G.R. No. L-2068 - Bustos vs. Lucero

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-2068)

Procedural posture and relief sought

After a preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol, petitioner was bound over (committed) to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for trial. Petitioner, via counsel, moved in the Court of First Instance that the record be remanded to the Justice of the Peace so that the complainant and her witnesses could be produced again for cross‑examination on their prior testimony given at the preliminary investigation. The respondent judge denied the motion. The petitioner instituted the present special civil action (mandamus) to compel remand; the Supreme Court was asked to review the denial.

Facts established at the preliminary investigation

At the preliminary investigation the accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross‑examined “in the manner and form provided by law.” The fiscal and private prosecutor objected, invoking Section 11 of Rule 108, and the objection was sustained by the Justice of the Peace. Thereupon, counsel for the accused announced intention to renounce the accused’s right to present evidence, and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance.

Legal issue presented

Whether the Court of First Instance acted in excess of jurisdiction or abused its discretion in refusing to remand the record to the Justice of the Peace to allow the complainant and her witnesses to be recalled and cross‑examined; and whether Section 11, Rule 108 (as interpreted) infringes upon the accused’s right to confront and cross‑examine witnesses guaranteed under the Constitution or otherwise impairs substantive rights beyond the Supreme Court’s rule‑making power.

Majority reasoning and disposition

The Court (majority) dismissed the petition with costs. The majority held that the respondent judge did not act in excess of jurisdiction or abuse his discretion in denying the remand. The majority relied on the recent decision in Potenciana Dequito and Carlos Saling Buhay v. Hugo O. Arellano, G.R. No. L‑1336, which sustained a Justice of the Peace’s exercise of discretion in permitting the recall and cross‑examination of complainant’s witnesses at preliminary investigation. The majority construed Section 11 of Rule 108 as not curtailing the inherent discretion of a justice of the peace or judge conducting a preliminary investigation to pursue procedures reasonably calculated to elicit the truth. The Court emphasized that while Section 11 defines the bounds of a defendant’s rights at preliminary investigation, nothing in the rule strips the court of its authority to take discretionary measures to bring out the truth. The majority also stated the constitutional right of confrontation does not apply to preliminary hearings; the absence of a preliminary examination does not constitute an infringement of the accused’s constitutional right to confront witnesses. The majority noted that preliminary investigation may be dispensed with entirely without violating the accused’s due process rights to a fair trial.

Reliance on precedent (Dequito decision)

The majority’s approach is grounded on their prior ruling in Dequito v. Arellano (G.R. No. L‑1336) where, in a case materially involving recall and cross‑examination at a preliminary investigation, the Court sustained the justice of the peace’s discretionary recall of witnesses despite objections. That decision was rendered by a divided court; the majority there likewise read Section 11 to permit judicial discretion, while emphasizing that a defendant cannot compel recall as an absolute right.

Dissenting opinion — Justice Feria (principal points)

Justice Feria dissented. He emphasized that the accused’s refusal to present evidence at the Justice of the Peace did not constitute a waiver of his claimed right to be confronted with and to cross‑examine prosecution witnesses at the preliminary investigation. He pointed out that counsel’s subsequent motion to remand the case to the Justice of the Peace to conduct that confrontation demonstrates the accused’s intent to preserve that right. Justice Feria framed the central legal contention as constitutional: Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution (the Court’s rule‑making limitation) grants the Supreme Court power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure but forbids rules that “diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.” He argued that the right to confront and cross‑examine witnesses at preliminary investigation, although statutory and not constitutional per se, is nevertheless a substantive right for accused persons outside Manila (historically grounded and protective of accuseds against unwarranted committal and public accusation). By reading Section 11 of Rule 108 to deprive the defendant of that right or make it wholly discretionary, the Court effectively diminished a substantive right. Therefore, Justice Feria concluded, Section 11 (as construed) exceeds the Supreme Court’s rule‑making authority and is null and void; accordingly, he would have granted the petition.

