Title
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 127326
Decision Date
Dec 23, 1999
A meat vendor was electrocuted due to BENECO's gross negligence in maintaining unsafe electrical wiring, violating safety codes. The court held BENECO liable, awarding damages for income loss, moral suffering, and exemplary damages, while reducing some amounts for proportionality.
electrocution
gross negligence
violation

Case Summary (G.R. No. 127326)

Factual Background

For about five years prior to his death, Jose Bernardo managed a stall at the Baguio City meat market. On 14 January 1985, at about 7:50 in the morning, Jose and other vendors left their stalls to meet a jeepney carrying slaughtered pigs so they could select meat for the day’s sale. Jose was the first to reach the parked jeepney. He grasped the handlebars at the rear entrance and was about to lift his right foot to board when he suddenly stiffened and trembled “as though suffering from an epileptic seizure.” Witnesses quickly observed that he was “already turning black.”

The other vendors rushed to Jose and discovered that the jeepney’s antenna, which was bearing the pigs and extending more than his expected safety range, had become entangled with an open electric wire connection located at the top of the roof of a meat stall. One vendor, Romeo Pimienta, used a broom to pry the antenna loose from the open wire. After the antenna was freed, Jose released his hold on the handlebars and slumped to the ground. He died shortly thereafter in the hospital.

The medical cause of death was recorded as “cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to massive brain congestion” with attendant findings, and the history of electrocution was noted.

The Civil Action and Joinder of Parties

On 6 February 1985, Caridad O. Bernardo, as widow of Jose Bernardo, and their minor children Jojo, Jeffrey and Jo-an, filed a complaint before the RTC of Baguio City against BENECO for a sum of money and damages arising from Jose’s electrocution.

Within the same civil action, BENECO filed a third-party complaint against Guillermo Canave, Jr., the owner of the jeepney, seeking to shift liability. Canave also filed a counterclaim, and BENECO similarly asserted a counterclaim against the Bernardos.

RTC Ruling

In its decision dated 15 August 1994, the RTC ruled for the Bernardos and ordered BENECO to pay damages. The RTC awarded, among others: P30,000.00 as compensation for Jose’s death with legal interest from February 6, 1985; P100,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and costs of suit. The RTC dismissed BENECO’s counterclaim against the Bernardos, dismissed BENECO’s third-party complaint against Guillermo Canave, Jr., and dismissed Canave’s counterclaim for lack of merit.

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

Both BENECO and the private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 5 November 1996, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the RTC’s liability determination but modifying the amounts of damages. The CA held BENECO liable and dismissed BENECO’s defenses seeking to attribute the fatal electrocution to the alleged negligence of Canave.

In attacking the appellate ruling, BENECO insisted that its responsibility should not attach because Canave’s act was purportedly the proximate and sole cause, or at least the principal cause, of the electrocution and death.

The Parties’ Positions on Liability and Causation

BENECO argued that the appellate court gravely erred in ordering it to pay damages despite evidence that the electrocution and death of Jose Bernardo were attributable to Guillermo Canave, Jr.’s fault or negligence, particularly that Canave parked the jeepney too close to a market stall and positioned the antenna in a manner that allegedly caused entanglement with an open wire above the stall.

The CA and, in turn, the Supreme Court rejected this theory. The courts emphasized that the central factual circumstances showed electrical hazards created and maintained by BENECO’s installation and failure to ensure safety in its distribution facilities.

Evidence of BENECO’s Negligence and the Court’s Findings

The Supreme Court examined the RTC findings as sustained by the records. The RTC had relied on testimony of Virgilio Cerezo, a registered master electrician and then Chief Electrical Building Inspector of Baguio City, who investigated Jose’s electrocution.

According to the evidence presented, BENECO installed a No. 2 high voltage main wire distribution line and a No. 6 service line to power the temporary meat market on Hilltop Road. The installation included a three-inch G.I. pipe pole with the main line strung above a stall and a service drop line connected thereto. Crucially, the vertical clearance between the No. 2 line and the service line was found to be only eight (8) to nine (9) feet, despite a requirement under the Philippine Electrical Code of a minimum vertical clearance of fourteen (14) feet where wiring crosses a public street.

The evidence likewise showed that the main line connected to the service line was not in a rigid conduit arrangement but was instead totally exposed and without safety protection. The open wire connections were not insulated.

