Title
Buac vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 155855
Decision Date
Jan 26, 2004
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC has jurisdiction over annulment petitions for plebiscite results, emphasizing its constitutional mandate to ensure the integrity of plebiscites, and ordered the reinstatement of the Taguig case.
jurisdiction
plebiscite
annulment
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 155855)

Factual Background

A plebiscite was conducted for the ratification of Republic Act No. 8487, proposing the conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a city. The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers initially failed to complete canvass of all returns and prematurely declared that the negative votes prevailed. The COMELEC en banc ordered the Board to reconvene and complete the canvass, which the Board did and then issued an Order proclaiming the negative votes prevailed.

Petition Filed with the COMELEC

Petitioners filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the plebiscite results and prayed for revision and recount of the ballots, alleging fraud and irregularities in the casting and counting of votes. The petition was docketed as an election protest, designated EPC No. 98-102, and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.

Proceedings in the COMELEC Second Division

The COMELEC Second Division initially gave due course to the petition, treated it as akin to an election protest, and ordered the Taguig ballot boxes brought to its Manila office for revision and recount by committees created for that purpose. The Division thereafter received an unverified Motion for Reconsideration from intervenor Alan Peter S. Cayetano asserting lack of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over plebiscite protests.

Reversal by the COMELEC Second Division and En Banc

On November 29, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division granted the Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition, holding that the COMELEC lacked jurisdiction because resolving the petition would require exercise of quasi-judicial powers not contemplated under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. The COMELEC en banc affirmed that ruling by Resolution dated October 28, 2002, concluding that controversies over plebiscite results are administrative and fall within the RTC under Section 19(6), B.P. Blg. 129.

Petition to the Supreme Court and Contentions of the Parties

Petitioners sought certiorari and mandamus relief to annul the COMELEC en banc Resolution and to compel the COMELEC to proceed with revision and recount. They argued that constitutional authority to enforce and administer laws relative to plebiscites vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to adjudicate and correct plebiscite results and that the COMELEC had exercised such jurisdiction in a similar Malolos plebiscite case. Respondents contended that there exists no legal concept of a plebiscite protest in the Constitution or statutes; that the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial powers are confined by Section 2(2), Article IX-C to contests involving elective officials; and that, to the extent judicial power is implicated, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction under Section 19, B.P. Blg. 129.

Supreme Court Disposition

The Court granted the petition. It directed the COMELEC to reinstate the petition to annul the results of the 1998 Taguig plebiscite and to decide it without delay. The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Puno. Chief Justice Davide, Jr. and Justices Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, and Azcuna concurred. Justices Carpio and Carpio Morales filed dissenting opinions, with Justice Callejo, Sr. joining the latter dissent and Justice Tinga taking no part.

Nature of the Controversy and Judicial Power

The Court framed the case as one concerning the ascertainment of the sovereign decision of the electorate of Taguig, namely whether the electorate approved the conversion to cityhood. The Court held that the controversy did not fit the paradigm of traditional judicial power because it did not principally involve the vindication of a legally demandable private right in an adversarial suit. The majority reasoned that a plebiscite primarily determines public will and therefore the dispute centered on protection of popular sovereignty rather than private rights to be resolved by the regular courts under Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

Inapplicability of Section 19, B.P. Blg. 129 to Plebiscite Disputes

The Court rejected reliance on Section 19, B.P. Blg. 129 as a basis for RTC jurisdiction. It observed that the cited provisions of Section 19 pertain to civil actions and that a civil action entails enforcement or protection of rights between private persons. The majority held that controversies over plebiscite results are not classic civil actions for enforcement of private rights and thus do not fall within the civil-jurisdiction framework that Section 19 prescribes.

Prudential Concerns Against Vesting RTCs with Plebiscite Jurisdiction

The Court warned that entrusting RTCs nationwide with jurisdiction over plebiscite protests would produce disorder, especially in the case of national plebiscites where multiple trial courts would be empowered to decide a single national controversy. The majority concluded that such dispersal of jurisdiction would impede orderly administration of justice.

Constitutional Allocation of COMELEC Powers

The Court examined the constitutional scheme and concluded that the Constitution relegates only contests involving elections, returns, and qualifications of elective officials to courts or quasi-judicial bodies, while other controversies touching on the conduct of plebiscites fall within the administrative enforcement and administration powers of the COMELEC. The majority read Section 2(1), Article IX-C as granting the COMELEC authority "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of ... plebiscite" and found that such authority necessarily includes power to correct canvassings and to determine true plebiscite results by means such as revision and recount.

Scope of COMELEC's Power to Enforce and Administer Plebiscites

Relying on precedent emphasizing the need to equip the COMELEC with necessary and incidental powers to ensure honest and credible elections, the Court held that the power to enforce plebiscite laws includes power to cancel proclamations, supervise canvassing, and order revision of ballots. The majority reasoned that denying the COMELEC authority to ascertain true plebiscite results by revision would render nugatory its constitutional mandate to enforce plebiscite laws.

Historical Practice and Competence of the COMELEC

The Court noted the historical practice of entrusting plebiscite conduct and determination to the COMELEC and emphasized the Commission’s institutional expertise in ballot appreciation. The majority critiqued the COMELEC’s inconsistent stance, pointing out prior instances where the Commission assumed jurisdiction over similar plebiscite revision cases, citing the Malolos matter as factually illustrative.

Procedural Defect in Intervenor's Motion for Reconsideration

The Court further held that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by intervenor Alan Peter S. Cayetano was filed late, contrary to Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and therefore the Second Division lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. The majority observed that Cayetano admitted receipt of the Division’s October 3, 2001 Resolution on October 9, 2001, but filed his Motion only on October 19, 2001, beyond the five-day period.

Dissenting View of Justice Carpio

Justice Carpio dissented, asserting that the Constitution expressly confines the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial jurisdiction to contests involving elective officials under Section 2(2), Article IX-C. He argued that

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