Case Summary (G.R. No. 163938)
Key Dates
Incident: January 1, 1994, circa 3:00 a.m. Trial judgment (RTC): April 7, 1998. Appellate disposition (Court of Appeals): November 13, 2003. Supreme Court decision: March 28, 2008.
Facts of the Incident
On the early morning of January 1, 1994, Adelina Borbe was at home watching over her sick child when she heard noise outside. Looking through a window she observed four men — later identified as Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. — congregating in front of her nipa hut. Upon stepping outside, she saw the roof on fire and shouted for help; the four men fled. Nearby, Olipiano Berjuela, who heard the screams, ran over and, by flashlight, identified Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos, Antonio Cornel, Jr., and saw Rolando Buela running away.
Indictment and Accusation
An Information charged the four accused with arson under P.D. No. 1613, alleging that on or about January 1, 1994, at 3:00 a.m., the accused, "conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage," wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of Adelina B. Borbe.
Evidence at Trial
Prosecution evidence was primarily the testimony of private complainant Adelina Borbe and the eyewitness Olipiano Berjuela. They recounted seeing the accused at the scene immediately before the roof caught fire, and the accused fleeing when alarm was raised. The prosecution relied on these accounts to establish identity and conduct at the material time.
Defense Case at Trial
The defense principally advanced denial and alibi. Each accused presented testimony and witnesses claiming presence elsewhere: Rolando Buela claimed to be at a novena at his parents’ house; Dante Buebos claimed to have been at another residence and to have left at noon on January 1; Sarmelito Buebos claimed he was at home and never left; Antonio Cornel, Jr. claimed to have been at his residence and alleged he learned of the accusation only days later. These alibis and supporting witnesses were credited by the defense as creating reasonable doubt.
RTC Disposition
The Regional Trial Court (Branch 18, Tabaco, Albay) convicted all four accused of arson beyond reasonable doubt and imposed an indeterminate penalty ranging from six years and one day of prision mayor (minimum) to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal (maximum), plus costs.
Court of Appeals Disposition
The four appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty on the ground that the Information did not specify the particular provision of P.D. No. 1613 violated — specifically it did not allege the house was an "inhabited house" or that it was situated in a populated/congested area. Concluding the accusation properly stated only a violation of Section 1 (simple arson), the CA downgraded the crime to simple arson and imposed an indeterminate sentence ranging from six years of prision correccional (minimum) to ten years of prision mayor (maximum).
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
Petitioners raised two principal issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction based on circumstantial evidence; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding conspiracy. The recourse was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Legislative and Doctrinal Overview of Arson Law
The Court traced the legislative history: prior multiple Revised Penal Code articles on arson were supplanted by P.D. No. 1613 (1979), which defined and classified arson (Section 1 as simple arson; Section 2 and Section 3 providing for more severe penalties for destructive or other cases such as inhabited houses). P.D. No. 1744 (1980) and R.A. No. 7659 (1993) affected Article 320 (destructive arson) of the Revised Penal Code, with Article 320 providing severe penalties for burning certain buildings, conveyances or public edifices and for group perpetrators; subsequent repeal of the death penalty by R.A. No. 9346 (2006) removed capital punishment. The Court emphasized the distinction between destructive arson (Art. 320 RPC) and simple/other cases of arson (P.D. 1613), and observed that classification depends on the kind, character and location of the property burned.
Standard for Conviction by Circumstantial Evidence
The Supreme Court reiterated the requisites for circumstantial evidence conviction under Rule 133, Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence: (a) more than one circumstance; (b) proven facts from which inferences are drawn; and (c) the combined circumstances produce moral certainty of guilt to the exclusion of all others. The Court confirmed that circumstantial evidence is permissible and may yield conviction if it forms a complete, unbroken chain of events pointing to the accused.
Application of Circumstantial Evidence to the Case
Applying the standards, the Court found the facts proved—noise at about 3:00 a.m., observation of the petitioners and co-accused in front of the hut, the immediate ignition of the roof, and the group’s flight when help was called—constituted multiple, proven circumstances forming an unbroken chain that left no reasonable doubt as to petitioners’ culpability in setting the hut on fire. The Court therefore upheld conviction based on circumstantial evidence.
Conspiracy: Legal Standard and Application
The Court stated the rule that conspiracy is established when two or more persons agree to commit a crime; proof need not be direct and may be inferred from conduct showing a common plan. It is unnecessary to show an explicit prior meeting of minds; acting in concert suffices, and the act of one becomes the act of all. Here, the Court found conspiracy r
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Case Caption, Citation and Court
- Full citation: 573 Phil. 347 THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008 ].
- Parties: Dante Buebos and Sarmelito Buebos, Petitioners; The People of the Philippines, Respondent.
