G.R. No. 132768 - Biana vs. Gimenez

Case Summary (G.R. No. 132768)

Factual Background: Execution Sale, Redemption Attempts, and Disputed Payment

In the labor case, the defendants, including Gimenez, were ordered to pay Mendones P1,520.00 plus P8.00 per day starting 1 August 1978 until reinstatement, and P3,168.00 as sheriff’s fees and expenses of execution. The judgment was computed by Deputy Sheriff Madera at P5,248.50, and he demanded payment. Upon failure to pay, Sheriff Madera levied four parcels of urban land in Naga City with a combined area of more than 74 hectares, registered under TCT No. 10249.

A public auction was held on 6 December 1978, and Mendones, as sole bidder, won for P8,908.50, representing the judgment obligation plus expenses of execution. A Provisional Certificate of Sale was issued and registered on 7 December 1978. Gimenez later claimed that he was not informed of the execution sale. He asserted that he learned of it only when a sheriff’s representative asked him to pay the publication fee in the amount of P3,510.00, which he paid immediately by issuing checks. On 27 January 1979, he was issued O.R. No. 161, dated 27 January 1979, which was more than ten months before the expiration of the one-year redemption period.

To redeem the properties, Gimenez sought the Provincial Sheriff, Manuel Garchitorena, because he could not locate Sheriff Madera. Provincial Sheriff Garchitorena allegedly computed that the remaining balance of the redemption price, including interest and sheriff’s fee, amounted to P6,615.89. Gimenez issued four checks payable to Garchitorena with the following amounts and dates: Check No. 272377 (18 July 1979) for P1,500.00, 272384 (3 August 1979) for P1,500.00, 272385 (18 August 1979) for P1,500.00, and 272386 (1 September 1979) for P1,115.89. Garchitorena issued a receipt dated 19 July 1979, within the redemption period, acknowledging receipt of “FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTEEN & 89/100 in full payment and satisfaction of the judgment”.

After some time, on 3 December 1979, Sheriff Madera wrote Gimenez’s counsel that the redemption period would soon expire on 7 December 1979, and that counsel’s client still had an unpaid balance of P4,367.81. Gimenez disputed this claim and sought details. Deputy Sheriff Madera provided an itemization that included a P3,510.00 publication fee due to Bicol Star. Despite the dispute, Madera executed a Definite Deed of Sale dated 8 December 1979 in favor of Mendones.

Gimenez then asked Provincial Sheriff Garchitorena to execute a deed of redemption in his favor, but the request was refused. He therefore filed in the Regional Trial Court a petition for mandamus with damages and included an alternative prayer that if the definite deed of sale had already been issued, it be declared null and void.

Trial Court Proceedings and the Relief Sought

Gimenez’s petition, Civil Case No. 860, impleaded Provincial Sheriff Garchitorena and/or Deputy Sheriff Madera, seeking to compel execution of a deed of redemption. Mendones, having obtained leave to intervene, asserted that there was no valid redemption within the one-year redemption period. During the pendency of the case, Mendones assigned his right over the acquired 74-hectare land to Jaime B. Biana in exchange for P1,000,000.00.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment on 20 January 1999 in favor of Gimenez. It set aside and declared the Definite Deed of Sale dated 8 December 1979 null and void. It ordered the Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Sur to execute a Deed of Redemption reconveying the parcels covered by TCT No. 10249 to Gimenez. It permanently enjoined the Register of Deeds of Naga City from registering the definite deed of sale issued by the Provincial Sheriff. It further ordered Biana, as intervenor, to pay Gimenez moral damages in P150,000.00, and attorney’s fees and related litigation expenses in P20,000.00. The court dismissed the counterclaim.

Appellate Review in the Court of Appeals

Biana, joined by the Provincial Sheriff, appealed to the Court of Appeals through CA-G.R. SP No. 40208. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in a Decision dated 9 July 1997. It later denied the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 30 January 1998. The present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 sought to set aside both appellate issuances.

The arguments assigned by Biana focused on alleged jurisdictional and procedural errors, including claims that the trial court improperly handled the mandamus case, disregarded impartiality, erred in treating redemption checks as sufficient, and exceeded its jurisdiction by awarding moral damages and attorney’s fees. However, the Court treated the appeal as crystallizing into a single pivotal question: whether the Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Sur could be legally compelled to execute a deed of redemption in favor of Gimenez.

