Title
Cabreza, Jr. vs. Cabreza
Case
G.R. No. 181962
Decision Date
Jan 16, 2012
Marriage annulled; conjugal home sold despite objections. Amparo's complaint to annul sale dismissed due to litis pendentia, forum shopping, and finality of prior court orders.
conjugal dwelling
litis pendentia
forum shopping

Case Summary (G.R. No. 181962)

Factual Background: Dissolution, Authorization to Sell, and Possession

After the 3 January 2001 decision became final, Ceferino moved for the sale of the parties’ only conjugal property, the conjugal home, and for distribution of proceeds as required by law. RTC Br. 70 granted the motion on 26 May 2003, an order which became final after the Supreme Court dismissed Amparo’s petition questioning it (docketed as G.R. No. 162745).

While the finality of the 26 May 2003 order was being enforced, Ceferino filed an Omnibus Motion before RTC Br. 70 to: (1) approve a Deed of Absolute Sale, (2) authorize Ceferino to sign the deed on Amparo’s behalf, and (3) order the occupants to vacate. Despite notice, Amparo and her counsel did not appear; only Ceferino and his counsel attended the hearing. RTC Br. 70 granted the omnibus motion on 2 October 2003, approving the deed and expressly authorizing Ceferino to sign and execute it for and on behalf of Amparo, whose refusal and failure to comply with the 26 May 2003 order were noted. The 2 October 2003 Order further directed that after consummation of the sale, all occupants would vacate to enable the buyer to take complete possession and control.

Consequently, Ceferino executed the deed in favor of BJD Holdings Corporation. He then moved for a writ of possession and for division of the purchase price. RTC Br. 70 issued a 12 May 2004 Order granting the writ of possession. In response, and following the issuance of a 30 June 2004 Notice to Vacate, Amparo moved to hold the writ and notice in abeyance, invoking two arguments: first, that the parties had another conjugal lot apart from the conjugal dwelling; and second, that under Article 129 of the Family Code, the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to her because four of the five children were staying with her. RTC Br. 70 denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals upheld the denial.

Amparo then filed a Supreme Court Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals ruling, docketed as G.R. No. 171260. On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court denied her petition. The Supreme Court ruled that granting relief would effectively modify an already final 26 May 2003 Order authorizing the sale. It held that the factual basis of Amparo’s challenge to the subsequent implementation orders (the writ and notice) had already existed when she questioned the 26 May 2003 order; therefore, she should have raised her arguments then. It also characterized her claim of another conjugal property as a question of fact not proper for a Rule 45 petition, and it treated the concurrent factual findings that there was only one conjugal property as conclusive. The decision in G.R. No. 171260 became final and executory on 5 January 2010.

The Separate Complaint to Annul the Deed and the Trial Court’s Dismissal

While her petition in G.R. No. 171260 was still pending, on 26 January 2005 Amparo filed with RTC Br. 67 a Complaint (Civil Case No. 70269) seeking to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale. She alleged that the deed was void due to lack of her consent. RTC Br. 67 dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding it barred by litis pendentia and forum shopping.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed RTC Br. 67’s dismissal. It concluded there was no litis pendentia and therefore no forum shopping, and it directed that the case be remanded for trial on the merits. Ceferino moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Ceferino then filed the present petition under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 181962, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in overturning RTC Br. 67’s dismissal of Amparo’s complaint during the pendency of Amparo’s petition assailing the writ of possession on the same grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping.

Issue and Governing Standards for Litis Pendentia

The central issue was whether RTC Br. 67 correctly dismissed Amparo’s complaint for declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale on the ground of litis pendentia and, consequently, whether Amparo committed forum shopping.

The Supreme Court reiterated the requisites for a proper invocation of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal: there must be (1) identity of parties or representation, (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, founded on the same facts and basis, and (3) identity of the first two particulars, such that any judgment in one case would, regardless of outcome, operate as res judicata in the other action.

The Parties’ Arguments and the Court of Appeals’ Error on Identity of Rights

As to the first requisite, the Supreme Court found no dispute because the parties were substantially the same in both proceedings.

