G.R. No. 199886 - Cagayan II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Rapa

Case Summary (G.R. No. 199886)

Factual Background

On October 31, 1998, a motorcycle with three passengers met an accident along the National Highway in Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan. Camilo Tangonan, the driver and owner of the motorcycle, died from the accident. Respondent Rapanan, and a companion named Erwin Coloma, sustained injuries.

Rapanan and Mary Gine Tangonan filed a complaint for damages before the RTC on March 29, 2000. They alleged that while the victims were traversing the national highway, they were struck and electrocuted by a live tension wire from an electric post owned by petitioner. They attributed the mishap to petitioner’s negligence in failing to fix and change the live tension wire despite being allegedly informed by residents that it posed an immediate danger to persons, animals, and vehicles.

Mary Gine’s claims included P50,000 civil indemnity, P25,000 burial expenses, P1,584,000 indemnity for loss of earning capacity, and P100,000 moral and exemplary damages. Rapanan prayed for P10,000 for medical treatment and P50,000 moral and exemplary damages. Both prayed for 30% of the total award as attorney’s fees.

Trial and Evidence Presented to the RTC

In its Answer, petitioner denied negligence and invoked fortuitous events, alleging that typhoons Iliang and Loleng caused some electric poles to fall and high tension wires to snap or cut off, resulting in brownouts in its areas of responsibility. Petitioner asserted that its employees cleared the areas and removed dangling wires immediately after the typhoons to secure safety. It further alleged that the proximate cause was the victims’ own negligence and imprudence in operating and driving the motorcycle.

During trial, respondents testified. Mary Gine stated that she was not married to Camilo but lived with him and had one child. She testified that she spent P20,776 for Camilo’s funeral expenses and submitted an itemized computation. She also claimed Camilo worked as a jeepney driver earning P150 per day and that Camilo’s death caused her sleepless nights and weight loss.

Rapanan testified that he, Camilo, and Erwin Coloma were riding the motorcycle on the highway around 9:00 p.m. He stated that they saw a dangling wire from an electric post, and because of strong wind, they were wound by the dangling wire. He said he suffered electric burns and was hospitalized for seven days. He also claimed he spent about P10,000 for medicines and experienced sleepless nights after the mishap.

Respondents also presented Dr. Triffany C. Hasim, the physician who attended the victims at the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital. Dr. Hasim testified that Rapanan’s abrasions were caused by pressure when the body was hit by a hard object or by friction, but she was uncertain whether a live electric wire caused the abrasions. She further testified that she did not find electrical burns on Rapanan. As to Camilo, she found abrasions and hematoma and opined that the cause of death was cardio respiratory arrest secondary to strangulation, which she said could have been caused by an electric wire entangled around Camilo’s neck.

Petitioner presented four witnesses. SPO2 Pedro Tactac investigated the incident and testified about a skid mark on the cemented portion of the road, approximately 30 meters long, which he considered indicative that the motorcycle was overspeeding. Petitioner’s employees Tranquilino Rasos and Rodolfo Adviento testified that as a result of typhoons Iliang and Loleng, power lines were cut because wires snapped and poles were destroyed. They said that after the typhoons, petitioner’s employees inspected the area, removed dangling wires, and placed snapped wires at the foot of the poles located four to five meters from the road. This relocation was presented as a safety measure after the storm.

RTC Decision and Its Rulings

On December 9, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The RTC held that the proximate cause of the incident was the negligence and imprudence of Camilo in driving the motorcycle. It also ruled that Mary Gine had no legal personality to institute the action because the right to sue for damages due to death belonged to the legal heirs, and Mary Gine was not a legal heir as a common law wife.

CA Proceedings and Decision

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA held petitioner liable for quasi-delict and found that respondents established that the accident resulted from petitioner’s dangling electric wire. The CA observed that regardless of the different versions regarding the occurrence, the consistent fact was the protruding or dangling Cagayan II Electric Cooperative wire to which the victims were strangled or trapped. It further stated that the police blotter and medical certificates, together with the testimony of Rapanan, sufficiently supported respondents’ allegations, which petitioner allegedly did not controvert.

The CA concluded that the dangling wire was the cause of the mishap leading to Camilo’s death and Rapanan’s injuries. It reasoned that without the wire striking the victims, they would not have fallen and sustained injuries. It also found that if petitioner had not been negligent in maintaining its facilities, the mishap could have been prevented. At the same time, the CA attributed partial responsibility to the victims because they were allegedly overspeeding and were not wearing protective helmets. It noted that the single motorcycle carried three persons and treated those circumstances as contributory, though not proximate, causes of the injuries and death.

Issues Raised by the Petition

Petitioner elevated the matter by Rule 45, asserting that the CA’s negligence finding was based on a serious misapprehension of facts and that the CA erred in concluding that the dangling electric wire caused the incident. Petitioner also challenged the CA’s awards to Camilo’s heirs, contending that the heirs were never impleaded as parties. Petitioner further argued that, even assuming liability, the awards of damages and attorney’s fees lacked basis.

Accordingly, two principal issues had to be resolved: (one) whether petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of Camilo’s death and Rapanan’s injuries; and (two) whether damages could be awarded in favor of Camilo’s heirs even if they were not impleaded.

The Parties’ Contentions in Review

Petitioner argued that it could not be held negligent because its crew cleared the roads of fallen poles and snapped wires. It described its method of rolling snapped wires and placing them behind nearby electric poles as a temporary remedy, pointing to evidence that the wires were allegedly placed at the shoulder of the road and tucked away among banana plants. Petitioner relied on the RTC’s findings that Camilo’s high speed caused the motorcycle to careen toward the shoulder where the wire was located and that the proximate cause was therefore Camilo’s recklessness. It also relied on police conclusions drawn from a skid mark.

