Title
Bides-Ulaso vs. Noe-Lacsamana
Case
A.C. No. 7297
Decision Date
Sep 29, 2009
Atty. Lacsamana notarized a document without the affiant's presence or signature, violating the Notarial Law. Despite a withdrawn complaint, the Supreme Court reprimanded her, emphasizing public interest and her unblemished record.
notarization
gross negligence
violation of notarial law

Case Summary (A.C. No. 7297)

Factual Background

Respondent had acted as counsel of Irene Bides (Bides) when Bides filed a civil action against Ulaso, her niece, and other defendants including Alan Ulaso, Bartolome Bides, the Register of Deeds of Region II, Metro Manila, and the Revenue District Office of San Juan, Metro Manila. The action was docketed as SCA No. 2481 and assigned to RTC Branch 167. On June 23, 2003, Bides amended the complaint to seek the declaration of nullity of a deed of sale dated May 27, 1996 involving a parcel of land in San Juan, Metro Manila, of which Bides was the registered owner. Bides alleged that Ulaso had taken Bides’ owner’s certificate of title during the former’s absence and then caused the transfer of the property through a fraudulent execution of the deed of sale.

The amended complaint included an amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping dated June 18, 2003. The signature preceded by the word “for” above the printed name “IRENE BIDES” bore a resemblance to respondent’s own signature as notary on the jurat of the verification affidavit. Ulaso and her co-defendants later moved to dismiss the case on July 22, 2003, citing the defect in the execution of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping.

Through respondent as counsel, Bides opposed the motion to dismiss on August 6, 2003, insisting that any defect was inadvertent. Bides claimed that the defective amended verification and affidavit had been a “sample-draft” prepared to instruct respondent’s new secretary where Bides should sign. Bides further asserted that respondent’s signature on the amended verification and affidavit was not intended to replace Bides’ signature as affiant, and that the correct amended verification and affidavit was executed only on June 23, 2003 after Bides’ delayed arrival from her home province of Abra. Respondent’s secretary, however, allegedly failed to replace the defective document with the correct one. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and proceeded, ultimately deciding the case in favor of Bides and granting reliefs including nullification of the deed of sale.

Initiation of Administrative Proceedings

While the RTC case and subsequent appeal unfolded, Bides and the respondent also engaged in further actions against Ulaso. On September 26, 2003, Bides sued Ulaso and others for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in San Juan, Metro Manila. Bides also filed a formal charge for falsification of a public document in the Manila Prosecutor’s Office, relating to the execution of the deed of sale that had been nullified.

Respondent actively pursued the criminal charge after the MeTC granted her express authority. The respondent also initiated separate proceedings for disbarment and usurpation involving other lawyers and persons associated with Ulaso’s defense.

In response to these moves, Ulaso initiated the present administrative proceeding against respondent on March 2, 2005, praying for disbarment. Ulaso alleged that respondent had signed the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping attached to Bides’ amended complaint, had notarized the document without Ulaso’s appearance before her, and had notarized it despite Ulaso not having personally signed or appeared as affiant.

Compromise in the Criminal Case and Continued Disciplinary Jurisdiction

During the pendency of the administrative case, on July 21, 2005, Bides and Ulaso entered into a compromise agreement to settle the falsification case. Under the agreement, Bides agreed to withdraw the criminal charge against Ulaso in exchange for, among others, Ulaso’s withdrawal of the disbarment complaint against respondent. The MeTC approved the compromise agreement. Despite this, the administrative complaint against respondent continued.

An IBP Committee designated Atty. Patrick M. Velez as Investigating Commissioner. After hearing, Atty. Velez submitted his report and recommendation dated December 8, 2005. He concluded that respondent’s excuses were not persuasive and found that respondent deliberately and improperly notarized a verification and affidavit in a manner inconsistent with notarial protocols, relying on the inference that the document was notarized in anticipation of the affiant’s signature and without ensuring the required physical presence for the oath. He recommended not less than a two-year suspension with additional MCLE requirements.

IBP Board Action and Respondent’s Challenge

The IBP Board of Governors approved the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but modified the penalty. Through IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-272 dated May 26, 2006, the IBP found that respondent committed gross negligence and violated the Notarial Law by notarizing a verification that she executed. It resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months.

Respondent then moved for reconsideration before the Court, essentially arguing that the penalty was unjust. She contended, first, that the complainant’s withdrawal of the disbarment case through compromise in the criminal case should have led to abatement. She also argued that Ulaso failed to show proof of gross negligence and of violation of the Notarial Law, and faulted the Investigating Commissioner for portraying her as dishonest and for relying on an “unacceptable pattern of behavior.” Lastly, she insisted that the complaint was filed out of rancor and after the dispute had already been settled at the trial and appellate levels.

The Court’s Consideration of Procedural Objections

The Court rejected respondent’s argument for abatement based on the compromise agreement and the withdrawal of the administrative complaint. The Court held that the compromise agreement, insofar as it stipulated withdrawal of the disbarment case, did not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and the Court. It relied on the principle explained in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos that desistance or withdrawal by the complainant does not exonerate the respondent, because disciplinary proceedings are not private controversies. The Court also held that the complainant is not a real party in interest in the disciplinary sense, and the public interest in the proper administration of justice remains controlling. Thus, suspension or disbarment may proceed based on the record even after the complainant withdraws.

The Court likewise rejected the contention that the complaint should be dismissed because of the lapse of time or because it was allegedly motivated by personal vendetta. It explained that ordinary statutes of limitation do not apply to disbarment or suspension. Such proceedings were characterized as sui generis, involving investigations into the fitness of a lawyer to retain the privilege to practice law, exercised under the Supreme Court’s plenary constitutional power to regulate the practice of law.

Issues Framed by the Court

The Court narrowed the controversy to whether the respondent’s conduct in notarizing the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping—despite the absence of the affiant’s signature at the time of notarization—constituted actionable misconduct. It noted that other matters invoked by respondent were tied to other cases and did not materially affect the focused inquiry in the present administrative proceeding.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on the Notarial Act

The Court agreed that respondent’s act constituted a breach of notarial protocol, even while it rejected the specific finding of deliberation and malice. The Court reasoned that the admitted precedence of the word “for” before the affiant’s printed name was an indicium that respondent did not intend to misrepresent the affiant’s signature as that of Ulaso. The Court also found that the similarity between the jurat’s notary signature and respondent’s signature rendered improbable that respondent would have preferred to forge or substitute a complete signature if she had intended deception. Moreover, the Court viewed respondent’s notarization as anticipatory—reflecting that the amended verification was being treated as a replacement for the earlier verification already signed by Bides. On that basis, the Court found no bad faith.

Even so, the Court concurred with the core finding that respondent’s act of notarizing the amended verification and affidavit in the absence of the affiant as signatory constituted a clear breach of the notarial protocol and was highly censurable. The Court emphasized the nature of a jurat. The jurat is the part where the notary certifies that the instrument was sworn to before the notary. Consequently, the notarial certification is essential. The Court stressed that notarization is not a meaningless routine step. The faithful observance of the legal solemnity of the oath in the jurat is sacrosanct.

Applying this understanding to the language of the jurat—“SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, on this 18th day of June 2003, affiant IRENE BIDES …”—the Court held that the jurat implied both the necessity for Bides’ physical presence as affiant and the fact that the signing was done in the presence of th

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