As to the specific mechanism of electrocution, the jeep’s antenna—described as more than eight (8) feet high from the ground—became entangled with the open wire connections, thereby electrically charging the handlebars that Jose held when he attempted to board the jeep.

BENECO’s witnesses, including Vedasto Augusto (an electrical engineer and BENECO’s line superintendent), admitted the general minimum clearance standards for service drop lines but still attempted to minimize BENECO’s responsibility. While Augusto and another witness insisted that the splicing of the service entrance conductor to the service drop line might not have been BENECO’s task, the record revealed that the service drop line passing through a spool insulator extended down so that the exposed splicing point was only about eight (8) feet from ground level. The exposed connection was thus not safeguarded by insulating tape or protective covering.

The Supreme Court treated these findings as establishing BENECO’s gross negligence. It stressed that an electric cooperative with an exclusive franchise does not only distribute electricity; it must also ensure public safety through the proper maintenance and upkeep of its facilities. The failure to keep the splicing point unprotected and uninsulated—despite its proximity to ground and noncompliance with the electrical clearance standards—was characterized as want of even slight care. The Court considered BENECO’s defense that the hazardous condition existed years earlier as further confirmation of its culpable disregard.

Rejection of BENECO’s Attribution to Canave

In addressing BENECO’s attempt to shift causation to Canave, the Supreme Court held that Canave’s alleged act of parking in an area not customarily designated as a parking or loading area was not an independent negligent act of the type contemplated in cases relied upon by BENECO (including Manila Electric Co. v. Ronquillo, 99 Phil. 125 (1956)). The record showed no municipal law or ordinance violated by Canave’s parking act and no foreseeable danger was shown to have resulted solely from parking.

The Court reasoned that no accident would have occurred had BENECO installed its electrical connections in accordance with the prescribed safety standards, particularly with respect to vertical clearance. In short, Canave’s parking was not the operative cause; the decisive factor was the hazardous electrical condition attributable to BENECO.

Damages: Net Income Loss (Life Expectancy and Computation)

BENECO also assailed the CA’s award of P864,000.00 as net income loss for the remaining thirty (30) years of Jose’s life expectancy, arguing that the RTC found no firm basis for that item.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the RTC had disallowed net income loss due to perceived contradictions in the widow Caridad Bernardo’s testimony. It further noted, however, that the CA modified the RTC ruling by relying on the testimony of Rosita Noefe, Jose’s sister, who described Jose’s meat-stall operations and earnings. The CA had used the rulings in Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals and Davila v. PAL to project Jose’s life expectancy and compute the loss. On that approach, the CA assumed a daily net income translating into total net income loss of P864,000.00.

The Supreme Court found that while indemnity for loss of earning capacity was warranted, the CA’s computation required modification. The Court emphasized that the computation is mainly based on: first, the years over which the damages are computed; and second, the rate at which losses are fixed.

Using Jose’s circumstances, namely his age (thirty-three (33)) and status as married with three (3) children, the Supreme Court applied a formula reflected in the text of the decision, arriving at a normal life expectancy of thirty-one and one-third (31-1/3) years, not thirty (30) years as used by the CA. The Court then reduced the life expectancy further based on “the nature and quality of life of a meat vendor,” concluding that it was not reasonable to assume that Jose would work for the full stretch of the remaining years. It therefore reduced the life expectancy to twenty-five (25) years.

On the second factor, the Court treated Rosita Noefe’s testimony as unrebutted and sufficient as a basis for fixing the income rate. The Court quoted the testimony in substance: Jose’s daily income from the stall was stated to range from P150.00 to P200.00 and, after expenses, his daily net income was P70.00 to P80.00. The Court rejected BENECO’s characterization that the heirs failed to establish earning capacity. It found no reason to doubt the testimony given that Rosita owned the same stall business and had firsthand experience with Jose’s operations.

The Court concluded that Caridad’s earlier claims in the complaint, which reflected P150.00 daily earning allegations, contrasted with trial testimony that inflated figures to P300.00 daily. The Court characterized the higher trial figure as potentially an afterthought influenced by the prospect of a larger recovery. It fixed Jose’s daily gross income at P150.00, translating into P54,000.00 yearly gross, and—after deducting necessary living and famil

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