G.R. No. 119010 - Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. 119010)

Facts relevant to the ruling

On 20 May 1994, after the prosecution rested and formally offered exhibits, defense counsel orally requested “leave of court to file demurrer to evidence,” asserting insufficiency of proof on material facts (where checks were issued/dishonored and absence of valid notice of dishonor). The private prosecutor and the court addressed these assertions on the record, the prosecution identifying documentary and testimonial evidence (including back stamps on a check exhibit and witness testimony) tending to show deposit and dishonor in Quezon City. The trial court denied the defense request as not well taken, then informed the defense that if it waived its right to present evidence it would be given time to file a demurrer; otherwise, the failure to present evidence would be considered a waiver and the case deemed submitted for decision. Defense counsel persisted in seeking to file a demurrer and was told the motion was dilatory; the court ultimately declared the defense to have been considered to have waived its right to present evidence and set the case for promulgation.

Procedural history after the trial court order

Petitioner sought relief by certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse by treating the denial of leave to file a demurrer as a waiver of the right to present evidence. The Court of Appeals modified the trial court order by directing the RTC to set the cases “for trial for reception of evidence for the petitioner.” Petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration in the Court of Appeals was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, challenging the Court of Appeals’ action and asserting that she should have been allowed to file a written demurrer after research and authorities were prepared.

Evolution of the demurrer-to-evidence rule and the 1988 modification

The Rules of Court have undergone shifts in the treatment of a demurrer to evidence. Earlier doctrine held that filing a motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence after the prosecution rested waived the accused’s right to present evidence. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure introduced a new demurrer-to-evidence rule that altered prior holdings. Subsequent amendment in 1988 refined the rule: an accused may file a demurrer to evidence only with prior leave of court; if leave is granted and the demurrer is denied, the accused retains the right to present evidence; if the accused files a demurrer without prior leave, or files a demurrer after leave has been denied, the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case is submitted for decision on the prosecution’s evidence. The Committee on Revision clarified these propositions, emphasizing that the grant of leave is discretionary and aims to prevent dilatory tactics while preserving the court’s ability to dismiss on its own motion after hearing the prosecution.

Supreme Court’s analysis of the trial court’s action

The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly denied petitioner's oral motion for leave to file a demurrer where it found the motion dilatory on the record. Under Sec. 15, Rule 119 as interpreted after the 1988 modification, once prior leave is denied the accused’s appropriate course is to present evidence; filing a demurrer nonetheless operates as a waiver of the right to present defense evidence. The Court explained that judicial discretion governs whether to grant leave, but that discretion does not extend to allowing the accused to present evidence once the accused has filed a demurrer after denial of leave (or without leave). Consequently, the trial court’s determination that the defense had waived its right to present evidence when it insisted on filing the demurrer after leave was denied was not a grave abuse of discretion.

Supreme Court’s holding and disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition to allow petiti

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 119010)

Title, Citation and Panel

Reported as 344 Phil. 335, First Division, G.R. No. 119010, decided September 05, 1997.
Decision penned by Justice Bellosillo; Justices Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., concurred.

Parties and Role

Petitioner: Paz T. Bernardo.
Respondents: Court of Appeals; Hon. Oscar L. Leviste (trial court judge referenced); Florlita Ronquillo-Concepcion (private complainant / private prosecutor in the criminal cases).

Nature of the Case and Relief Sought

Writ of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus seeking review of the trial court order deeming the defense to have waived the right to present evidence after a denied motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence.
Petitioner sought permission to file a demurrer to evidence and challenged the trial court’s action as grave abuse of discretion; subsequently sought relief from the Court of Appeals and then from the Supreme Court.

Underlying Criminal Cases and Charges

Petitioner originally charged with four counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-46792 to Q-93-46795.
Two of those four cases (Q-93-46794 and Q-93-46795) were dismissed following an Affidavit of Desistance executed by private complainant Florlita Ronquillo-Concepcion, leaving Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46792 and Q-93-46793 for disposition by the trial court.

Key Dates in the Proceedings

20 May 1994: Prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits; calendar reflected further reception of prosecution evidence set at 8:30 a.m.
20 May 1994: In open court, defense counsel moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence; trial court denied the motion and eventually deemed the defense to have waived its right to present evidence, setting promulgation for June 6, 1994.
30 September 1994: Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying the trial court’s order by directing the trial court to set the two remaining criminal cases “for trial for reception of evidence for the petitioner.”
7 February 1995: Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration.
05 September 1997: Supreme Court decision denying petitioner’s petition to file a demurrer to evidence and setting aside the Court of Appeals’ directive.

Trial Court Proceedings — Substance of the Hearing (20 May 1994)

Calendar showed continuity of prosecution’s reception of evidence at 8:30 a.m.; prosecution formally offered its exhibits after resting.
Defense counsel (Atty. Miravite) orally asked “for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence” on grounds: prosecution failed to show where checks were issued and dishonored (material for jurisdiction), and lack of valid notice of dishonor upon the accused.
Trial court questioned prosecution and private prosecutor about stamps and documentary markings on Exhibit A and other exhibits (references to A-4, B-4, “DAIF” stamps, PNB West Avenue, Quezon City).
Private prosecutor contended checks were dishonored in Manila but deposited by PAR CREDIT ENTERPRISES in Quezon City and forwarded to Philippine National Bank; indicated documentary stamps and testimony established dishonor and nonpayment, and there were “admissions in handwriting regarding the claim.”
Trial court ruled the defense grounds for demurrer “not being well taken” and DENIED the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence.
Trial court informed defense counsel that if they waived right to present evidence, court would give time to file a demurrer to evidence but if they did not present evidence then they would be considered to have waived their right to present evidence.
Defense counsel reiterated motion to file demurrer; court characterized the motion as “tantamount to postpone this case” and “dilatory.”
Trial court concluded: “the defense having been considered to have waived her right to present her evidence, this case is deemed submitted for decision,” and set promulgation for June 6, 1994 at 8:30 a.m.

Petitioner’s Contentions on Appeal and Before the Supreme Court

Petitioner argued the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by considering her to have waived her right to present evidence after denial of her motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence.
Petitioner asserted that the oral motion for leave actually signified an intent to file a written demurrer after research and authorities; when the trial court denied the motion for leave to file, petitioner contended the denial was only of the motion for leave and not a denial of a filed demurrer itself.
Petitioner maintained she should be given opportunity to file the demurrer to evidence, and wait for its denial with finality, before being directed to present evidence.

Court of Appeals’ Ruling (Summarized)

The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s May 20, 1994 order insofar as it stated the defense was considered to have waived the right to present evidence and the case was deemed submitted.
The Court of Appeals directed the trial court to set Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46792 and Q-93-46793 “for trial for reception of evidence for the petitioner.”
Petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration before the Court of Appeals was denied on 7 Febru