G.R. No. 235873 - Yulo vs. Concentrix Daksh Services Philippines, Inc.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 235873)

Procedural and Factual Background

The City Court of Caloocan City rendered judgment in an ejectment case (Civil Case No. 6926) in favor of private respondents on November 25, 1970. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. C-2036). On March 23, 1971, the respondent judge ordered the City Court clerk to transmit stenographic transcripts within 15 days and directed counsel to file memoranda within 30 days from receipt of that order; the order was apparently received by petitioner on April 17, 1971. Because the transcript had not yet been transmitted, petitioner filed an ex parte motion on May 5, 1971, asking that she be given 30 days to file her memorandum from actual notice of submission of the transcript; that motion was granted on May 7, 1971. Before receiving notice of the transcript’s submission, the respondent judge issued an order dated August 4, 1971 dismissing the appeal for failure to prosecute. Petitioner moved for reconsideration (filed September 28, 1971) and later filed her memorandum (dated October 18, 1971), but the motion for reconsideration was denied on October 30, 1971. A further motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration (filed January 25, 1972) was denied March 15, 1972. Petitioner sought annulment of those orders and mandamus relief to compel decision on the merits.

Legal Issue Presented

Whether, under the second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296 as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit a memorandum within the time requested permits a Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute, or whether the court is instead required to decide the appeal on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal court notwithstanding the appellant’s failure to file a memorandum on time.

Statutory Provision at Issue

The pertinent text of the second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, provides in substance: "Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested..." The provision was construed in the light of the ordinary meaning of "may" and "shall" as legal terms.

Supreme Court Holding

The challenged dismissal orders of August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and March 15, 1972 were set aside as null and void. The Court directed the respondent Court of First Instance to decide Civil Case No. C-2036 on the merits based on the evidence and records transmitted from the City Court of Caloocan City.

Reasoning of the Court (Majority)

The Court interpreted the statutory language as clear and unambiguous: the directive that Courts of First Instance "shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted" imposes a mandatory duty to decide appeals on the record. The provision that "the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested" uses the word "may," which is permissive and indicates optional action by the parties rather than a mandatory prerequisite. Consequently, memoranda and oral argument are not essential requirements for the exercise of appellate review; they are allowed only if requested. Therefore, the mere failure of an appellant to file a memorandum within the time requested does not empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute. Because the court retains the record and evidence transmitted from the lower court, it has the obligation to decide the appeal on that basis irrespective of the appellant’s omission to file memoranda. The Court further emphasized that a contrary construction would imperil a litigant’s statutory right to appeal and be inconsistent with precedents cautioning against precipitous summary dismissals that deprive parties of appellate review. Applying these principles, the Court found that petitioner had not received notice of submission of the transcript and thus could not be deemed to have failed to file her memorandum within the granted 30-day period; dismissing the appeal prior to expiration of that period was improper.

Precedents and Doctrinal Support Cited

The Court relied on the conventional statutory interpretation that "may" is permissive and "shall" is mandatory (citing Dizon v. Encarnacion). It invoked Republic v. Rodriguez for the principle that courts should proceed cautiously so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal except for weighty reasons. Municipality of Tiwi, Albay v. Cirujales was cited for the proposition that summary dismissals issued

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 235873)

Procedural History

Petitioner Purita Bersabal sought, on March 23, 1972, to annul respondent Judge's orders of August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971 and March 15, 1972, and to compel the respondent Judge to decide petitioner’s perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted by the City Court of Caloocan City plus the memoranda already submitted by the parties.
The Court of Appeals, finding only questions of law involved, on October 13, 1972, issued a resolution certifying the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
The underlying ejectment action was docketed as Civil Case No. 6926 in the City Court of Caloocan City; the City Court rendered a decision on November 25, 1970, which petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance where the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. C-2036.
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of First Instance, respondent court issued successive orders (notably March 23, 1971; August 4, 1971; October 30, 1971; and March 15, 1972) culminating in the dismissal of the appeal for alleged failure to prosecute and the denial of petitioner’s motions for reconsideration, prompting the present petition.

Facts

Private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee filed an ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 6926) in the City Court of Caloocan City against petitioner; the City Court rendered a decision on November 25, 1970.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance; the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. C-2036.
On March 23, 1971, the respondent Court issued an order, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6031, directing the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City to transmit the transcripts of stenographic notes of the City Court hearing within fifteen days and granting counsels thirty days from receipt of that order to file their respective memoranda, after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
The March 23, 1971 order was apparently received by petitioner on April 17, 1971.
The transcript of stenographic notes was not immediately forwarded to the respondent Court.
On May 5, 1971, petitioner filed a "MOTION EX-PARTE TO SUBMIT MEMORANDUM WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES TAKEN DURING THE HEARING OF THE CASE BEFORE THE CITY COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY," which the respondent Court granted on May 7, 1971.
Before petitioner received notice of the transcript's submission, the respondent Judge issued an order on August 4, 1971: "For failure of the defendant-appellant to prosecute her appeal, the same is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against her."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 4, 1971 order on September 28, 1971, citing the May 7, 1971 ex-parte order as ground; private respondents filed their opposition on September 30, 1971.
Petitioner filed her memorandum dated October 18, 1971 (noted in the record as filed on October 2, 1971).
On October 30, 1971 the respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
On January 25, 1972 petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, which the respondent Court denied on March 15, 1972.
These events led to the present petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue Presented

Whether, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute; or, whether it is mandatory upon said Court to proceed to decide the appealed case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, the failure of the appellant to submit a memorandum on time notwithstanding.

Relevant Statutory Provision (as quoted in the record)

Second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031: "Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal cour