Title
Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan
Case
G.R. No. 110503
Decision Date
Aug 4, 1994
Governor Bolastig challenged mandatory preventive suspension under Anti-Graft Law after being charged for overpricing paper purchases; SC upheld suspension as mandatory under RA 3019.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 110503)

Factual Background

The information alleged that on or about June 24, 1986, in Catbalogan, Samar, petitioner, as OIC Governor and a member of the Bids and Awards Committee, together with two other public officers, entered into a purchase contract with a private supplier for one hundred reams of onion skin paper, size 11" x 17", at a unit price of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00). The information further alleged that the prevailing unit price for the item was Fifty-Five Pesos (P55.00) or a total of Five Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government in the amount of Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00).

Criminal Proceedings and Arraignment

Petitioner was arraigned before the Sandiganbayan on January 5, 1993, where he pleaded “not guilty.” On January 25, 1993, the Special Prosecution Officer moved for petitioner’s preventive suspension pendente lite, invoking Republic Act No. 3019, sec. 13, which provides in part that any incumbent public officer against whom a criminal prosecution under a valid information under that Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is pending in court shall be suspended from office.

Sandiganbayan’s Resolution Ordering Suspension

On March 18, 1993, the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution’s motion and ordered petitioner suspended from office for a period of ninety days. The Sandiganbayan reasoned that preventive suspension was mandatory under sec. 13, Republic Act No. 3019 and that the only requirement for granting or denying suspension was that the accused stood charged under a valid information for any of the enumerated crimes. Implementation of the March 18 resolution was initially held in abeyance pending petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied on March 29, 1993.

Petition for Certiorari and Grounds for Relief

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, alleging that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion by ordering preventive suspension despite the prosecution’s failure to show any public interest to be served, any injury to be prevented, or any other compelling factual circumstance that would justify suspension. Petitioner contended that the Sandiganbayan should determine necessity in light of the legislative intent of the Anti‑Graft Law and should order suspension only when it would prevent the accused from using office to influence witnesses, tamper with records, or continue committing malfeasance.

Prosecution’s and Solicitor General’s Position

The Solicitor General maintained that, upon the filing of a valid information charging an offense under Republic Act No. 3019 or the other enumerated statutes, preventive suspension pendente lite was mandatory. The Solicitor General relied on established precedents, including Bunye v. Escareal, Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, and People v. Albano, which held that the court had no discretion to refuse suspension once a valid information was filed for the specified offenses.

Supreme Court’s Legal Analysis on Mandatory Suspension

The Court held that the Sandiganbayan acted according to law in ordering petitioner’s preventive suspension. The Court reiterated the settled rule that sec. 13, Republic Act No. 3019 makes preventive suspension mandatory for any incumbent public officer against whom a valid information for the enumerated offenses is filed. The Court explained that the trial court had neither discretion nor duty to probe whether preventive suspension was separately required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses, tamper with records, or commit further malfeasance. The Court analogized the rule to the issuance of an arrest warrant upon a finding of probable cause, observing that the law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade jurisdiction before issuing a warrant.

Duration of Preventive Suspension and Its Source

The Court clarified that the ninety-day period of preventive suspension was not prescribed in sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 but was adopted from sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807), now sec. 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Court explained that the duration of preventive suspension is coextensive with the period prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases: the suspension lasts less than ninety days if the case is decided within that period and up to ninety days if it is not decided within ninety days. The Court applied this principle analogously to criminal prosecutions under Republic Act No. 3019.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Additional Contentions

The Court rejected petitioner’s argum

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