Title
Cagasca-Evangelista vs. Bantag
Case
G.R. No. 251954
Decision Date
Jun 10, 2020
Two inmates convicted of illegal drug sale sought release via habeas corpus, arguing abolition of death penalty and GCTA benefits. SC dismissed, citing valid detention, retained reclusion perpetua, and GCTA exclusion for heinous crimes.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 251954)

Factual Background

The petition arose from the convictions of Reyes and Evangelista by Branch 103, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on December 14, 2001 for violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, for the illegal sale of 974.12 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride. The RTC sentenced both convicts to reclusion perpetua and to pay fines of PHP 500,000 each. The Supreme Court affirmed those convictions in People v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 175281, September 27, 2007. Petitioner asserted that, following the abolition of the death penalty under RA 9346, and taking into account the retroactive application of Good Conduct Time Allowance under RA 10592, the convicts had already served the effective term of imprisonment and should be released.

Petition and Procedural Defects

Petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus praying for the presentation of Reyes and Evangelista and for their release from custody at the New Bilibid Prison. The Court first observed that the petition failed to comply with basic procedural requirements. The petition lacked a verified declaration of electronic submission of the soft copy and omitted the written explanation of service or filing mandated by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The Court treated these omissions as material procedural defects bearing on the petition’s propriety.

Hierarchy of Courts and Appropriate Forum

The Court emphasized the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts. Although this Court shares original and concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the trial courts to issue writs of habeas corpus, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is proper only to resolve questions of law and not factual disputes. The Court cited Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019, and related precedent to explain that matters requiring factual determination must be brought first in the appropriate lower court. The Court concluded that petitioner’s central contention—that the convicts had served their sentences under RA 10592 and its implementing rules—posed a factual question about entitlement to Good Conduct Time Allowance and therefore fell outside the category of matters this Court would ordinarily entertain in the first instance.

Legal Nature and Scope of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

The Court restated the object of the writ of habeas corpus as an inquiry into involuntary restraints of liberty. It noted that where the restraint derives from a judicial process, the scope of habeas corpus is significantly narrowed. The Court invoked Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court to the effect that the writ shall not be allowed when the person is in custody under process or judgment of a court of record which had jurisdiction to render it. The Court reiterated that a writ of habeas corpus may operate as a post-conviction remedy only under exceptional circumstances, namely deprivation of a constitutional right, lack of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, or an excessive penalty void as to its excess.

Application of Rule 102 to the Present Case

Applying Section 4, Rule 102, the Court found that the confinement of Reyes and Evangelista was pursuant to a lawful judgment of a court of record that had jurisdiction. Their sentence traced to convictions affirmed by this Court. Petitioner’s invocation of habeas corpus therefore confronted the presumption of regularity attaching to a valid judicial sentence. The Court observed that petitioner essentially sought post-conviction relief on the ground of an excessive penalty claim arising from subsequent statutory changes; such an argument required more than the limited habeas corpus inquiry would permit in the first instance.

Effect of RA 9346 on the Penalty Imposed by RA 7659

The Court addressed petitioner’s argument that the abolition of the death penalty under RA 9346 reverted the penalty for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs to the prior range under RA 6425. The Court examined Section 1 and Section 2 of RA 9346 and concluded that RA 9346 removed only the imposition of the death penalty and provided alternative penalties in lieu of death. The statute repealed or amended prior laws only insofar as they imposed the death penalty. Section 2 of RA 9346 expressly prescribed reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment in place of death depending on nomenclature. Accordingly, RA 9346 did not repeal the amendment effected by RA 7659 that imposed reclusion perpetua for the sale of two hundred grams or more of shabu. The Court held that the imposition of reclusion perpetua on Reyes and Evangelista remained valid.

Applicability of RA 10592 and the 2019 IRR on GCTA

The Court considered whether the convicts were entitled to deductions from their sentences under RA 10592 by way of Good Conduct Time Allowance. The Court quoted Section 2, Rule IV of the 2019 IRR, which governed GCTA during service of sentence and expressly excluded from entitlement recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees, and persons convicted of heinous crimes. The Court read Section 1 of RA 10592, which contains a proviso excluding persons charged with heinous crimes, as consistent with the implementing rules. Because Reyes and Evangelista were convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs exceeding two hundred grams, the Court classified their offense as a heinous crime under RA 7659, which had so characterized the distribution and sale of dangerous drugs. The Court therefore found that the convicts were excluded from GCTA under the statute and the 2019 IRR.

Force and Application of Administrative Issuances

The Court observed that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies, such as the 2019 IRR promulgated by the Department of Justice and the Department of the Interior and Local Government, had the force of law and were presumptively valid. The Court noted that the validity of the 2019 IRR was not placed in issue in the petition. In those circumstances, courts were obliged to apply the administrative issuance. The Court relied on precedent holding that administrative issuances enjoy a presumption of legality and that courts must respect them unless declared invalid.

Ruling and Disposition

The Court found the petition procedurally defective, improperly filed directly with the Supreme Court in the absence of exceptional circumstances, and substantively without merit. The Court h

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