Title
Binay vs. Sandiganbayan
Case
G.R. No. 120681-83
Decision Date
Oct 1, 1999
Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over municipal mayors accused of graft; no due process or double jeopardy violations found.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 142396)

Petitioners and Respondents (specifics)

Petitioner Jejomar Binay faced three informations (one for Art. 220, two for Sec. 3(e) R.A. 3019) alleging acts in 1987 while he was Municipal Mayor of Makati. Petitioners Mario Magsaysay et al. were charged in informations arising from overpricing allegations relating to a school landscaping project; one information was filed in the RTC of Batangas City and another, later, in the Sandiganbayan.

Key Dates and Filing Events

Significant events include: initial Ombudsman/Tanodbayan preliminary work and COA reports in the late 1980s and early 1990s; the Sandiganbayan informations against Binay filed in 1994; Republic Act No. 7975 taking effect May 16, 1995; Binay’s motions (quash, reconsideration), suspension pendente lite (April/June 1995), and petition to the Supreme Court (July 1995); the RTC information against Magsaysay filed August 11, 1995; another information filed in the Sandiganbayan February 9, 1996 (amended May 17, 1996); R.A. No. 8249 later amending jurisdictional provisions and taking effect in February 1997. The Supreme Court consolidated the petitions and resolved the jurisdictional and related issues.

Applicable Law and Primary Legal Questions

Primary statutory and constitutional materials: Presidential Decree No. 1606 (creating Sandiganbayan), R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989), R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249 (both amending Sandiganbayan jurisdiction), Rule 110 and Rule 117 of the Rules of Court (duplicity, motions to quash), and the 1987 Constitution (including the right to speedy disposition). Central legal questions: whether municipal mayors fall within the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive original jurisdiction under the amended statutes; how transitory provisions (Section 7 of R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249) apply to pending cases; and attendant issues of speedy disposition, estoppel, double jeopardy, duplicity, and forum shopping.

Procedural History — Binay matters

Ombudsman filed informations against Binay in September 1994; Binay moved to quash based on due process delay, which the Sandiganbayan denied (March 29, 1995; motion for reconsideration likewise denied after procedural step allowing a reply). The prosecution moved for suspension pendente lite and the Sandiganbayan suspended Binay for 90 days (April/June 1995). R.A. No. 7975 took effect on May 16, 1995. Binay then moved to refer his cases to the RTC, which the Sandiganbayan denied (July 4, 1995). Binay petitioned the Supreme Court, obtaining temporary relief; the High Court directed allowance of his reply, after which the Sandiganbayan again denied reconsideration and reiterated suspension orders. Binay also alternatively urged dismissal for alleged inordinate preliminary investigation delay and lack of probable cause.

Procedural History — Magsaysay matters

Ombudsman investigation produced recommendations for filing. An information was filed in the RTC (Aug 11, 1995) by one set of Ombudsman officers; later another information concerning essentially the same facts was filed in the Sandiganbayan (Feb 9, 1996; amended May 17, 1996). The Sandiganbayan initially denied a motion to quash (June 21, 1996) but suspended proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of the jurisdictional question in the Binay matter. The Sandiganbayan later granted the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration (Oct 22, 1996) and set the case for arraignment; petitioners sought relief in the Supreme Court and a TRO was issued to prevent further proceedings in the Sandiganbayan.

Issue — Whether Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over municipal mayors

The consolidated petitions required determination whether the Sandiganbayan, as redefined by R.A. No. 7975 (and later R.A. No. 8249), exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors charged with violations of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 220, RPC, and how the transitory provisions affect cases pending at different times and in different courts.

Court’s analysis on salary grade and the proper test for jurisdiction

The Court emphasized that jurisdiction under R.A. 7975/8249 hinges on the official’s position as classified under R.A. No. 6758 (Salary Grade classification) and the DBM’s Index of Occupational Services — i.e., grade is determined by the nature, responsibilities, and qualifications of the position (a matter of law and judicial notice), not by the actual salary received in a particular locality. Because the DBM Index (both 1989 and 1997 versions) lists municipal mayor as Salary Grade 27, municipal mayors fall within the statutory categories (grade 27 and higher) subject to Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under the amended statutes. The Court rejects petitioners’ attempts to equate actual local salary received with grade for jurisdictional purposes.

Statutory construction: expressio unius and the scope of enumerations

The Court rejected arguments that enumerations in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, are exclusive by principle of expressio unius. The presence of the phrase “specifically including” and a catchall clause demonstrates non‑exhaustive enumeration; Congress could not practicably list every position. The Local Government Code (Sec. 444(d)) further confirmatively provides that municipal mayors shall receive minimum compensation corresponding to Salary Grade 27, reinforcing their classification under R.A. 6758.

Application of transitory provisions (Section 7 of R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249)

The Court analyzed the transitory provisions and applied the established rule that whether a case remains with the forum where pending depends on whether trial has begun at the time the statute takes effect. Section 7 of R.A. 7975 (and more explicitly Section 7 of R.A. 8249) means: (1) if trial in a court had already begun at enactment, the case remains with that court; (2) if trial had not begun, the new statute determines whether the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts have jurisdiction, and the case is referred accordingly. Applying this: Binay’s informations were pending in the Sandiganbayan before R.A. 7975’s effect, and because the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction under the amended statute and trial had not begun, the Sandiganbayan retains the cases; Magsaysay’s RTC filing occurred after R.A. 7975 took effect, and the Sandiganbayan therefore has exclusive original jurisdiction, requiring the RTC case to be referred.

Right to speedy disposition — Binay’s claim and the Court’s balancing of factors

Binay asserted deprivation of his constitutional right to speedy disposition due to inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman. The Court applied the balancing test (length of delay, reasons for delay, assertion of the right, prejudice) and precedent distinguishing mere passage of time from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. The record showed complex factual and documentary inquiry (COA audits, voluminous records, multiple affidavits, clarificatory examinations), prosecutorial review and independent assessment of COA findings, and active participation by parties; hence the delay was justified and not shown to be prejudicial. Consequently, the Court found no denial of the right to speedy disposition, upheld the validity of the informations, and sustained the suspension pendente lite as lawfully ordered.

Magsaysay petitioners’ ancillary issues: jurisdictional attachment, estoppel, double jeopardy, duplicity, forum shopping

The Court addressed several claims: (1) the RTC’s purported attachment of jurisdiction (by filing an information) did not oust the Sandiganbayan because the RTC lacked jurisdiction under R.A. 7975 at the time; jurisdiction is determined by law, not by unilateral acts; (2) estoppel cannot be invoked against the State or to divest a court of jurisdiction — the doctrine does not bar prosecution in the proper forum when the earlier filing was in a court without jurisdiction; (3) double jeopardy did not attach because jeopardy cannot attach where the first court lacked jurisdiction; (4) duplicity (charging more than one offense in a single information) is distinct from multiple informations charging the same offense; the latte

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