G.R. No. L-47185 - Buscayno vs. Enrile

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-47185)

Factual Background and Procedural History

The petition alleged that the respondent military commission had no authority to try petitioner, a civilian. The decisive premise of petitioner’s theory was anchored on an asserted “termination” of the martial law or authoritarian regime upon the plebiscite held on October 17, 1976. Petitioner further contended that any judgment the military commission would render would violate Article X, Section 9, which requires that every decision of a court of record “shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based.”

As to the material chronology, the facts were stated in the petition with modifications admitted in the answer. Petitioner was arrested and charged while his trial before Military Commission No. 2 had already started. The trial continued after his arraignment. On October 25, 1977, he filed the habeas corpus and prohibition petition. On December 3, 1977, he filed an urgent supplemental petition, prompting respondents to submit a comment that quoted in full a presidential directive dated November 29, 1977.

The Respondents’ Comment and the Presidential Directive

In the respondents’ comment to petitioner’s urgent supplemental petition, respondents quoted a presidential order dated November 29, 1977. The quoted portion stated, in substance, that despite the lengthy trial and the opportunities granted to the accused, and despite the severity of the charges and the consequent penalty (death), the President directed that the accused “get another opportunity” and that the military commission reopen the trial to receive the arguments, witnesses, and other evidence that the accused and their co-accused might wish to present. The Court treated this presidential directive as crucial to the relief petitioner sought, because it afforded the mechanism for further proceedings that would address alleged procedural infirmities, assuming arguendo that the proceedings were vitiated by constitutional infirmity.

The Principal Legal Issue

The Court framed the “decisive issue” as the power of military tribunals to try individuals who were not members of the armed forces. It treated petitioner’s claims as requiring reconsideration or distinction from the controlling doctrine already laid down in Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission, in which the Court had ruled against the contention that military commissions lacked jurisdiction over civilians.

The Court’s Ruling on the Alleged Loss of Jurisdiction after October 17, 1976

Petitioner’s attempt to introduce a “novel aspect” relied on an allegation that the military commission “lost” its judicial power on October 17, 1976 when the Filipino people terminated the authoritarian regime established by the Commander-in-Chief, as reflected in the ratification of constitutional amendments. The Court refused to carve out a different result. It held that there was no valid distinction sufficient to justify a different ruling, especially in light of Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission.

To address the asserted effect of the plebiscite and the termination of the authoritarian regime, the Court relied on an excerpt attributed to then Chief Justice Makalintal in Aquino Jr. v. Ponce Enrile, which explained that the state of rebellion and its attendant conditions justified the continuing measures against subversion even if armed hostilities were not uniform across all provinces. The opinion treated rebellion as including clandestine and subtle subversion, propaganda, recruitment, procurement of arms and materials, sabotage, and intelligence activities that could not be effectively countered outside the emergency framework.

The Court also invoked the concept that the validity of the martial-law-related proclamations had been foreclosed by transitory provisions in the 1973 Constitution, referencing the transitory provision described in that excerpt and citing Javellana v. Executive Secretary. The Court thus treated the question of effectivity and the effect of the subsequent constitutional developments as matters already laid to rest by earlier decisions and by political realities in the conduct of national affairs.

The Commander-in-Chief Power and the Ratification Doctrine

The Court further reinforced its conclusion by underscoring that the President acted as Commander-in-Chief precisely because he remained the incumbent President. It cited Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections to explain the constitutional allowance for proclamations, orders, and decrees during martial law, and it reiterated the doctrine that such measures remained part of the law of the land. The Court quoted the rule that decrees and instructions issued by the incumbent President prior to the approval by the Constitutional Convention and prior to the people’s ratification would remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after the lifting of martial law or the ratification of the 1973 Constitution, unless modified, revoked, superseded by subsequent Presidential acts, or expressly and specifically modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.

Confirmation of Military Commission Jurisdiction over Civilians in Aquino Jr.

The Court then relied on the authoritative holdings in Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission. It reiterated that Military Commission No. 2 had been “lawfully constituted” and “validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner.” The reasoning in the earlier Aquino Jr. decision was summarized in the Court’s opinion: Proclamation No. 1081 was held valid and constitutional; the President had broad authority compatible with emergency requirements; General Orders and Presidential Decrees had created military tribunals and defined their jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over certain public-order-related and subversion-connected offenses; and the constitutional provisions during the martial-law period authorized such measures, which were treated as part of the law of the land.

Procedural Due Process and the Form of Tribunal

The Court also treated due process arguments as foreclosed by Aquino Jr.. It reiterated the doctrinal point that the constitutional guarantee of due process did not require any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. It held that a military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, with due accusation, notice and opportunity to defend, and trial before an impartial tribunal, satisfied procedural due process. The Court described Presidential Decree No. 39 as establishing procedures that assured observance of fundamental procedural due-process requisites, including due notice, fair and impartial trial, and reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense.

Impartiality and Lack of Presumptions of Prejudice

The Court also rejected petitioner’s claim of lack of impartiality as already addressed in Aquino Jr.. It treated as unjustified the notion that prejudice could be presumed merely because the President had acted or because the military commission was created by executive action. The Court emphasized that prejudice could not be presumed, particularly when weighed against the people’s trust in the President and the President’s legal oath to do justice. It likewise considered it unjustifiable to presume that members of the military commission and reviewing authorities, including the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of National Defense and their respective supporting judge advocates, would disregard justice or violate duties to act fairly and impartially.

