Title
Berteni Causing vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 258524
Decision Date
Oct 11, 2023
Petitioner challenged RTC's denial of Motion to Quash cyber libel charges; SC ruled cyber libel prescribes in one year from discovery under RPC art 90(4); RTC denial affirmed; prescription is factual matter for trial.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 258524)

Factual Background

The offended party, Representative Ferdinand L. Hernandez, alleged that on February 4, 2019 and April 29, 2019 petitioner Berteni Cataluna Causing uploaded and reposted Facebook material that imputed to Hernandez the theft of funds intended for Marawi evacuees, specifically an alleged pilferage of PHP 225 million. Hernandez filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on December 16, 2020; Causing submitted a Counter-Affidavit and the parties exchanged pleadings before a finding of probable cause issued.

Informations Filed and Charges

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City filed two separate Informations dated May 10, 2021 charging Causing with two counts of Cyber Libel under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, in relation to Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC, alleging malicious and public imputations through Facebook posts and a public Facebook group that exposed Hernandez to public contempt and ridicule.

Motion to Quash and Grounds

On June 28, 2021, Causing filed a Motion to Quash asserting that Cyber Libel did not create a new crime and that the prescriptive period applicable to libel under the RPC governed the cause of action; he contended that paragraph 4 of Article 90, RPC applied so that the crime prescribed in one year from publication, rendering Hernandez’s December 16, 2020 complaint time-barred as the posts were dated February 4 and April 29, 2019. Causing also challenged the precedent in Tolentino v. People and argued that the latter was not binding because it was an unsigned resolution.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In the assailed Order dated October 5, 2021, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 denied the Motion to Quash. The RTC held that because RA 10175 penalizes Cyber Libel as a special law and lacks a prescriptive period, Act No. 3326 in relation to Section 6 of RA 10175 applied, producing a twelve-year prescriptive period, or alternatively, that if the RPC applied suppletorily the penalty increase under Section 6 made the offense afflictive and paragraph 2 of Article 90, RPC would govern producing a fifteen-year prescription. The RTC concluded that Hernandez filed his Complaint-Affidavit within the applicable prescriptive period.

Petition and Parties' Contentions

Causing directly petitioned the Supreme Court under Rule 65, contending the RTC gravely abused its discretion by applying Act No. 3326 and paragraph 2 of Article 90 instead of paragraph 4 of Article 90, and insisted that the prescriptive period for Cyber Libel is one year from publication or discovery. The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, answered that the Petition was an improper remedy from the denial of the Motion to Quash and defended the RTC’s application of law, urging that the Court’s earlier decision in Tolentino supports the longer prescriptive period and that unsigned resolutions like Tolentino are binding per Eizmendi v. Fernandez.

Issues Presented

The Supreme Court framed the issues as: (1) whether the Petition should be dismissed as an improper remedy and for disregarding the hierarchy of courts; (2) whether Article 90, RPC or Section 1 of Act No. 3326 determines prescription for Cyber Libel; and (3) whether the two counts of Cyber Libel against Causing had prescribed.

Supreme Court Procedural Disposition on Direct Filing

Although certiorari is ordinarily an inappropriate remedy from the denial of a motion to quash, the Court exercised discretion to accept the Petition because the questions presented were purely legal, implicated the Court’s power to revisit and clarify Tolentino, and had significance for bench and bar practice; the Court found exceptional circumstances justifying direct review and proceeded to resolve the merits.

Whether RA 10175 Created a New Crime

The Court held that Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 did not create a new crime but merely implemented and recognized the existing felony of libel as defined in Article 355, in relation to Article 353, RPC, when committed through a computer system or similar means, reaffirming the Court’s prior pronouncements in Disini v. Secretary of Justice and its resolution, and observing that the legislative history shows that lawmakers intended to identify ICT as an additional means of publication and as a qualifying circumstance that may justify higher penalties.

Choice of Statute Governing Prescription

Because Cyber Libel is the same substantive offense as Libel under the RPC, the Court ruled that Articles 90 and 91, RPC, govern prescription rather than Act No. 3326, which applies only when an offense is defined and penalized exclusively by a special law without its own prescriptive rule. The Court endorsed the longstanding rule that, where both a special law and the RPC apply, the provision most favorable to the accused controls.

Application of Article 90: One-Year Prescription and Overruling Tolentino

Applying principles of statutory construction, the Court concluded that paragraph 4 of Article 90, RPC—which expressly provides that “the crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year”—controls the prescriptive period for Cyber Libel despite Section 6 of RA 10175 increasing the penalty by one degree. The Court abandoned the contrary holding in Tolentino, explaining that paragraph 4 is a specific exception to the general prescriptive periods tied to afflictive penalties, that legislative history shows deliberate alignment of criminal and civil defamation prescription, and that prescription statutes must be construed in favor of the accused.

Computation of Prescription Under Article 91

The Court held that the one-year prescriptive period under paragraph 4 of Article 90 is to be computed in accordance with Article 91, RPC, such that prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents; prescription may be reckoned from publication only if discovery coincides with publication. The Court reaffirmed earlier jurisprudence that discovery, not mere publication, governs when the offended party lacks earlier knowledge.

Application to This Case: Factual Determination and Burden of Proof

The Court affirmed the RTC’s denial of the Motion to Quash because prescription is an affirmative defense that ordinarily requires factual proof and is not to be resolved on the face of an Information unless prescription is clear and apparent. Causing did not submit affidavits or other evidence establishing the date of discovery; the Informations did not state discovery dates; and therefore the RTC properly required evidentiary showing before extinguishing criminal liability. The Court remanded that the RTC must compute prescription applying paragraph

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.