejected that belief as erroneous.

Assuming arguendo that a new period existed, the Court noted that petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was nonetheless denied on December 18, 1963, and the denial resolution was served on counsel on December 20, 1963. Since the motion filed on December 14, 1963 was on the last day of the assumed period, the Court held that the December 18, 1963 denial became final at the latest on December 22, 1963, when viewed alongside the service date of the denial resolution.

The Court then invoked Section 1 of Rule 56 of the Rules of 1940, then in force. It stated that, under that provision, the latest a second motion for reconsideration could be filed was “within two days from notice of the order denying the first motion.” Applying the service date—December 20, 1963—the Court reasoned that the latest filing for a second motion would have been December 22, 1963. Because the petitioners filed their second motion only on December 23, 1963, it was late. The Court further stressed that the second motion was filed “without leave of court,” providing an additional ground for procedural invalidity.

Review on the Merits Was Unavailing on the Point Decisive to Jurisdiction

Aside from procedural finality, the Court addressed, as a “parenthetical” matter, the substantive character of the issues. After re-study, it concluded that the main issues raised by petitioners necessarily involved findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals and that such findings were not shown to be unsupported by substantial evidence. This further supported the appropriateness of dismissal and underscored the absence of a basis to disturb the Court of Appeals’ determinations.

Disposition and Effect of the Court’s

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