The Parties’ Core Contentions: Valid Redemption and Use of Checks

Biana contended that there had been no redemption because Gimenez’s tender consisted only of postdated checks of varying dates. Biana relied on Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., where the Court ruled that payment by check issued in the name of an absconding sheriff did not operate as payment of the judgment obligation. In Biana’s view, redemption could not be compelled absent actual payment.

Gimenez’s position, as sustained by the courts below, was that he had timely and validly exercised his right of redemption within the redemption period through tender and payment represented by the checks and receipts issued by the sheriff’s office. Gimenez maintained that mandamus lay because the Provincial Sheriff had a ministerial duty to execute the deed of redemption once valid redemption had been effected.

Legal Reasoning of the Court: Redemption as a Right, Not Payment of an Obligation

The Court rejected Biana’s attempt to apply Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. as controlling. It held that the reliance was misplaced because PAL involved payment of a judgment obligation, where Civil Code provisions on payment of obligations, particularly Art. 1249, applied. In this case, the Court emphasized, the controversy did not concern payment of an obligation but the exercise of a right of redemption. For that reason, the Civil Code rules on payment of debts were not treated as governing.

The Court instead applied the settled principle that, for purposes of compelling redemption, a mere tender of a check is sufficient to compel redemption. It quoted Fortunado, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., explaining that a check may be used to exercise the right of redemption because it is a right and not an obligation. The Court added that tender is sufficient to compel redemption, although it does not itself relieve the redemptioner from the obligation to pay the redemption price.

The Court further distinguished PAL on its peculiar factual setting. In PAL, the sheriff named as payee absconded or disappeared, making collection impossible. The Court found no evidence in the present record that Sheriff Garchitorena absconded or disappeared. It referenced Deputy Sheriff Madera’s letter to Mendones stating that the counsel and parties could come to the office on Monday, December 10, 1979 to withdraw the amount because Atty. Manuel Garchitorena was still on vacation leave. The Court also considered the sheriff’s receipt dated 19 July 1979 acknowledging full payment and satisfaction of the judgment. In addition, it noted that Sheriff Madera’s itemization deducted the aggregate amount of the four checks (P5,615.89) when submitting the account after respondent’s counsel demanded details.

On the basis of these facts, the Court upheld the conclusion that Gimenez made a valid redemption within the redemption period, thereby entitling him to a deed of redemption. The Court did not accept the argument that a lack of final payment barred redemption; it treated tender and its accepted receipt as sufficient to compel the ministerial act of executing the deed.

Mandamus, Annulment of the Definite Deed of Sale, and Alleged Jurisdictional Overreach

Biana also faulted both courts for entertaining mandamus despite the existence of a Definite Deed of Sale dated 8 December 1979, arguing that mandamus could not compel performance that had already been performed unless the deed were annulled. Biana contended that the proper course was an independent action to annul the deed and thereafter seek redemption relief.

The Court found no error. It agreed with the Court of Appeals that Gimenez’s mandamus petition already included an alternative prayer to declare the definite deed of sale null and void ab initio if final confirmation of sale had been executed by the sheriff. The Court reasoned that annulling the definite deed was necessary to give effect to the order compelling the execution of a deed of redemption. Otherwise, the writ would have been a mere formality. The Court viewed the trial court’s handling as consonant with the relief sought in the mandamus petition and with the principle against technicalities defeating substantive rights.

The Court also noted that the redemption mandamus case had been filed on 25 February 1982 and had remained pending for more than two decades. It therefore considered that requiring an independent action for nullification would result in multiplicity of suits. The

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 132768)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Jaime B. Biana filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to assail the rulings of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40208.
George Gimenez defended the appellate rulings and sought affirmance.
The Court of Appeals decision dated 9 July 1997 affirmed in toto an earlier Regional Trial Court judgment in a special civil action for mandamus with damages.
The Court of Appeals resolution dated 30 January 1998 denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The Regional Trial Court granted mandamus and awarded damages and attorney’s fees against petitioner as assignee of the judgment purchaser.
Petitioner and the Provincial Sheriff proceeded to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal, which the Court of Appeals resolved against them.

