G.R. No. L-22645 - Calubayan vs. Pascual

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-22645)

Factual Background

The plaintiffs alleged that, upon their acquisition of the lots on October 22, 1957, they found the defendant already on the premises. After they purchased the properties, they repeatedly notified the defendant that they had become the legal owners and requested that arrangements be made to allow the defendant to continue, “for the meantime,” using the portion he was occupying. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant consistently ignored these requests and did not see the plaintiffs to discuss the proposed arrangement.

On February 2, 1963, the plaintiffs notified the defendant that they now needed the two parcels and demanded that he vacate within twenty (20) days from receipt. The defendant received the letter on February 7, 1963, yet refused to vacate and continued occupying the premises.

Motion to Dismiss and the Jurisdictional Issue

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, characterizing the case as one for ejectment. He relied on the position that the action was filed less than one year after the demand to vacate, a circumstance which, in his view, required that the case be brought before an inferior court exercising exclusive jurisdiction over unlawful detainer/ejectment-type cases.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion. They argued that their purpose was not merely to eject the defendant but to recover possession of the real property occupied by him, which they characterized as falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance under an action for **recovery of possession (accion publiciana).

Appellate Consideration of the Nature of the Action

On appeal, the Supreme Court focused on a central method of resolving jurisdiction: the nature and purpose of an action, and the character of the relief sought, were to be determined from the averments in the complaint.

The Court examined the plaintiffs’ allegations and treated the defendant’s status as significant. While the plaintiffs referred to the defendant as a “squatter,” the Court observed that the defendant’s occupancy had been effectively permitted or tolerated even before the Philippine Realty Corporation sold the lots to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs themselves had found the defendant on the premises when they acquired ownership in 1957. Thus, the Court saw the parties’ interaction as reflecting tolerance and implied permission rather than an original unlawful entry as of the date the plaintiffs acquired the property.

The Court also noted that the plaintiffs did not initiate court action for nearly six years. Only on February 2, 1963 did they notify the defendant that they needed the land and demand that he vacate. The Court reasoned that by allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate or filing an action to eject, the plaintiffs had effectively acquiesced to the defendant’s possession and use.

The Court’s Treatment of “Demand to Vacate” and the One-Year Counting Rule

The Supreme Court held that a person who occupies another’s land at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without a contract between them, is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand. If such a person refuses to leave after demand, the proper remedy is a summary action for ejectment. The Court found the defendant’s position analogous to that of a tenant whose term has expired but whose occupancy continued by the owner’s tolerance.

Accordingly, the Court ruled that the time for counting the period of unlawful withholding should be reckoned from the date of the demand to vacate. The Court addressed what constituted that demand on the facts. It found that the notifications made by the plaintiffs on several occasions, including requests for the defendant to see them, did not show an intention to immediately eject the defendant. The Court characterized those earlier communications as efforts to be recognized as owners and to facilitate “necessary arrangements,” including allowing the defendant to remain “for the meantime” and create an effective landlord-tenant relationship.

Thus, the Court held that the one-year period for purposes of determining whether the case should be treated as ejectment was to be counted from February 2, 1963, when an effective demand to vacate was made. Even if the earlier notifications were assumed to be demands in a broader sense, the Court considered the length of detention still anchored on the last demand, which was on February 2, 1963.

The Court further stated that the plaintiffs’ failure to file suit promptly after earlier refusals or ignoreances amounted to a waiver on their part to eject in the meantime. The Court emphasized that consent to remain in possession could be extended for substantial periods, and the possession became unlawful only upon withdrawal of consent and a demand to vacate followed by the occupant’s refusal to comply.

Ruling on Jurisdiction and Disposition

The Court applied the foregoing principles to the case timeline. The written demand for the defendant to quit was made on February 2, 1963, and the complaint was filed on May 6, 1963. Since the action was filed less than one year from the demand to vacate, the Supreme Court held that the case must be treated as one for ejectment. Ejectment of this character lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts, not the Court of First Instance.

