Title
Bernardez, Jr. vs. City Government of Baguio
Case
G.R. No. 197559
Decision Date
Mar 21, 2022
Baguio City's AO 171, appointing a separate Building Official, upheld as valid under LGC and NBC; petitioner's claims dismissed due to mootness and failure to exhaust remedies.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 197559)

Factual Background

On January 1, 2004 the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Baguio enacted Ordinance No. 01, s. 2004, appropriating PHP 713,579,000 for reorganization and restructuring of local departments. Pursuant to that ordinance, City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon issued Administrative Order No. 171, s. 2004 on September 9, 2004, designating Engr. Oscar V. Flores as Acting Building Official of Baguio City pending appointment of a regular Building Official and transferring certain building functions from the City Engineer to a newly created Building and Architecture Office. Petitioner, who then served as City Engineer, perceived AO 171 as divesting him of his functions as local Building Official and challenged the administrative order in court.

Complaint and Trial Proceedings

Petitioner filed a complaint on December 1, 2004 for declaration of nullity of AO No. 171 with prayers for temporary restraining order, writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, and mandamus. The RTC initially granted a temporary restraining order but later lifted it, denied the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and proceeded to trial. Petitioner alleged that AO 171 unlawfully usurped his functions, violated Section 477, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code, violated civil service security of tenure, and improperly placed reorganization matters in an appropriation ordinance in violation of the Constitution and RA 6656.

Respondents’ Defense at Trial

Respondents defended AO 171 as a valid executive act effectuating authorized reorganization under the Local Government Code, implemented with approvals of the Department of Budget and Management and the Civil Service Commission. They maintained that the issuance and implementation of AO 171 did not terminate or diminish petitioner’s salary, benefits, or rank. The Department of Public Works and Highways asserted that it had authority under the National Building Code to appoint or designate Building Officials in aid of national enforcement of PD 1096 and denied any participation in AO 171’s enactment.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its May 8, 2009 Decision the RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint. The RTC held that the validity of Ordinance No. 01 could not be collaterally attacked and that AO 171 was issued pursuant to the mayor’s authority under the Local Government Code to create offices necessary to carry out city functions. The RTC found that subsequent appointment of Flores as Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office rendered AO 171 moot, and that petitioner was estopped from challenging AO 171 after he had turned over functions to the new office and did not suffer diminution in salary or rank. The RTC also held that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, notably by not raising the issue to the oversight committee mandated by the LGC.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in its January 31, 2011 Decision. The CA held that the mayor’s appointment of a Building Official separate from the City Engineer was authorized because the functions of the two offices are distinct under the National Building Code and its IRR. The CA found valid the DPWH Secretary’s appointment of Flores under the NBC and accepted AO 171 as a necessary temporary designation to meet exigencies of the service. The CA rejected petitioner’s contention that AO 171 improperly appeared in an appropriation measure by invoking the mayor’s authority to issue executive orders to enforce ordinances. The CA also agreed with the RTC that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies and was estopped from attacking AO 171.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Petitioner presented four principal assignments of error summarized as: (A) whether the CA erred in sustaining the validity of AO No. 171; (B) whether Section 477, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code prohibits appointment of a separate local Building Official apart from the City Engineer; (C) whether Rule II, Section 203 of the IRR of the National Building Code authorizes appointment of a separate Building Official and empowers the Secretary of the DPWH to appoint local Building Officials; and (D) whether the CA erred in finding estoppel and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Petitioner's Contentions before the Supreme Court

Petitioner argued that AO 171 was irregular as an exercise of reorganization power absent a proper legislative act and that inclusion of reorganization measures within an appropriation ordinance violated Article VI, Section 26(1) of the 1986 Constitution. He contended that the LGC mandates that the City Engineer shall also act as local Building Official and that the creation of the City Buildings and Architecture Office without placing petitioner as its head contravened Section 477. Petitioner further maintained that the DPWH Secretary’s authority under the NBC did not extend to appointing Building Officials but only to designating them under specified conditions, and that Flores’s appointment was invalid because the position was not vacant. Finally, petitioner asserted that exhaustion of administrative remedies was unnecessary because the issues were purely legal.

Respondents’ Contentions before the Supreme Court

Respondents countered that Section 477 does not prohibit appointment of a separate Building Official and that such provision must be read with Section 205 and Section 203, Rule II of the IRR of the NBC, which allow creation of a distinct Building Official and authorize the DPWH Secretary to appoint one. They emphasized that Flores’s designation and subsequent appointment were validated by the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Budget and Management. The DPWH Secretary argued that he lacked participation in AO 171 and that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering judicial relief premature.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on Justiciability and Mootness

The Court found the petition deficient principally because supervening events rendered the controversy moot and academic. The Court observed that Flores was later appointed Department Head of the City Buildings and Architecture Office, thereby making the temporary designation under AO No. 171 no longer operative. The Court reiterated the settled principle that courts will not decide issues where no actual controversy remains. The Court also declined to sustain a collateral attack on Ordinance No. 01, emphasizing the legal presumption of validity of ordinances and the rule that such validity must be contested in a direct proceeding.

Supreme Court’s Legal Reasoning on Statutory Construction and Authority

Even while dismissing the petition as moot, the Court analyzed the substantive legal question whether a local Building Official may be appointed separate and distinct from the City Engineer. The Court construed the Local Government Code provisions on local organizational authority—particularly Sections 18, 76, and 454—as empowering local governments to design organizational structures and to create offices necessary to carry out city functions, subject to CSC standards. The Court read those provisions harmoniously with the IRR of the NBC, citing Rule II, Section 203

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.