Dissenting opinion — Justice Perfecto (principal points)

Justice Perfecto concurred in dissent with a complementary view: Section 11 of Rule 108 must be read and applied so as not to contravene the constitutional guarantee that an accused be allowed “to meet the witnesses face to face” (cited as Sec. 1(17), Art. III in the dissent). He argued that, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by Rule 108, the defendant is entitled as a fundamental right to hear the testimony of prosecution witnesses and to cross‑examine them. Perfecto stressed that preliminary hearings are not merely technical but c

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-2068)

Citation and Decision

Reported at 81 Phil. 640.
G.R. No. L-2068.
Date of decision: October 20, 1948.
Opinion delivered by Justice Tuason.
Final disposition: The present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
Justices Moran, C. J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones concurred.
Justices Feria and Perfecto each filed separate dissenting opinions.

Parties and Posture

Petitioner: Dominador B. Bustos, an accused in a criminal case.
Respondent: Antonio G. Lucero, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
Procedural posture: Special civil action (mandamus) attacking denial by the Court of First Instance of a motion to remand the record to the Justice of the Peace of Masantol for the purpose of confronting and cross-examining the complainant and her witnesses.

Factual Background

The accused, Dominador B. Bustos, appeared with counsel at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga.
The Justice of the Peace informed him of the charge and asked whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty; he pleaded not guilty.
Counsel for the accused moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined "in the manner and form provided by law."
The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to that motion, invoking Section 11 of Rule 108.
The Justice of the Peace sustained the objection.
Thereupon, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence.
The Justice of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance, where the accused was bound over for trial.
After the case was bound over, counsel for the accused filed with the Court of First Instance a motion praying that the record be remanded to the Justice of the Peace to permit the accused to cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses concerning their testimony as the basis for the warrant for arrest.
The Court of First Instance denied that motion; the denial is the subject of the present petition.

Procedural Issue Presented

Whether the Court of First Instance acted in excess of jurisdiction or abused its discretion in refusing to remand the record to the Justice of the Peace to permit the accused to cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses after the preliminary investigation and binding over.

Relevant Law and Authorities Referred To in the Opinion

Section 11 of Rule 108 (provisions governing preliminary investigation) — invoked by fiscal and private prosecutor to oppose recall and cross-examination at preliminary hearing.
Constitutional provisions cited in the opinions:
- Section 13, Article VIII (power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, with the proviso that such rules "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights").
- Section 1(17), Article III (guarantee to "meet the witnesses face to face") — referenced by Justice Perfecto in dissent.
General Order No. 58 and Act No. 194 — referenced by Justice Feria in discussion of statutory rights to preliminary investigation.
Case cited and analyzed: Potenciana Dequito and Carlos Saling Buhay v. Hon. Hugo O. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336 — previously promulgated and discussed in the majority opinion.

Majority Opinion — Disposition and Reasoning (Justice Tuason)

Disposition:
- The petition is dismissed; the respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in denying the accused's motion to return the record for purposes of confronting and cross-examining the complainant and her witnesses.
Key reasoning points:
- The Court left open ("Leaving aside the question") whether the accused's announced renunciation of his right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation estopped him from later seeking the confrontation; notwithstanding that question, the Court found no jurisdictional excess or abuse of discretion by the respondent judge.
- Reference to Potenciana Dequito and Carlos Saling Buhay v. Arellano: in that case the Justice of the Peace allowed, over the complainant's objection, the recall of the complainant and her witnesses to permit cross-examination, and the Supreme Court sustained the Justice of the Peace's order.
- The Court construed Section 11 of Rule 108 as not curtailing the sound discretion of the Justice of the Peace. The majority stated that "while Section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
- The majority emphasized that, however, "the defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complainant and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest."
- The Court further observed that the constitutional right of an accused "to be confronted by the witnesses against him" does not apply to preliminary hearings; the absence of a preliminary examination will not be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses.
- The majority stated that preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
- The majority noted that the decision in Potenciana Dequito was rendered by a divided court, and that the minority in that case went further than the majority by denying any discretion in the court holding a preliminary investigation to compel witnesse