Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

Factual Background

Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, to Filipino parents and was therefore a Filipino citizen at birth under the 1935 Constitution. He enlisted in the United States Marine Corps on November 5, 1985, and, while in service, took an oath of allegiance to the United States and was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), rendering service to the armed forces of a foreign country and taking an oath of allegiance effected loss of Philippine citizenship. After his discharge from the U.S. service, Cruz availed himself of Republic Act No. 2630 and on March 17, 1994 took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registered that oath with the Local Civil Registry, thereby seeking reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He ran for and won the seat as Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Proceedings before the HRET

Petitioner Antonio Bengson III, the defeated incumbent, filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) asserting that Cruz was not a natural-born citizen as required by the Constitution and therefore not qualified to sit in the House. On March 2, 2000 the HRET dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared Cruz duly elected; the HRET denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 27, 2000.

Petition for Certiorari and Issues Presented

Petitioner brought a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court contending that the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion in concluding that Cruz is a natural-born citizen, in recognizing his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship as valid, and in ruling that such reacquisition restored his natural-born status. The central legal question was whether a person who was natural-born, lost Philippine citizenship by acquiring foreign citizenship and thereafter reacquired Philippine citizenship by repatriation can be regarded, for constitutional qualification purposes, as a natural-born Filipino.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner argued that the phrase “from birth” in Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires continuity of citizenship and therefore precludes restoration of natural-born status after an intervening loss and reacquisition; because Cruz at one time became an alien and had to perform acts to reacquire Philippine citizenship, he could not now be treated as a natural-born citizen. Respondent Cruz and the HRET contended that repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630 effects recovery of the original nationality and restores the person to the status he held at birth; the constitutional phrase “from birth” denotes the innate character of being natural-born and does not prevent restoration of that status by lawful reacquisition.

Legal Framework on Acquisition, Loss, and Reacquisition of Citizenship

The Court summarized the relevant law: under the 1987 Constitution, citizens include those who are citizens at adoption of the Constitution, those whose fathers or mothers are citizens, those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elected Philippine citizenship on majority, and those naturalized in accordance with law. Citizenship may be acquired by birth or by naturalization; natural-born citizens are defined as “those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.” Commonwealth Act No. 63 sets out modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired after loss: naturalization, repatriation, and direct act of Congress. Republic Act No. 2630 specifically provides that those who lost citizenship by serving in the U.S. armed forces may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance and registering it with the Local Civil Registry and that the oath shall contain a renunciation of other citizenship.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Ruling

The Court affirmed the HRET. It held that repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630 effects recovery of the original nationality and restores the former status of the person prior to loss of citizenship. The Court reasoned that repatriation is not equivalent to naturalization; it requires an oath and registration but does not subject the applicant to the lengthy procedures and qualifications applicable to naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473. Because Cruz was a natural-born Filipino at birth and because the statute governing his reacquisition did not require him to undergo naturalization, his repatriation restored him to his original status as a natural-born citizen. The Court further observed that under the 1987 Constitution enumeration of citizens there is no separate category for reacquired citizens; the status upon reacquisition depends on the original status and the mode provided by applicable law. Finally, the Court emphasized its limited review of HRET decisions, noting that the HRET is the “sole judge” of contests concerning election and qualifications and that the Court may intervene only for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; no such grave abuse was shown. The petition was dismissed.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Panganiban

Justice Panganiban concurred and elaborated three principal points: first, that repatriation is the recovery of original citizenship and therefore restores original status rather than conferring a new, naturalized status; second, that under the present Constitution a person who is not naturalized qualifies as natural-born because the Constitution’s enumeration leaves only two broad classes of citizens — natural-born and naturalized — and repatriates assume their prior classification; and third, that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion and that judicial interference is proper only where the tribunal’s action is arbitrary, capricious, or in manifest excess of jurisdiction. He also urged that in cases of doubt c