Title
Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. vs. Obias
Case
G.R. No. 172077
Decision Date
Oct 9, 2009
BAPCI claimed a right of way over a disputed road built by BISUDECO, but the Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling no agreement or title existed, and discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by prescription.
ownership dispute
road construction
lack of evidence

Case Summary (G.R. No. 172077)

Factual Background

Sometime in 1972, BISUDECO was established in Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur. In the same year, it constructed the disputed road, approximately seven meters wide and 2.9 kilometers long. Petitioner claimed that, by reason of BISUDECO’s use of the road for hauling and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site, the road became indispensable to sugar milling.

Petitioner asserted that BISUDECO constructed the road pursuant to an alleged agreement with landowners whose ricefields the road traversed. The purported terms were that BISUDECO would employ the children and relatives of the landowners in exchange for the construction. Petitioner further contended that, through prolonged and continuous use, BISUDECO acquired a right of way, and that such right of way was acquired by BAPCI when it purchased BISUDECO’s assets on October 30, 1992.

Initiation of the Civil Action and Early Court Orders

On April 19, 1993, BAPCI filed a complaint against the respondents alleging that, on March 27, 1993 and April 3, 1993, respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards, and stones across it, preventing petitioner and other sugar planters’ vehicles from passing through. Petitioner prayed that respondents be permanently restrained from barricading and from obstructing free passage.

In an Order dated April 19, 1993, the RTC directed respondents and those acting with them to cease and desist from placing barricades on the disputed road. On July 21, 1993, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction ordering respondents to desist from constructing barricades across the road.

Respondents’ Defense and Petitioner’s Alternative Theory

Respondents denied that they had entered into any agreement with BISUDECO regarding the construction and use of the disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent constructed the road on their properties and intermittently and discontinuously used it for hauling sugarcane despite repeated protests. Respondents also claimed they tolerated BISUDECO because BISUDECO was then a government-owned and controlled corporation and because the country was under Martial Law. They further denied that the road had become a public road, emphasizing that no public funds were used for its construction and maintenance.

Petitioner amended its complaint and, as an alternative cause of action, invoked Article 649 of the New Civil Code, seeking a compulsory easement of right of way upon payment of proper indemnity. Respondents replied, arguing that an alternative road existed—a route from the sugarmill to the Maharlika Highway at Barangay Romero, Bula, Camarines Sur—purportedly only about fifteen kilometers away, and therefore a more appropriate right of way.

RTC Decision: Permanent Injunction and Indemnity; No Agreement Proven

On June 25, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision. It declared the writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants, their agents, representatives, and those acting with them, permanent and perpetual. It nevertheless held that petitioner failed to present concrete evidence proving an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents for the construction of the disputed road. It also ruled that petitioner did not acquire the right by prescription.

Despite rejecting petitioner’s theory of acquisition through agreement and prescription, the RTC found petitioner entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way under Article 649, upon payment of proper indemnity to respondents. The RTC ordered petitioner to pay the owners of the lots affected by the road specified in the dispositive portion, and it declared that, upon full payment, petitioner would become the absolute owner of the road in question.

CA Proceedings and Modification of the RTC Ruling

Both parties filed motions for reconsideration in the RTC, which were denied on September 24, 1997. The parties then appealed to the CA.

On August 24, 2005, the CA issued a decision that modified the RTC ruling. The CA deleted specific awards of indemnity to Clara Padua and Prudencio Benosa, Jr., and reversed the portion of the RTC decision declaring that petitioner would become the absolute owner of the disputed road upon full payment of indemnity. The CA held instead that the owners of the servient estate in the easement of right of way would retain ownership of the affected lands in accordance with Art. 630 of the Civil Code. In all other respects, the CA affirmed the RTC.

The CA sustained the RTC’s factual determination that there was no conclusive proof of an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents. It also reiterated that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired by prescription. It maintained that petitioner was entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way upon payment of proper indemnity but corrected the ownership consequence by keeping ownership with the servient estate owners.

