Title
Billoso y Obligar vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 257733
Decision Date
Jan 11, 2023
Accused charged under RA 9165 sought plea bargaining; RTC granted, CA reversed. Supreme Court upheld CA, ruling plea bargaining requires mutual consent and addressing evidentiary sufficiency.
plea bargaining
methamphetamine hydrochloride
shabu

Case Summary (G.R. No. 257733)

Charges, Informations, and the Initial Plea

In Criminal Case No. C-224-18, the Information alleged that Billoso and his co-accused, Dave Billoso y Capapas, conspired to sell and/or deliver to PO2 Rudy Fontenilla, described as a poseur buyer, a heat-sealed transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), marked “JOB-BB.” The alleged consideration was P500.00, and the Information described the exchange as involving the poseur buyer’s positive response to Billoso’s request to “quote” the amount and the subsequent handover of the sachet in return for marked money.

In Criminal Case No. C-225-18, the Information charged Billoso with possession of four heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing shabu, marked “JOB-01,” “JOB-2,” “JOB-3,” and “JOB-4,” with a stated total weight of 0.3934 grams, alleged to be without legal authorization, and thus falling under Article II, Section 11 of R.A. 9165.

At arraignment on 1 August 2018, both accused pleaded “not guilty” to both charges. On the same day, they submitted a written Proposal for Plea Bargaining, expressing their willingness to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Article II, Section 12 of R.A. 9165 for all charges.

The Prosecution’s Objection to Plea Bargaining

The prosecution filed a Comment/Objection (To Proposal for Plea Bargaining). As to Criminal Case No. C-224-18, the prosecution objected on two fronts: first, that it was directed not to accept plea bargaining proposals involving the charged offenses pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 027-18, as reflected in the “Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for R.A. 9165”; and second, that the evidence was allegedly sufficient to convict the accused of the crimes as originally charged. For Criminal Case No. C-225-18, the prosecution similarly asserted that the evidence was sufficient to convict.

Thus, the prosecution’s objection was not limited to an alleged DOJ guideline conflict. It also raised a substantive contention that the prosecution’s evidence was strong enough to sustain conviction on the original charges, a matter the RTC would later be faulted for not adequately addressing.

RTC Grant of Plea Bargaining and Conviction Under Section 12

In an Order dated 24 January 2019, the RTC granted the proposal for plea bargaining and ordered re-arraignment for the lesser offense of violation of Article II, Section 12. After the pleas to the lesser offense were entered, the RTC issued a Decision declaring both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the plea-bargained offense.

The RTC’s reasoning, as reflected in the Decision, relied on four stated grounds: (one) the total weight of shabu allegedly sold and possessed qualified the accused to avail of the benefits of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC; (two) reliance on Estipona v. Lobrigo that an accused could plead bargain during arraignment, pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution rested its case; (three) the RTC’s view that police or PDEA consent was not necessary because the violation of R.A. 9165 was treated as a public crime with the State as offended party; and (four) a determination that between A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and DOJ Circular No. 027, the former prevailed because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Estipona v. Lobrigo.

In its dispositive rulings, the RTC found Billoso guilty under Section 12, Article II of R.A. 9165 in both cases and imposed imprisonment terms and fines as stated. It also provided for credit of detention and advised probation and outpatient rehabilitation orientation. It ordered confiscated sachets turned over for disposal and directed handling of the buy-bust money.

When the Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration, the RTC denied the motion, holding it was filed out of time. The Solicitor General then initiated a petition for certiorari, challenging the RTC’s grant of plea bargaining.

The Court of Appeals’ Certiorari Ruling and Directive to Resume Prosecution

In CA-G.R. SP No. 12761, the Court of Appeals granted the Solicitor General’s petition for certiorari. It reversed and set aside the RTC Decision dated 24 January 2019 and its Order, and directed the RTC to immediately proceed with the criminal cases against Billoso and his co-accused.

On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit, and ordered the RTC to proceed with the original charges in the two criminal cases, returning the accused to the custody of the court.

Billoso then filed the present Petition before the Supreme Court, presenting the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the RTC decision and ordering reinstatement of the original proceedings.

Supreme Court’s Evaluation of the Prosecution Objections

The Supreme Court held that the Petition was without merit. It focused on the two grounds raised by the prosecution when objecting to plea bargaining: first, the DOJ Circular-based objection; and second, the claim that there was sufficient evidence to convict under the originally charged offenses.

On the DOJ Circular objection, the Supreme Court relied on its later clarification in People v. Montierro, where the Court had taken judicial notice that DOJ Circular No. 18 dated 10 May 2022 effectively amended and aligned the DOJ’s plea bargaining framework with the Supreme Court’s plea bargaining framework, and in doing so reconciled the inconsistency that previously arose from DOJ Circular No. 27. The Court explained that after the amendments introduced by DOJ Circular No. 018-22, objections based solely on DOJ Circular No. 27 could be treated as effectively withdrawn, rendering that portion of the objection moot as to purely circular-based grounds.

On the second ground, however, the Court underscored controlling jurisprudence: trial courts must not approve plea bargaining simply because the proposal complies with the lesser offense alignment; they must instead base the approval on evidence. The Supreme Court invoked Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, which emphasized that the trial court’s exercise of discretion in allowing a change of plea must rest on the prosecution’s evidence on record. The ruling required that the trial court’s resolution disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. The Court further reiterated later instructions in drugs plea bargaining jurisprudence that trial courts should consider, based on evidence, whether the accused is a recidivist, habitual offender, known drug addict and troublemaker, a person who relapsed after rehabilitation, someone charged many times, or one for whom guilt on the original charge is strong.

The Supreme Court further relied on additional clarificatory guidelines issued by the Court on how plea bargaining offers in drugs cases should be handled, particularly the mandatory character of trial court review when objections are valid and evidence-supported. It stressed that acceptance of plea bargaining is not demandable as a matter of right and that a trial court must still exercise sound discretion, including the requirement to hear and rule on the merits of an objection when supported by evidence. When the objection is meritorious, the proceedings must continue as originally charged.

Grave Abuse of Discretion by the RTC

The Supreme Court held that no impediment prevented the trial court from continuing with proceedings to determine the merits of the prosecution’s second objection. It found error in the RTC’s approach because the RTC had approved plea bargaining over the prosecution’s opposition without resolving the prosecution’s claim that there was sufficient evidence to convict Billoso of the crimes charged.

The Supreme Court characterized this omission as grave abuse of discretion. It recited doctrinal definitions of grave abuse of discretion, describing it as capricious or whimsical action equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an arbitrary exercise of judgment evidencing a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Using these standards, the Court held that the RTC’s approval, contrary to established jurisprudence requiring evidence-based resolution of plea bargainin

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