On the second requisite, the Court of Appeals had applied tests to compare identity of rights and reliefs. It treated the first test as focusing on whether the same evidence would sustain both cases, and it treated the second test as focusing on whether defenses in one case would substantiate the complaint in the other. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no identity of rights asserted because the evidence needed in the complaint for nullity would be the deed itself, while the evidence in the petition against the writ of possession would be RTC Br. 70’s application of Article 129 in issuing the relevant orders.

The Supreme Court rejected that conclusion. It emphasized that RTC Br. 70’s 2 October 2003 Order had already granted authority to Ceferino to sign the deed on Amparo’s behalf and had also ordered that all occupants vacate after sale to permit the buyer to take possession. Under the first test, the same evidence—RTC Br. 70’s 2 October 2003 Order—would defeat both Amparo’s complaint attacking the deed and her petition challenging the writ of possession. The Supreme Court also stressed Amparo’s failure to timely assail the 2 October 2003 order.

The Court of Appeals had further held, under the second test, that the denial of the petition impugning the writ of possession would not necessarily bar the deed-nullification complaint because the latter was premised on Amparo’s lack of consent. The Supreme Court again disagreed. It observed that Amparo sought to prevent the sale and preserve ownership of the conjugal dwelling in both cases. In both proceedings, she advanced the same core theory: first, that the RTC Br. 70 decision and its subsequent orders improperly modified each other and that the sale directives improperly altered the effect of the final dissolution and liquidation order; and second, that under Article 129 the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to her as the spouse with whom a majority of the common children chose to remain. Because both cases contested the same orders implementing the sale and the same basis for adjudication under Article 129, the Supreme Court held that the same defense—RTC Br. 70’s 2 October 2003 Order—would defeat both actions.

The Court likewise considered that the later writ of possession was the logical consequence and implementation of the sale and of the approval embodied in the Deed of Absolute Sale previously authorized by RTC Br. 70. Thus, the two cases were, in substance, belated attempts to impugn the final sale-authorizing orders already upheld in earlier failed challenges.

The Third Requisite: Res Judicata Would Attach Between the Proceedings

On the third requisite, the Supreme Court reasoned that a final judgment on the merits by a court with jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter in the petition impugning the writ of possession would have barred a subsequent judgment on the complaint to annul the deed based on res judicata.

From RTC Br. 67’s standpoint at the time Amparo filed the deed-nullification complaint, the petition in the Court of Appeals was already pending. Therefore, the Court of Appeals’ later final determination on the propriety of the writ of possession necessarily involved and upheld the validity of the deed that the writ sought to implement. Conversely, if the Court of Appeals had nullified the writ based on Amparo’s grounds, then upholding the complaint to annul the deed would have required a ruling that the underlying sale directive was improper. That impropriety would necessarily have extended to subsequent orders implementing the sale, including RTC Br. 70’s authorization for Ceferino to sign the deed on Amparo’s behalf. For that reason, the Supreme Court concluded that RTC Br. 67 correctly found the requisites of litis pendentia present.

Forum Shopping as a Consequence

Having ruled that litis pendentia had been properly invoked, the Supreme Court held that Amparo necessarily committed forum shopping. It referenced Buan v. Lopez, which recognized that forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.

Clarification on Res Judicata and the Effect of the Dismissal in G.R. No. 171260

The Supreme Court then clarified a point to avoid doctrinal confusion. While it reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated RTC Br. 67’s dismissal, it stated that res judicata could not be automatically treated as applicable merely because the Supreme Court dismissed Amparos Petition in G.R. No. 171260 and that dismissal had become final.

The Court explained that a final judgment must be a judgment on the merits for res judicata to apply. It reiterated the principle that a judgment may be considered on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, despite formal, technical, or dilatory objections, or when it is rendered after a determination of which party is right rather than on a preliminary, formal, or merely technical point. It also cited American jurisprudential treatment that dismissals not considered on the merits include dismissals based on the court’s procedural inability to consider the case.

Applying these standards, the Supreme Court noted that G.R. No. 171260 had been dismissed based on a procedural inab

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