Title
Borjal vs. Wenceslao
Case
G.R. No. 126466
Decision Date
Jan 14, 1999
Petitioners Borjal and Soliven were held liable for libel against Wenceslao, but the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, ruling Wenceslao was not sufficiently identified as the subject of the articles.
libel
freedom of expression
damages

Case Summary (G.R. No. 126466)

Factual Background

Petitioners were among the incorporators and principal officers of Philippines Today, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star. At the time relevant, Arturo Borjal was President of the company and a regular columnist who wrote the column “Jaywalker.” Maximo Soliven was Publisher and Chairman of the Editorial Board. Respondent Francisco Wenceslao was a civil engineer, businessman, consultant and journalist who served as technical adviser to a House subcommittee and was later elected Executive Director of the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT), an initiative promoted as a joint government-private sector project to draft an omnibus land transportation bill.

Publications at Issue

Between May and July 1989, petitioner Borjal published a series of Jaywalker columns in The Philippine Star that criticized an unidentified “organizer of a conference.” The columns accused that organizer of soliciting funds for a purportedly unsophisticated conference, using names of high government officials without consent, engaging in shady deals including alleged extortion attempts, and associating with influence-peddling to procure favors in exchange for contributions. The columns did not name Francisco Wenceslao or explicitly identify the FNCLT in most items.

Private Respondent’s Reaction

Respondent Francisco Wenceslao publicly asserted that he was the person referred to in the columns. He wrote letters to The Philippine Star disputing the allegations and challenging petitioner Borjal to prove misuse of funds or, in the alternative, to resign should proof be shown that Borjal used his column to obtain clients for his PR firm. He filed an ethics complaint with the National Press Club. Thereafter he filed a criminal libel complaint against petitioners and others, and subsequently instituted a civil action for damages for libel, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-7058 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City.

Criminal Proceedings and Civil Suit

The criminal libel complaint was dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor on August 7, 1990 for insufficiency of evidence. The dismissal was sustained by the Department of Justice and later by the Office of the President. On October 31, 1990, respondent filed the civil libel action. Petitioners answered and interposed compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys’ fees and costs.

Trial and Court of Appeals Rulings

The trial court found for respondent and awarded P1,000,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P200,000.00 moral damages, P100,000.00 exemplary damages, P200,000.00 attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed liability but reduced the monetary award to P110,000.00 actual damages, P200,000.00 moral damages and P75,000.00 attorneys’ fees plus costs, and held that respondent was sufficiently identifiable from the columns although not named, that the writings were defamatory, and that publication in a newspaper of general circulation defeated any claim of qualified privilege.

Petitioners’ Contentions on Review

Petitioners asserted before the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred in several respects: that respondent was not sufficiently identified; that the appellate court improperly discounted the DOJ and Office of the President findings of insufficiency of evidence in the criminal investigation; that the writings were qualifiedly privileged and the privilege was not lost by publication in a newspaper; that the New York Times v. Sullivan standard for public officials and public figures applied and required proof of actual malice; that respondent failed to prove actual malice; and that if Borjal were liable, Soliven should not be held solidarily liable.

Identifiability Issue

The Supreme Court examined identifiability as a threshold element of libel and reiterated that the victim must be identifiable to at least a third person and that mere self-recognition by the claimant is insufficient. The Court found that the Jaywalker columns did not sufficiently identify Francisco Wenceslao as the “organizer” because the columns did not name him, the FNCLT was not consistently identified in the texts, conference letterheads and programs did not designate him as the organizer, and respondent himself had admitted he was only part of the organization. The Court emphasized that respondent’s own letter to the editor revealing his identity was the source of public identification and that, absent that disclosure, the public would not have known who was meant. On that ground alone the Court concluded that identifiability was grossly inadequate.

Privilege and Free Speech Doctrine

The Supreme Court addressed whether the columns were privileged communications and canvassed the distinction between absolute and qualified privilege. The Court observed that Art. 354, Revised Penal Code enumerates certain privileged communications but is not exhaustive. The Court reaffirmed that fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged, and that the doctrine of privileged communications arises from the constitutional guarantee of free speech and free press under Art. III, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution. The Court rejected the appellate court’s restrictive construction of Art. 354 and held that public-interest fair comment is within the protective ambit of privileged communication.

New York Times v. Sullivan and Public Figure Analysis

The Supreme Court applied the New York Times v. Sullivan principle to the case and classified respondent Francisco Wenceslao as a public figure by virtue of his role as Executive Director and spokesman of a public-interest conference organized jointly by government and private sectors. The Court held that the FNCLT’s objectives, fundraising from the public, and involvement of prominent officials and businessmen placed the conference squarely within public debate. The Court further explained that even if respondent were not a public figure, a private person who becomes involved in a matter of public interest may be the subject of public comment. Consequently, the constitutional protection against libel judgments unless actual malice is proven applied.

Actual Malice and Burden of Proof

The Supreme Court clarified that the privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice that normally attaches to defamatory words. It placed on respondent the burden to prove actual malice, defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The Court found that respondent did not prove by preponderant evidence that petitioner Borjal acted with ill will or with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard. The Court noted that reasonable errors or inaccuracies do not alone establish actual malice and that the press must be allowed a margin for honest mistakes in the exercise of free expression.

Documentary Evidence and Good Faith Findings

The Supreme Court reviewed the record and identified documentary and testimonial evidence that bore on the reasonableness of petitioner Borjal’s statements. The Court found evidence supporting several factual bases for the colu

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