Respondents insisted that petitioner was negligent in maintaining its facilities and should have ensured that all needed repairs were completed. They maintained that petitioner’s failure to maintain the electric lines caused the accident and that the CA’s finding on causation was correct.

Legal Standards Applied: Quasi-Delict and Proximate Cause

The Court treated the case under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, with fault or negligence, is obliged to pay damages, and where there is no pre-existing contractual relation, such fault or negligence constitutes quasi-delict. The Court reiterated the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict action: (one) damages to the plaintiff; (two) negligence by the defendant (or by some person for whom the defendant must respond); and (three) the connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damages.

The Court found the existence of damages undisputed because Camilo died and Rapanan suffered physical injuries. The Court, however, held that the second and third elements were not established, thereby barring recovery.

Court’s Findings on Negligence and Causation

The Court accepted testimony from petitioner’s witnesses that the electric poles along the highway, including the one where the mishap occurred, were erected about four to five meters from the shoulder. It also found corroborated evidence that after the typhoons, petitioner’s employees rolled fallen electric wires and placed them at the foot of the electric poles to prevent mishaps. These testimonies were supported by the police blotter prepared after SPO2 Pedro Tactac investigated the incident.

The Court quoted and relied on the police blotter excerpt indicating that the motorcycle victims were “accidentally trapped by a protruding Cagelco wire at the shoulder of the road” and that this occurred “due to the over speed of motor vehicle.” The blotter further recorded that the wire strangled the neck of the victims and caused Camilo’s instantaneous death and abrasions on the other victims. The Court treated this as showing that, at the time of the fatal mishap, the wires were positioned on the shoulder far enough from the concrete portion so as not to pose a threat to passing vehicles and pedestrians.

From these premises, the Court reasoned that if the victims were strangled by the wires, the occurrence must have resulted from the motorcycle careening toward the shoulder, or, more likely, from the passengers being thrown off the motorcycle toward the shoulder and catching up with the wires. The Court stated that the manner in which the accident unfolded could not be attributed to petitioner but should be attributed instead to Camilo’s over speeding, consistent with the police investigation.

The Court als

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 199886)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Cagayan II Electric Cooperative, Inc., represented by its manager and chief executive officer, Gabriel A. Tordesilllas, petitioned for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to assail the December 8, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 77659.
Allan Rapanan and Mary Gine Tangonan were the respondents and the prevailing parties in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the December 9, 2002 RTC decision in Civil Case No. 10-305, held Cagayan II Electric Cooperative, Inc. liable for quasi-delict, and awarded damages and attorneys fees.
The Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals decision, and reinstated the RTC dismissal of the complaint for damages of Allan Rapanan and Mary Gine Tangonan.

Key Factual Allegations

On October 31, 1998, around 9:00 p.m., a motorcycle with three passengers figured in an accident along the National Highway of Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan.
The driver was Camilo Tangonan, who died from the accident, while respondent Allan Rapanan and Erwin Coloma suffered injuries.
Respondents alleged that while the victims traversed the highway, they were struck and electrocuted by a live tension wire from an electric post owned by petitioner.
Respondents attributed the mishap to petitioner’s negligence for failing to fix and change the live tension wire despite residents having allegedly informed petitioner that the wire posed an immediate danger to persons, animals, and vehicles.
Mary Gine also claimed expenses for funeral and personal suffering, while Rapanan claimed medical expenses and physical and sleepless-night complaints.

Pleadings and Core Defenses

Respondents filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan on March 29, 2000, and sought civil indemnity, burial expenses, loss of earning capacity, and moral and exemplary damages.
Respondents also prayed that attorneys fees be awarded as thirty percent of the total award.
Petitioner denied negligence and invoked fortuitous events, alleging that typhoons Iliang and Loleng caused electric poles to fall and high tension wires to snap or cut off, which allegedly caused brownouts.
Petitioner claimed that after the typhoons it cleared fallen poles and removed dangling wires immediately to secure safety.
Petitioner argued that the proximate cause was the victims’ own negligence and imprudence in operating and driving the motorcycle.

Trial Evidence Presented

Respondents testified that the victims were wound or trapped by a dangling electric wire and that the mishap occurred in the presence of wind.
Mary Gine testified that she was not married to Camilo but lived with him as a common law wife and that they had one child.
Mary Gine presented testimony and a self-prepared itemized computation of Camilo’s funeral expenses.
Rapanan testified that he saw a wire dangling from an electric post and that strong wind contributed to being wound by the dangling wire.
Respondents presented Dr. Triffany C. Hasim, who testified on injuries and the possible cause of death, including an opinion that the victim’s strangulation could have been caused by an electric wire entangled around the neck.
Petitioner presented multiple witnesses, including SPO2 Pedro Tactac and petitioner employees Tranquilino Rasos and Rodolfo Adviento.
SPO2 Tactac testified to the presence of a skid mark on the road caused by the motorcycle’s foot rest and concluded the motorcycle was overspeeding.
Petitioner employees testified that after the typhoons, electric wires snapped and poles were destroyed, and that petitioner rolled or removed dangling wires and placed them at the foot of the poles located four to five meters from the road.
Petitioner’s defense was corroborated by an excerpt from the Buguey Police Station Police Blotter, which recorded that the motorcycle was over speeding and that the victims were accidentally trapped by a protruding wire at the shoulder, causing Camilo’s instantaneous death and abrasions on the other victims.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals found that a consistent fact was the protruding or dangling petitioner wire with which the victims were strangled or trapped.
The Court of Appeals held that the police blotter, medical certificates, and Rapanan’s testimony established respondents’ allegations and that petitioner did not controvert the circumstances materially.
The Court of Appeals ruled tha