Title
Calalang vs. Williams
Case
G.R. No. 47800
Decision Date
Dec 2, 1940
A taxpayer challenged traffic regulations restricting animal-drawn vehicles in Manila, alleging unconstitutional delegation of power and infringement on liberty. The Supreme Court upheld the regulations, ruling they were a valid exercise of police power for public welfare.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 47800)

Key Dates

  • July 17, 1940: National Traffic Commission adopts resolution
  • July 18, 1940: Chairman’s recommendation to Director of Public Works
  • August 2, 1940: Director’s indorsement to Secretary with modification
  • August 10, 1940: Secretary’s approval of closures
  • December 2, 1940: Decision promulgated

Factual Background

The National Traffic Commission resolved to recommend the prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles on specified sections of Rosario Street (7:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.; 1:30 p.m.–5:30 p.m.) and Rizal Avenue (7 a.m.–11 p.m.) for one year from the opening of the Colgante Bridge. The Director of Public Works, under Commonwealth Act No. 548, forwarded the recommendation—limiting the Rizal Avenue closure to Azcárraga Street— to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, who approved both closures. The Mayor and Chief of Police of Manila enforced the regulation, barring animal-drawn vehicles and affecting both drivers’ livelihoods and public convenience.

Applicable Law

Commonwealth Act No. 548 grants the Director of Public Works, with the Secretary’s approval, authority to:

  1. Promulgate rules and regulations for safe transit and to prevent obstructions on national roads.
  2. Temporarily close any or all classes of traffic on such roads when road conditions or traffic render it necessary in the public interest.
  3. Regulate construction of structures within a reasonable distance from national roads, subject to Presidential approval.

Issue

Whether Commonwealth Act No. 548:

  1. Constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
  2. Unlawfully interferes with trade or abridges personal liberty and freedom of movement.
  3. Violates principles of social justice by unduly favoring certain groups.

Delegation of Legislative Power

The Court affirmed that Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not delegate legislative power. The Act articulates the legislative policy (“to promote safe transit…and avoid obstructions”) and vests in executive officials only the discretion to ascertain and apply facts (road conditions, traffic volume, public convenience). Reliance on authorities such as Wayman v. Southard and Field v. Clark underscores that legislatures may delegate fact-finding and administrative rulemaking without ceding the power to legislate. The rules issued here implement, rather than formulate, public policy previously declared by statute.

Exercise of Police Power

The Court held that the restrictions derive from the State’s paramount police power, aimed at public safety and convenience. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was enacted to relieve traffic congestion—considered a public menace. Under established jurisprudence (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus; Dobbins v. Los Angeles; People v. Pomar), the State may impose reasonable burdens on personal liberty, property, and business when advancing general welfare. The temporary prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles on key thoroughfares fell squarely within those bounds.

Social Justice Considerat

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