On March 28, 2006, the CA denied the motions for reconsideration, prompting petitioner’s Supreme Court petition.

Procedural Issue on the Remedy: Rule 65 Instead of Rule 45

At the outset, the Supreme Court addressed the procedural posture. Petitioner denominated the petition as one under Rule 65 though it sought to set aside CA’s decision and resolution. The Court held that the proper remedy should have been a petition for review under Rule 45, since the assailed dispositions were final rulings of the CA.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court considered the petition as one under Rule 45 in the interest of substantial justice, because it was filed within the reglementary period and because petitioner did not allege grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the CA.

The Parties’ Contentions in the Supreme Court

Petitioner assigned multiple errors, centered on five themes: first, it claimed the CA erred by not finding that BISUDECO and respondents had forged an agreement for constructing the disputed road; second, it argued that principles of prescription, laches, and estoppel should bar respondents from asserting ownership rights; third, it contended the CA disregarded the road’s alleged classification as a barangay road; fourth, it argued that indemnity should be valued at the time of construction; and fifth, it invoked unjust enrichment.

Existence of the Alleged Agreement: Failure of Proof; Hearsay and Circumstantial Evidence Insufficient

In relation to the first error, petitioner argued that there was an agreement, supported by both circumstantial evidence and alleged public knowledge. The Supreme Court emphasized that petitioner bore the burden of proving the existence of the agreement because the easement of right of way, as characterized by the CA as discontinuous, could be acquired only by title.

The CA had explained that an easement of right of way is typically a discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man. Under Article 622, discontinuous easements may be acquired only by virtue of a title. Since petitioner conceded it had no direct evidence of the agreement, the question was whether the circumstantial evidence sufficed.

The RTC and CA both found that it did not. The RTC noted that petitioner’s witnesses relied on commonly known information, sources not presented in court, and statements from persons not personally involved in concluding the alleged agreement. The CA agreed that petitioner’s evidence was not conclusive. It held that the circumstances cited by petitioner were susceptible to diverse interpretations. It also found that petitioner’s testimonies were largely hearsay, because the witnesses did not have personal knowledge by direct participation or presence when the agreement was concluded.

The Supreme Court sustained these concurrent factual findings. It held that petitioner’s inability to prove an agreement undermined the theory that it acquired the easement by title grounded on agreement, and it refused to disturb the CA’s factual conclusions, particularly because the CA had affirmed the RTC’s factual findings.

Acquisition by Prescription: Discontinuous Easement; No Re-examination of Controlling Doctrine

Petitioner sought to revisit Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals, which held that a right of way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired by prescription. Petitioner attempted to argue that recognized authorities support acquisition by prescription, contending that continuity is not absolute and that intervals do not defeat prescription.

The Supreme Court declined to re-examine Costabella. It instead relied on Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which involved an easement of right of way in the form of a railroad track. That case had clarified the legal distinction: easements are continuous or discontinuous based on the manner of exercise, not on the presence of apparent physical signs. A right of way is discontinuous because it is exercised only if and when a person passes or sets foot on another’s land. The presence of physical indications, such as tracks or a paved road, renders the easement apparent but does not convert it into a continuous easement.

Applying this reasoning, the Court held that the road in dispute remained a discontinuous easement. Accordingly, Article 622 required that it be acquired only by title, not by prescription. The Court thus rejected petitioner’s prescription argument, even if the road had been improved and maintained over many years.

Laches and Estoppel: Equity Cannot Override Article 622; No Showing of Estoppel

Petitioner also invoked laches and estoppel. It asserted that BISUDECO’s use had been peaceful and continuous for almost two decades without protest, and therefore respondents should be barred from later obstructing access.

The CA had rejected the laches theory, reasoning that Article 622 is categorical: discontinuous easements require title. It explained that laches, as an equitable doctrine,

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