The Article X, Section 9 Argument and the Court’s Treatment of Military Commission Decisions

An additional issue raised by petitioner was that a judgment of the military commission would violate Article X, Section 9 because it did not emanate from a court of record. The Court reasoned that a military commission terminated with a guilty or not guilty verdict. It suggested that a military commission was not a court of record in the constitutional sense and that the procedure and the form of judgment had been approved in Aquino Jr., citing the applicable constitutional framework under transitory provisions. The Court further reasoned that the record of proceedings was available to reviewing authorities, which reduced any claim of arbitrariness that the constitutional requirement sought to avoid.

Reaffirmation of Doctrine and the Court’s Disposition

The Court noted that less than a year earlier it had sustained, in Gumaua v. Major General Romeo Espino, the power of the President to create military commissions or courts martial not only for members of the armed forces but also for civilian offenders. It also observed that the earlier sequence of cases had involved judicial review of the presidential authority to issue martial-law decrees and the validity of constitutional ratification matters. The Court treated petitioner’s effort to stigmatize the period between September 22, 1972 and October 17, 1976 a

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-47185)

The case involved an application for a writ of habeas corpus and a proceeding in prohibition filed by Bernabe Buscayno to challenge his trial before Military Commission No. 2.
The petition was directed against Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Secretary of National Defense; Gen. Romeo C. Espino, Chief of Staff, AFP; Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Chief, PC; Military Commission No. 2; and Col. Miguel Aure, Philippine Constabulary.
The Court resolved the petition by applying the controlling rulings in prior Aquino cases sustaining the authority of military tribunals to try civilians during the martial law period, while addressing Buscayno’s asserted “novel” constitutional objections.
The separate opinion of Teehankee, J. reiterated a dissent position that civilians were entitled to trial by regular civil courts and that military commissions were not part of the judicial system exercising judicial power.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Bernabe Buscayno filed the petition for habeas corpus and prohibition on October 25, 1977.
The petition was followed by an urgent supplemental petition dated December 3, 1977.
The Court treated the controversy as involving the continuing question of the power of military tribunals to try individuals who were not members of the armed forces.
The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that the asserted distinctions did not justify a departure from the prior Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission ruling.
Teehankee, J. filed a separate dissenting opinion, voting to grant the petition and to direct endorsement of the charges to the corresponding civil court.
The text reflected that Teehankee and retired Justice Munoz Palma dissented in related earlier proceedings, while the majority here sustained denial.

Key Factual Allegations

The petition alleged that Buscayno was arrested in Barrio Sto. Rosario, Mexico, Pampanga as a ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), specifically the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the New People’s Army (NPA).
Buscayno faced two criminal cases before Military Commission No. 2, one for violation of R.A. No. 1700 and another for murder.
Buscayno was also an accused in the MV Karagatan case for rebellion before Military Commission No. 1.
The facts showed that Buscayno’s trial before Military Commission No. 2 had already started prior to his arrest, and continued after his arraignment.
The majority identified a “novel aspect” in Buscayno’s allegation that Military Commission No. 2 had “lost” its judicial power after October 17, 1976, due to the people’s termination of the authoritarian regime or military dictatorship and the alleged effect on jurisdiction after constitutional changes.
The majority noted that Buscayno contended that any judgment rendered by the commission would violate Section 9, Article X of the Constitution.
The separate dissent recorded that a death sentence had been imposed by the military commission on the evening of November 25, 1977, despite counsel’s assertions about a motion for postponement and the purported failure to allow defense preparation.

Core Legal Issues Raised

The primary issue was whether military commissions retained jurisdiction to try civilians despite Buscayno’s argument that after October 17, 1976, the military commission no longer had power.
The petition also invoked the contention that judgment by the military commission would violate Article X, Section 9 because the decision of a tribunal must clearly state the facts and law on which it is based.
The “novel aspect” was framed around the alleged constitutional effect of the people’s termination of authoritarian rule and the alleged incompatibility of subsequent judgments with Section 9, Article X.
The majority characterized the decisive issue as one already raised and decided adversely to Buscayno in Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission.
The separate dissent additionally treated as an issue whether the reopening ordered by the President could proceed before the same or a different military tribunal, invoking Article 50-A of the Articles of War.

Constitutional and Statutory Framework

The majority relied on the constitutional basis for the President’s martial law authority and the continuing validity of presidential acts during the martial law period under transitory provisions.
The Court referenced the 1935 Constitution commander-in-chief clause as the constitutional foundation for martial law measures sustained in the earlier framework.
The decision discussed Proclamation No. 1081 and the existence of a state of rebellion, treating it as continuing and not limited to armed clashes in selected regions.
The majority treated the question of the validity of Proclamation No. 1081 as foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution and reinforced by Javellana v. Executive Secretary.
The ruling cited Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, including the provisions that affirmed the continued validity of presidential decrees and acts during martial law unless modified, revoked, superseded, or expressly repealed by proper authority.
The Court cited the constitutional principle that civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military under Article II, Section 8.
The petition’s Article X, Section 9 claim required that a decision of a court of record clearly and distinctly state the facts and law on which it is based.
The separate dissent invoked Article X, Section 1, 1973 Constitution (judicial power allocation) and Article XVII, Section 8 (continuation of courts and jurisdiction rules).
The separate dissent relied on Article 50-A of the Articles of War to argue that a rehearing must be conducted by a tribunal composed of officers not members of the original court.
The dissent treated military commissions as executive instruments not constituting “courts” within the judicial system exercising judicial power.

Arguments of the Parties

Buscayno argued that after October 17, 1976, the military commission was deprived of any power to try him because the people had terminated the authoritarian regime or military dictatorship.
Buscayno also argued that the constitutionally significant event on October 17, 1976 meant that any judgment thereafter would violate Section 9, Article X of the Constitution.
Respondents countered that the controlling doctrine