Title
Bengzon vs. Drilon
Case
G.R. No. 103524
Decision Date
Apr 15, 1992
Retired Justices challenged President Aquino's veto of pension adjustments in the 1992 budget, arguing PD 644's repeal of RA 1797 was invalid. The Supreme Court ruled the veto unconstitutional, upholding retirees' vested rights and fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 103524)

Petitioner Claims and Relief Sought

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the President’s partial vetoes of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for Fiscal Year 1992 that would have funded adjusted pensions for retired Justices pursuant to Republic Act No. 1797 and a prior Supreme Court resolution (Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA). They asserted the vetoes (1) exceeded the Executive’s item-veto power, (2) violated separation of powers, (3) deprived retirees of vested pension rights, and (4) impaired the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy.

Respondents’ Role and Procedural Posture

Respondents are Executive officials responsible for implementing and releasing appropriated funds. The petition was consolidated with Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA (a petition by retired Court of Appeals Justices seeking readjustment of their pensions). The Court treated the OSG’s comments as the government’s answer and resolved the consolidated matters on the merits.

Key Dates and Legislative Background

Relevant statutory and administrative milestones include: Republic Act No. 910 (1953) establishing retirement pensions for Justices; Republic Act No. 1797 (1957) providing for automatic adjustment of those pensions; Presidential Decree No. 644 (1975) purporting to repeal Section 3-A of RA 1797; subsequent presidential decrees restoring pension adjustments for military retirees (PD Nos. 1638 and 1909); Congress’s 1990 effort to reenact RA 1797 (House Bill No. 16297) which the President vetoed; the Supreme Court resolution of November 28, 1991 (AM-91-8-225-CA) authorizing adjusted pension payments; inclusion of implementing provisions in the GAA FY 1992; and the President’s partial veto of specified GAA provisions on January 15, 1992.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Provisions

The Court’s analysis was governed by RA 910 and RA 1797 (pension statutes), Presidential Decrees cited in the factual history, the publication requirement for laws and decrees articulated in Tanada v. Tuvera, and the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution’s pertinent provisions referenced include: Article VI, Section 27(2) (item veto in appropriation, revenue or tariff bills), Article VI, Section 25(5) (authority to augment appropriations for heads of branches and constitutional commissions), and Article VIII, Section 3 (Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy: appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced below the prior year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released).

Factual Summary

RA 910 (1953) granted lifetime pensions based on the salary at retirement; RA 1797 (1957) provided that changes in Justices’ salaries would be deemed the salary for pension purposes, thereby automatically adjusting pensions with salary changes. PD 644 (1975) purported to repeal the adjustment provision, but subsequent evidence showed it was not validly published at the time of promulgation; publication occurred belatedly and backdated in an Official Gazette supplement released in 1983. Congress and the Supreme Court later acted to secure pension adjustments, culminating in the Court’s November 28, 1991 resolution ordering adjustments and Congress’s inclusion of implementing appropriation provisions in the GAA FY 1992.

Administrative Matter and Supreme Court Resolution

In Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA the Court authorized pension adjustments for named retired Justices, ordering their monthly pensions to be adjusted under RA 1797 effective January 1, 1991 and allowing for payment of prior differentials when funds became available. That resolution became the operative judicial determination requiring implementation.

Inclusion and Veto of Appropriations in GAA FY 1992

Congress incorporated specific appropriations and special provisions in the GAA FY 1992 to implement the Court’s resolution and to permit the Chief Justice and the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to augment items from savings to pay adjusted pensions. The President vetoed selected underlined portions and entire sections of those special provisions on the ground that they effectively nullified her earlier veto of HB 16297 and would undermine the policy of standardized compensation.

Issues Presented to the Court

The Court addressed whether the President’s partial vetoes were (1) an impermissible partial veto of parts of an appropriation item, (2) an unconstitutional encroachment on judicial authority and separation of powers by attempting to nullify a prior law and a Supreme Court resolution, (3) a deprivation of vested pension rights under RA 1797, and (4) an impairment of the Judiciary’s constitutionally-mandated fiscal autonomy.

Ruling and Relief

The Court granted the petition: it set aside the President’s challenged vetoes as illegal and unconstitutional, declared the vetoed appropriations provisions valid and subsisting, ordered respondents to automatically and regularly release the funds appropriated for the subject pensions and other Judiciary appropriations pursuant to fiscal autonomy, and directed implementation of the Supreme Court’s Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA resolution.

Item Veto Doctrine and Application

The Court reaffirmed that the President’s item veto power under Article VI, Section 27(2) of the Constitution authorizes veto of particular item(s) in appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills but does not permit vetoing only a part of an indivisible appropriation item or severing portions of an item into vetoed and unvetoed fragments. The Court distinguished between an “item” (a specific, indivisible appropriation of money for a stated purpose) and a “provision” (a legislative method, condition, or authority contained within an appropriation bill). The vetoes at issue struck provisions (methods by which appropriations would be augmented and released), not whole appropriation items, thus exceeding permissible item-veto scope.

Nondelegable Limits: Executive Cannot Repeal Statutes or Set Aside Final Judicial Decisions

The Court held that the President may not, through the veto power, repeal an existing statute enacted decades earlier (RA 1797) nor nullify or set aside a final and executory judgment or resolution of the Supreme Court. The challenged vetoes, premised on the erroneous belief that RA 1797 had been repealed by PD 644 or that the Court’s resolution improperly restored benefits, effectively attempted to achieve by veto what the Executive lacks the power to do—amend or repeal statutes and overturn final judicial determinations.

Validity of PD 644 and Continuance of RA 1797

Applying the publication requirement articulated in Tanada v. Tuvera, and relying on certification that the Official Gazette supplement purporting to publish PD 644 had been actually released only in 1983, the Court concluded that PD 644 never validly became law. Because the alleged repealing decree lacked timely and valid publication, RA 1797 remained effective and continued to confer an entitlement to adjusted pensions. Consequently, Congressional and judicial efforts to restore benefits addressed a problem that, legally speaking, had not existed.

Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary

The Court emphasized the constitutional protection of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy (Article VIII, Section 3), explaining that the Constitution commands that appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced below the previous year and shall be automatically and

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