Title
Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff
Case
G.R. No. 64261
Decision Date
Dec 26, 1984
Search warrants issued against newspapers deemed invalid due to lack of probable cause, specificity, and unconstitutional prior restraint on press freedom.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 221133)

Procedural Posture and Relevant Chronology

Search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982 and executed that day, producing seizures of printing machinery, vehicles, papers and other materials. Petitioners filed the instant petition in this Court on June 16, 1983, challenging the validity of the warrants and seeking return of seized property and injunctions against use of the seized items in the criminal prosecution. Respondents answered and raised procedural defenses including failure to first seek quashal in the issuing court, laches, and estoppel; the Solicitor General later manifested that respondents would not use the seized articles as evidence until the legality of the seizure was finally resolved, rendering the preliminary prohibitory relief moot.

Court’s Discretion to Hear the Petition Despite Procedural Objections

Respondents argued dismissal for failure to move for quashal before the issuing judge; they also asserted laches because the petition was filed more than six months after the seizure. The Court acknowledged both points but exercised its discretion to take cognizance of the petition because of the gravity and urgency of constitutional questions raised and the public interest involved (noting televised and widely publicized nature of the searches). Petitioners’ explanation for delay—attempts to obtain extrajudicial return of property through presidential channels and other efforts—was accepted as negating abandonment and sufficient to defeat laches. The Court also rejected estoppel based on petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.’s prior use of some documents in a separate criminal case, finding ownership and lawful control permitted such use without affecting the validity of the warrants.

Examination Under Oath and the Allegation of Noncompliance with Rule 126

Petitioners initially argued the issuing judge failed to personally examine the applicant and witnesses under oath as required by Sec. 4, Rule 126 and Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. At the hearing petitioners conceded that an examination under oath was in fact conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses, rendering that objection moot and academic.

Description of Place to Be Searched — Typographical Error and Its Effect

One warrant (No. 20‑82[b]) contained a clause indicating the items were kept at No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, although the warrant’s opening paragraph and the affidavit identified 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue as the place to be searched. Petitioners contended this ambiguity invalidated the warrant for failure to particularly describe the place. The Court treated the inconsistent reference as a typographical error, noting that two separate warrants were applied for and issued to search two distinct premises and that Col. Abadilla, who led the execution, was the affiant and thus had prior knowledge of the intended place. The Court relied on authority that an executing officer’s knowledge and the affidavit in the court file may resolve warrant ambiguities; accordingly the typographical defect did not nullify the warrant.

Seizure of Property Belonging to Third Parties

Petitioners objected that the warrants were directed only against Jose Burgos, Jr., but property belonging to co‑petitioners was seized. The Court applied Section 2, Rule 126, which authorizes seizure of: (a) property that is the subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds; and (c) property used or intended to be used to commit an offense. Ownership is not a precondition for seizure; control or possession by the person named in the warrant is sufficient. Hence items belonging to others but in the possession or control of the target (here, Jose Burgos, Jr.) were legally seizable.

Movable vs. Immovable Character of Machinery and Equipment

Petitioners argued that some of the seized machinery constituted immovable property under Article 415 of the Civil Code. The Court explained the settled rule that machinery may become immovable when affixed by the owner of the tenement but generally remains movable when placed by a tenant or other person with a temporary right, absent agency showing. Petitioners did not claim ownership of the premises; therefore the machinery bolted to the premises remained movable for purposes of seizure under a warrant.

Probable Cause and Particularity: Constitutional and Rule 126 Requirements

The Court found merit in petitioners’ central contention that the affidavits and application failed to establish probable cause with the particularity required by Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Probable cause for search requires facts and circumstances that would lead a prudent person to believe an offense has been committed and that specified objects connected to the offense are at the place to be searched. Where the subject is a newspaper publisher or editor, the affidavit must specify with particularity the allegedly subversive material published or intended to be published; general allegations and conclusions will not suffice. The application’s statement that the publisher “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion” was held to be a conclusion of law and insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.

Sufficiency of Affidavits and Requirement of Personal Knowledge

The joint affidavit of Metrocom intelligence officers alleging that “evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises ... were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities ...” was also deemed inadequate. The constitutional prescription that the judge determine probable cause “after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce” requires that those persons possess personal knowledge of facts supporting probable cause. Broad, conclusory assertions that restate an intelligence unit’s general conclusion do not meet the Alvarez standard requiring that the oath attest to facts within the personal knowledge of affiants capable of convincing the magistrate of probable cause.

General Warrant Doctrine and Overbreadth in the Description of Items

The warrants were invalidated for being tantamount to general warrants. The listing of items to be seized was overbroad and non‑particular: for example, categories such as “all printing equipment ... and any and all documents ... related to the ‘WE FORUM’ newspaper” and “subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives ... [of specified movements]” failed to describe the materials with the necessary particularity. The Court invoked Stanford v. Texas and analogous authorities holding too‑general descriptions (e.g., “books, records, pamphlets” relating to a political movement) render a warrant constitutionally invalid. The Court stressed the historical danger of roving commissions and held that such general seizure powers are inconsistent with the constitutional protection against unre

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