Key Factual Allegations

A labor case titled Santos B. Mendones vs. Gimenez Park Subdivision and George Gimenez was filed before the Naga City District Office of the Department of Labor and Employment, docketed as Term Case No. R05-D-008-78.
In that labor case, the defendants, including George Gimenez, were ordered to pay P1,520.00 plus P8.00/day starting 1 August 1978 until reinstatement, and also to pay P3,168.00 as sheriff’s fees and expenses of execution.
Deputy Sheriff Renato Madera computed the judgment obligation at P5,248.50 and demanded immediate payment from the defendants.
Because of nonpayment, Sheriff Madera levied and attached four parcels of urban land in Naga City, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10249, in the names of Jose F. Gimenez, Tessa F. Gimenez, Maricel G. Gimenez, and George Gimenez.
A public auction was held on 6 December 1978, where Mendones was the sole bidder with a bid of P8,908.50, representing the judgment obligation plus execution expenses.
A Provisional Certificate of Sale was issued and registered on 7 December 1978 in the name of Mendones.
George Gimenez claimed he was not duly informed or notified of the execution sale and learned of it only when a sheriff’s representative asked him to pay the publication fee of P3,510.00.
Gimenez paid the full publication fee before the expiration of the redemption period and was issued O.R. No. 161 on 27 January 1979, dated 10 months and 20 days before the one-year redemption period ended.
For redemption, Gimenez approached Provincial Sheriff Manuel Garchitorena after he could not locate Sheriff Madera.
Provincial Sheriff Garchitorena computed the redemption balance, including interest and sheriff’s fee, as P6,615.89.
Gimenez issued four checks payable to Provincial Sheriff Garchitorena, namely: Check No. 272377 (18 July 1979) for P1,500.00, Check No. 272384 (3 August 1979) for P1,500.00, Check No. 272385 (18 August 1979) for P1,500.00, and Check No. 272386 (1 September 1979) for P1,115.89.
Provincial Sheriff Garchitorena issued a receipt dated 19 July 1979, within the one-year redemption period, acknowledging receipt of P5,615.89 in “full payment and satisfaction” of the judgment, with respect to the redemption context.
On 3 December 1979, Sheriff Madera wrote counsel for Gimenez warning that the one-year redemption period would expire on 7 December 1979 and that Gimenez still had an alleged unpaid balance of P4,367.81.
Deputy sheriff Madera later provided an itemization showing P3,510.00 as the publication fee due to Bicol Star, prompting Gimenez to dispute the itemization on the ground that he already paid the publication cost to the publisher.
Deputy Sheriff Madera executed a Definite Deed of Sale dated 8 December 1979 in favor of Mendones.
Gimenez requested that Provincial Sheriff Garchitorena execute a deed of redemption, but the request was refused.
Gimenez filed a special civil action for mandamus with damages to compel execution of the deed of redemption and included an alternative prayer to nullify the Definite Deed of Sale if it had already been issued.
Mendones sought leave to intervene and did intervene, contending that no valid redemption occurred within the redemption period.
During the pendency of the case, Mendones assigned his acquired rights in the land to petitioner in exchange for P1,000,000.00.
The trial court found for Gimenez, set aside the Definite Deed of Sale, and ordered redemption-related reconveyance and execution.

Issues Raised

The pivotal issue presented for decision was whether the Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Sur could be legally compelled by mandamus to execute a deed of redemption in favor of George Gimenez.
Petitioner argued that there was no valid redemption because Gimenez allegedly tendered only postdated checks rather than actual payment of the redemption price.
Petitioner relied on Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., particularly the doctrine that payment by check issued in the name of an absconding sheriff did not operate as payment of the judgment obligation.
Petitioner contended that the lower courts erred in entertaining mandamus despite the existence of an already executed Definite Deed of Sale, asserting that the appropriate remedy was an independent action to nullify the deed and then seek redemption.
Petitioner asserted that the courts acted arbitrarily by allegedly disregarding judicial impartiality and by allegedly converting the special civil action for mandamus into an ordinary civil action with multiple reliefs.
Petitioner challenged the factual conclusion that redemption was validly made using the checks with varying dates.
Petitioner argued that mandamus is a remedy for official inaction and is unavailable for correcting acts already performed, in view of the issuance of the Definite Deed of Sale.
Petitioner argued that the trial and appellate courts lacked authority to impose moral damages and attorney’s fees in the absence of a prayer for such relief in