The Court acknowledged the plaintiffs’ allegation of ownership of the parcels. It ruled, however, that an allegation of ownership, when included merely to show the character of the plaintiffs’ possession and not to seek a declaration of ownership, did not convert the action into one cognizable as accion publiciana. The Court observed that the complaint did not pray for a declaration of the plaintiffs’ right to ownership. What the plaintiffs sought, in substance, was possession by ousting the defendant, and that objective was obtainable through a summary ejectment action filed within the prescribed time and before the proper court.

The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the lower court’s order dismissing the case for lack of the proper juri

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-22645)

The case arose from a civil action filed by Carlos Calubayan and Emilia Ferrer against Ciri lo Pascual concerning the possession of two parcels of land in Caloocan City.
The plaintiffs sought to oust the defendant from portions of their registered lands, which the defendant allegedly occupied as a squatter.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs appealed, insisting that their suit was one for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) within the Court of First Instance’s competence.
The Court affirmed the dismissal and held that the action was in truth one for ejectment cognizable by the inferior courts because it was filed within one year from an effective demand to vacate.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Carlos Calubayan and Emilia Ferrer (plaintiffs-appellants) were the registered owners of the disputed parcels of land.
Ciri lo Pascual (defendant-appellee) occupied a portion of the parcels alleged to be illegally occupied.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal on May 6, 1963.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, characterizing the action as ejectment.
The lower court issued an order dismissing the case on September 3, 1963.
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction because the action sought recovery of possession and not only ejectment.
The Court of Appeals was not mentioned; the Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal and the jurisdictional characterization of the complaint.

Key Factual Allegations

The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were the registered owners of two parcels located at the corner of 6th Avenue and F. Roxas Streets, Grace Park, Caloocan City.
The parcels were identified as Lots Nos. 1 and 3, Block No. 48 C of the Subdivision Plan Psd-15136, being a portion of Block No. 48-C of Plan Psd-4212.
The lands were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7200 in the land records of the Province of Rizal.
The plaintiffs stated that they purchased the two parcels from the Philippine Realty Corporation on October 22, 1957.
The complaint alleged that the defendant occupied part of the parcels and that, upon the plaintiffs’ acquisition, the defendant was already on the premises.
The plaintiffs alleged that, “on several occasions,” they notified the defendant that they were the legal owners and requested him to meet them so that arrangements could be made allowing him to continue using the portion he occupied.
The complaint alleged that the defendant ignored these requests and did not see the plaintiffs.
The complaint further alleged that on February 2, 1963, the plaintiffs notified the defendant that they needed the premises and requested him to vacate within twenty (20) days from receipt.
The complaint alleged that the defendant received the letter on February 7, 1963 but refused to vacate.
The complaint’s framing treated the defendant as a “squatter,” while simultaneously describing the plaintiffs’ earlier tolerance for the defendant’s continued occupation pending arrangements.

Jurisdictional Issue Presented

The central issue was whether, based on the complaint’s averments, the case was properly treated as ejectment or as recovery of possession (accion publiciana).
The question turned on the character and purpose of the action, and the relief sought, as determined from the complaint rather than the plaintiffs’ labels.
The defendant argued that the suit should be treated as ejectment because it was filed less than one year after the demand to vacate.
The plaintiffs contended that their purpose was not merely to eject the defendant but to recover possession as owners, thus bringing the action within the Court of First Instance’s jurisdiction.

Applicable Jurisdictional Tests

The Court held that jurisdiction depended on the nature and purpose of the action and the character of the relief sought, which were determinable from the complaint’s averments.
The Court treated the defendant’s status as analogous to a possessor whose occupancy continued due to the owner’s tolerance or permission, absent any contract.
The Court noted that where the occupant’s possession existed by permission or tolerance, the proper remedy for the owner’s withdrawal of consent depended on a demand that effectively asserted the owner’s right to possession.
The Court reasoned that, analogously to a tenant whose lease expired but whose occupancy co