- Decision authored by Justice R.T. Reyes; Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares‑Santiago was on official leave; Acting Chairperson Austria‑Martinez and Justices Tinga, Chico‑Nazario, and Nachura concurred; an additional member was designated per Special Order No. 497 dated March 14, 2008.
Procedural Posture
- Petition is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 questioning the Court of Appeals (CA) decision that affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC) conviction for arson.
- RTC case: Criminal Case No. T-2563, Tabaco, Albay; RTC judgment dated April 7, 1998.
- CA decision: November 13, 2003, penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos; CA affirmed with modification the RTC judgment.
- Relief sought: Petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos appealed the CA decision to the Supreme Court raising specified issues.
Factual Background
- Date and time: January 1, 1994, around 3:00 o’clock in the morning.
- Private complainant: Adelina B. Borbe was in her nipa hut at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay, watching over her sick child when the incident occurred.
- Initial disturbance: Adelina heard noise around her house; upon looking through the window and then stepping outside, she saw four accused — Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. — congregating in front of her hut.
- Fire outbreak and flight: Adelina saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire; she shouted for help, and the four persons fled instead of aiding her.
- Third‑party witness: Olipiano Berjuela, who was nearby drinking with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year’s Eve, heard Adelina scream for help, ran to the scene, saw people jumping over the fence, focused his flashlight on them and identified Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr.; he also saw Rolando Buela running away.
- Resulting action: Based on Adelina’s complaint, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson.
The Information (Accusatory Allegation)
- The Information alleged that on or about January 1, 1994 at 3:00 o’clock in the Barangay Hacienda, Island of San Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, the accused, “conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter’s damage and prejudice.”
- The Information referenced a violation of P.D. No. 1613 (the decree on arson) but did not specify the particular section or expressly allege that the house was inhabited or situated in a populated or congested area.
Prosecution Evidence
- Principal witnesses: Private complainant Adelina Borbe and Olipiano Berjuela supplied the prosecution’s narrative and identification testimony.
- Testimony highlights:
- Adelina’s testimony that she saw the four accused in front of her house and the roof catching fire, and that they fled as she shouted for help.
- Olipiano’s testimony of identifying petitioners and co‑accused running away after Adelina’s cry for help, effected by using a flashlight.
Defense Evidence and Theories
- Primary defenses: Denial and alibi.
- Summary of defense alibis (as summarized by the trial court):
- Rolando Buela: Claimed presence at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay for a novena prayer on the death anniversary of his late grandfather.
- Dante Buebos: Claimed to have been at Romeo Calleja’s from the evening of December 30, 1993, leaving at 12:00 noon on January 1, 1994.
- Sarmelito Buebos: Claimed to have been at his residence at sitio Malictay, Hacienda San Miguel and never to have left his house that day.
- Antonio Cornel, Jr.: Claimed to have been at his residence at AAgas after visiting his in‑laws and that he only learned of the accusation five days after the incident; witnesses were presented to corroborate these testimonies.
RTC Disposition
- Trial court finding: On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all four accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson.
- Dispositive sentence imposed by the RTC: Each accused was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; costs were imposed.
- RTC basis: The RTC convicted under the applicable law as construed at trial (the RTC’s legal basis is later discussed in the Supreme Court decision).
CA Disposition and Rationale
- CA disposition: On November 13, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification, reducing the penalty.
- Modified sentence by CA: Each accused sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
- CA’s legal rationale for modification:
- The CA concluded that the accused could only be convicted of simple arson (punishable by prision mayor under P.D. No. 1613, Section 1) and not of burning an inhabited house (which would merit reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua), because the Information failed to allege with specificity that the burned house was an “inhabited house” or that it was situated in a populated or congested area.
- The CA held that the Information’s failure to specify the particular provision of P.D. No. 1613 or to allege the qualifying circumstance reduced the charge to simple arson.
Issues Raised to the Supreme Court
- Petitioners’ principal assignments of error presented to the Supreme Court:
- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that conspiracy existed in the case at bar.
Overview and Legislative History of the Law on Arson (as discussed by the Court)
- Historical breadth: Previously, arson was defined and penalized under multiple articles of the Revised Penal Code (Articles 320–326‑b) with varying classifications.
- P.D. No. 1613 (issued March 7, 1979) supplanted the penal code provisions on arson; pertinent provisions quoted or summarized in the decision include:
- Section 1 (Arson): Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another punished by prision mayor; same penalty when one sets fire to one’s own property under circumstances exposing to danger the life or property of another.
- Section 2 (Destructive Arson): Penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua for specified properties (e.g., ammunition factories, archives, churches, trains, hospitals, hotels, buildings in populated areas).
- Section 3 (Other Cases of Arson): Penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua when the property burned includes “Any inhabited house or dwelling” and enumerates other categories.
- Section 4 (Special Aggravating Circumstances): Specifies aggravating circumstances that warrant imposition of penalty i