G.R. No. L-252 - Calo vs. Roldan

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-252)

Factual Background

The respondents Regino Relova and Teodula Bartolome filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Laguna alleging ownership and actual possession of two described parcels of land, one rice land and one coconut land, and prayed for an ex parte preliminary prohibitory injunction with a bond of P2,000 and damages of P200. The complaint alleged that the petitioners intended, by force, stealth, threats and intimidation, to enter and harvest the lands and thus render a later judgment ineffectual. The petitioners answered, asserting ownership and actual possession since 1925 and opposed the injunction. At a hearing on August 9, 1945, evidence was received, and the presiding judge, Judge Rilloraza, denied the ex parte preliminary injunction on the ground that the defendants were in actual possession of the lands. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs on August 20, 1945, and was pending. On December 17, 1945, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte urgent petition for the appointment of a receiver of the properties and their fruits; on the same date the respondent judge, Hon. Arsenio C. Roldan, granted the petition and appointed a receiver.

Procedural History

The interlocutory order of December 17, 1945 appointing a receiver in Case No. 7951 prompted the present special civil action in the form of a petition for a writ of certiorari, alleging that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse of discretion. The petition challenged the receivership order as having no available plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal. The record also reflected that a receivership had been appointed by the Court of First Instance of Laguna in a separate case No. 7989, instituted by the same plaintiffs against other members of the Calo family, and the Court addressed that matter insofar as it bore on multiplicity of suits.

Nature of the Action

The Court analyzed the pleadings and concluded that the cause of action asserted by the plaintiffs was an ordinary action of injunction, as the complaint sought to restrain defendants from entering, working, or harvesting the lands allegedly in plaintiffs' possession. The Court emphasized that the nature of the action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint and that a reply or subsequent pleading cannot, without leave of court, change the cause of action into one of a different nature in violation of section 2, Rule 17.

Legal Issues Presented

The principal issue was whether the appointment of a receiver by the respondent judge amounted to an excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, given the character of the principal action and the facts then before the court. Related issues included whether receivership was a proper provisional remedy in an ordinary action for injunction and whether interlocutory orders transferring possession by receivership were proper where title or possession was controverted.

Parties' Contentions

The plaintiffs (respondents below) maintained that they were owners and possessors in good faith of the lands and that appointment of a receiver was necessary to preserve the properties and their fruits from loss. The defendants (petitioners) contended that they were the owners and had been in possession since 1925 and thus opposed any interlocutory transfer or disruption of possession by receivership.

Legal Reasoning of the Court

The Court reviewed the scope and purpose of provisional remedies, holding that attachment, preliminary prohibitory injunction, receivership, and delivery of personal property are available only for preservation or protection of rights during pendency of the principal action and only where the nature of the action warrants them. The Court construed Rule 61, noting that a receiver may be appointed when the applicant has an interest in the property and the property is in danger of loss or when receivership is the most convenient means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in litigation (section 1[b] and 1[e], Rule 61). The Court concluded that receivership is improper where the plaintiff alleges ownership and actual possession of the property, because there is no need to place the property in custodia legis when the plaintiff already possesses it; a plaintiff cannot seek to have property taken from his own possession by appointment of a receiver. The Court further held that where the rights of the parties depend upon determination of adverse claims of legal title and one party is in possession, equity will not ordinarily appoint a receiver to transfer possession before final adjudication. The Court cited the principle expressed in Mendoza v. Arellano and B. do Arellano and authorities summarized in 53 C.J. to justify restraint of interlocutory dispossession.

Application of Rules to the Record

Applying these principles to the record, the Court found that the plaintiffs' complaint asserted an ordinary injunction and that the lower court had earlier denied the preliminary injunction because it found the defendants in possession. The subsequent ex parte petition for receivership rested on the asserted convenience of receivership and the protection of fruits, but the Court determined that those grounds were inconsistent with the plaintiffs' own allegation that they were in possession. Even if the complaint had been amended to raise title disputes, the record indicated that the petitioners were in possession and had planted the crop; under those circumstances equity disfavors appointment of a receiver that would, befo

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-252)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Tranquilino Calo and Doroteo San Jose, Petitioners, filed a special civil action for certiorari challenging an order of appointment of a receiver.
Hon. Arsenio C. Roldan, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, Respondent, issued the order appointing a receiver in Case No. 7951 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
Regino Relova and Teodula Bartolome, Respondents, instituted the underlying suit No. 7951 and sought a preliminary injunction and later the appointment of a receiver.
The petition alleged excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion in the appointment of the receiver and raised the absence of any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the interlocutory order.

Key Factual Allegations

Relova and Bartolome alleged in their complaint that they were the owners and in actual possession of two described parcels of land and that the defendants intended to enter and harvest existing fruits.
The complaint specifically prayed for a preliminary prohibitory injunction and offered a PHP 2,000 bond.
The defendants (now petitioners) answered and asserted ownership and actual possession of the lands since 1925.
At a hearing on August 9, 1945, the court denied the ex parte petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the defendants were in possession.
On December 17, 1945, Judge Roldan granted an urgent ex parte petition by plaintiffs and appointed a receiver for the properties.

Procedural History

The trial court denied the preliminary injunction after hearing evidence and before any final determination on title.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on August 20, 1945, which remained undecided at the time of the certiorari petition.
Plaintiffs then filed an urgent petition for appointment of a receiver on December 17, 1945, which Judge Roldan granted the same day.
Petitioners sought certiorari in the Supreme Court to annul the receivership order as beyond jurisdiction or made with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues Presented

Whether Judge Roldan exceeded his jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing a receiver in Case No. 7951.
Whether appointment of a receiver was a proper provisional remedy in an action whose nature, as alleged in the complaint, was for ordinary injunction and where plaintiffs claimed actual possession.
Whether the appointment of a receiver in a related case No. 7989 was also beyond the trial court's jurisdiction.
Whether respondents should be punished for contempt for enforcing the receivership order.

Contentions of the Parties

Relova and Bartolome contended that they had an interest in the properties and that the fruits were in danger of being lost absent appointment of a receiver.
Petitioners contended that they were owners and in actual possession since 1925 and that appointment of a receiver unlawfully disturbed the status quo.
Petitioners further contended that the action filed by respondents was for injunction and that provisional relief should have been limited to a preliminary prohibitory injunction.

Applicable Law

The nature of an action is determined by the facts alleged in