Title
C-J Yulo and Sons Inc. vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 133705
Decision Date
Mar 31, 2005
Donee leased donated land without donor's consent; donor sought revocation. Court upheld donation, ruling breaches casual and aligned with donation’s purpose.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 133705)

Facts of the Donation

On September 24, 1977, petitioner executed a deed of donation conveying a 41,117-square-meter parcel (registered under TCT No. T-82803) to respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc. The deed, which the donee accepted, described the donee’s mission and recited that the land was donated to establish and support a home for the aged and infirm, with ancillary agricultural use to sustain residents and limited permissive commercial leasing subject to prior written consent of the donor.

Material Conditions in the Deed of Donation

The deed contained express conditions: (1) the land or so much as needed shall be used for construction of a home for the aged and infirm (admitting residents regardless of creed, with retirees/priests excepted and residents paying what they can); (2) a 15-meter green belt to be established; (3) portions not needed for residence/greenbelt to be used for agriculture for residents’ consumption and to raise funds; (4) commercial use by leasing allowed only with the donor’s prior written consent and subject to prescribed uses of rentals; (5) annual masses to be celebrated for the Yulo family; and (6) a reversion/trust clause providing that, absent compliance or without prior written consent for prohibited dispositions, the land and improvements would revert in trust to the donor for disposition to another charitable organization the donor deems fit.

Post-Donation Use and Leases by the Donee

After issuance of a new TCT in the donee’s name (T-91348), the donee leased portions of the donated property on three occasions without securing the donor’s prior written consent as required: circa 1980 to Martin Gomez (sugar cane cultivation) — lease ended 1985; 1986 to Jose Bostre (ranch use, explained as protection and fund generation for electrification and construction of a nucleus building called "Casa dela Merced") — later terminated; and subsequently to Rudy Caballes (cattle fattening) — also without prior written consent.

Donor’s Revocation and Demand for Reconveyance

By board resolution dated September 20, 1990, petitioner notified the donee via letter (signed by its president Miguel A. Yulo) that the donation was revoked pursuant to Section 5 of the deed because of the donee’s material breach of the deed’s conditions, and requested turnover of TCT No. T-91348. The donee replied November 5, 1990, denying material breach, asserting continued compliance, and refusing to turn over the title.

Commencement of Litigation and Trial Court Ruling

Petitioner filed suit for revocation of the donation with reconveyance on November 19, 1990, alleging non-construction of the home for the aged, present use as cattle farm under lease, and lack of prior written consent for leases. The donee defended, asserting it was attempting compliance and that the leases were entered with the express but unwritten consent of a Yulo family member; it also pleaded prescription, claiming the donor knew of the leases since 1980. The Regional Trial Court (Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34) rendered judgment for the donor on December 22, 1995, declaring the deed of donation revoked, ordering the donee and those claiming under it to vacate and surrender peaceful possession and to turn over the TCT for cancellation and reissuance in favor of the donor.

Court of Appeals Reversal

The donee appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 45392). In its Decision dated December 19, 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and upheld the donation, concluding that the donee’s breaches were casual and did not defeat the donation’s purpose; therefore revocation was improper. The CA denied the donor’s reconsideration in a resolution dated April 30, 1998.

Issue Presented to the Supreme Court

The donor petitioned for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, contending the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that revocation was improper. Central legal questions included the nature of the donation (whether onerous), the governing legal rules (law on contracts vs. law on donations), whether the donee’s acts constituted substantial breaches warranting rescission under Art. 1191, and prescription of the donor’s right to revoke.

Classification of the Donation and Choice of Governing Law

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the donation was onerous because the donee was saddled with the reciprocal obligation to establish and operate a home for the aged and infirm on the property. Citing Art. 733, the Court reiterated that donations with onerous cause are governed by the rules on contracts; consequently, remedies and standards applicable to contracts (including rescission under Art. 1191) apply rather than the special rules on donations.

Standard for Rescission and Application to the Facts

Under the contract-based standard, rescission for non-performance requires a substantial and fundamental breach that defeats the object of the contract; slight or casual breaches do not warrant rescission. The Court found that the three leases, though entered without the donor’s prior written consent, were aimed at generating funds and protecting the property to further, not defeat, the purpose of establishing the home. The deed itself contemplated leasing for commercial use, subject to the donor’s written consent; hence the leases without written consent were characterized as casual breaches rather than substantial ones that would render the donation nugatory.

Consideration of Prior Doctrine on Absolute Conditions

The Court recognized that an absolute prohibition or condition that unreasonably restrains ownership (e.g., a century-long prohibition on alienation) may be declared illegal or impossible under Art. 727 and treated as not imposed, citing precedent. It reasoned that treating the prior written consent requirement as absolute in every instance would impose an unreasonable restriction on ownership and could nullify otherwise permissible acts that do not detract from the donation’s purpose. A reasonable construction of the condition is preferred: where acts (like leasing) do not undermine the dona

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