Title
Bernabe vs. Alejo
Case
G.R. No. 140500
Decision Date
Jan 21, 2002
Adrian Bernabe, claiming to be the illegitimate son of the late Fiscal Bernabe, sought recognition and a share in his estate. The Supreme Court upheld his right to file for recognition under the Civil Code, ruling that the Family Code did not impair his vested rights, allowing the action within four years of attaining majority.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 140500)

Factual Background

The complaint alleged that the late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe had fathered a son, Adrian, with his then-secretary, Carolina Alejo. Adrian was born in 1981. After the deaths in 1993 of Fiscal Bernabe and his wife Rosalina, Ernestina Bernabe remained as the sole surviving heir and custodian of the decedent's estate. On May 16, 1994, Carolina, acting for Adrian, sued for declaration of recognition of Adrian as an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and for his share in the estate then held by Ernestina.

Orders of the Trial Court

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. By Order dated July 26, 1995, and an additional Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court held that under the Family Code, specifically Article 175, the action for recognition was barred because the putative father had died and had not executed a written acknowledgment during his lifetime. The trial court ruled that the action should have been filed while the alleged father was alive to afford him the opportunity to affirm or deny paternity.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's dismissal, holding that Adrian, having been born in 1981, fell under the time frame of Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allowed an action for recognition to be brought within four years after attaining majority where the presumed parent died during the child’s minority. The CA concluded that the subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not extinguish the right already granted by Article 285 and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

Issues Presented

Petitioner raised three issues: first, whether respondent had a cause of action for recognition and partition with accounting against petitioner after the putative father's death absent any written acknowledgment of paternity; second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that its remedy survived the Family Code; and third, whether the petition for certiorari was defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as respondent.

Parties' Contentions

Petitioner argued that the Family Code repealed Article 285 and that its provisions should be given retroactive effect so as not to permit posthumous recognition when no written acknowledgment existed. Petitioner relied on Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which require that an action for recognition be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent, and asserted that no vested right accrued under the Civil Code that the Family Code could not alter. Respondent countered that Adrian’s right to bring an action under Article 285 had vested before the Family Code took effect and that the four-year post-majority period remained available to minors whose putative parent died during their minority.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court denied the petition for review and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and resolution. The Court held that the petition lacked merit and that Article 285 of the Civil Code afforded a vested substantive right to minors whose putative parent died during their minority to institute an action for recognition within four years after attaining majority. The Court further held that the petitioner’s failure to implead the Court of Appeals did not constitute reversible error under Rule 45, Rules of Court, because impleading the lower court was no longer required.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court treated Article 285 as substantive rather than merely procedural, applying the test articulated in Fabian v. Desierto to determine whether a rule affects substantive rights. The Court reasoned that a vested right is one absolute and complete in itself and that Adrian’s right to bring the action within four years after majority had vested prior to the Family Code’s enactment. Consequently, Article 255 of the Family Code, which preserves rights already vested at the time of the Code’s effect, prevented the Family Code from impairing the Civil Code remedy. The Court distinguished Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals on the ground that the claimant in that case was no longer a minor when he sought recognition. The Court relied on precedents, notably Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals and Divinagracia v. Rovira, to

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